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PREFACE
From 1973 to 1981 I attempted to apply a background of manage-
ment science training and practice to duties in science management
within two international scientific organizations, the East-West Center in
Hawaii and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
in Austria. The experience was stimulating in that both organizations were
supportive of the application of scientific principles in decisionmaking
and in the design of their respective management systems. It was also
frustrating in that I found the problems encountered in the management
of these two organizations intractable by the formal methods with which I
was familiar. During these eight years, I began to gain a deep appreciation
both for the exceptional nature of science management as a problem con-
text indicative of most problems in management science applications
elsewhere, and for the clarity and visibility which science management
offers for new descriptive modeling of decision systems facing rather per-
plexing conditions.
In the summer and fall of 1980. IIASA held two workshops which
helped crystalize my ideas of science management as a problem context
for the further development of management science theory. The first was
on Rethinking the Process of Systems Analysis. and was the initial
workshop in a proposed series examining the potential role of the
behavioral sciences in systems analysis. The second was on the Role of
Analysis in Decisionmaking and was focused on the selected context of sit-
ing decisions for large storage facilities of liquefied energy gases.
Throughout this paper are references to both these workshops and to the
overall work of IIASA as well.
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ABSTRACT
Current trends in the development of management science are
characterized by increasing usage of advanced mathematics and by large
scale computer programs and data structures based on simplistic formu-
lations conforming to the requirements of traditional analytical tech-
niques. What was originally conceived as management aids for practical
operational problems is rapidly becoming an esoteric branch of
mathematics ill-suited to most management concerns and incomprehen-
sible to most managers. Rather than striving to critique and improve
management science's basic assumptions, formulations, and concepts to
reflect more accurately the problem contexts addressed, management
scientists have tended to maintain traditional formulations and concepts,
and concentrated instead on adding new and more complex analytical
procedures to their repertoire. As a consequence, the history of manage-
ment science is filled with both successes and failures, and some consider
the record rather dismal compared to both expectations and potential.
In a second, unrelated context of science management, develop-
ments in theory are Virtually non-existent in the West, the science of sci-
ence is still in its infancy in the Soviet Union and Eastern European coun-
tries, and the practice of science management remains largely a craft
dependent on personal skill and intuition.
These two fields have much to offer each other, though little interac-
tion and mutual interest currently exists. For the development of
management science, science management offers a rich empirical base of
problems and discernible decision processes both requiring and
encouraging the emergence of new analytical formulations for descriptive
and prescriptive studies in decisionmaking. For improvements in science
management, though management science may offer little usefulness as a
-v-
technique-laden scientific approach to rational decisionmaking, it may be
quite helpful as a source of concepts and strategy alternatives to science
managers in particular problem situations.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the prospects that science
management offers as a context for further developments in management
science theory and analytical formulations. These prospects are abundant
largely because of the exceptional nature of science management as a
field clearly incompatible with the assumptions and focus of traditional
management science frameworks. Additionally, current trends in
management science formulations are reflected in many critical issues of
science management, and thus may gain support from studies and
approaches to those issues. Also, other science management problems
require novel analytical approaches and challenge management scientists
to create them. Why has science management been so neglected by
management scientists? How can the obstacles it poses be turned to
opportunities for new theory development? What kinds of developments
can be expected to emerge from a focus on science management prob-
lems? These and other questions are answered in this brief introduction
of science management to management scientists.
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MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND SCIENCE :MANAGEMENT:
PROSPECTS FOR THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Arnold J. Lieberman
DITRODUcnON TO PART I
Management science in the 1960's and 1970's gained considerable
acceptance as a useful discipline for addressing diverse management
problems in a wide variety of settings.l Surveys of usage (cf. Markland
1979.p.17 and Wagner 1970,p.25) attest to the application of management
science techniques in the petroleum. paper, chemical, metal processing,
brewing, food manufacturing, aircraft, rubber, transportation and distri-
bution, mining, textile, cement, glass, computer. electronics, farm and
industrial machinery, motor vehicles. and pharmaceuticals industries, as
well as commercial banks, insurance companies, merchandising com-
panies, and public utilities. Within government, applications are made in
military affairs; health, education. and welfare: air and highway traffic
control; air and water pollution: police and fire protection; voter and
school redistricting: and program budgeting. Early business applications
of management science techniques tended to be found in the manage-
ment functions of production scheduling, inventory control. and forecast-
ing, though current applications are also found supporting management
decisions in plant size and location, new product development, marketing,
lllanagement science is used here in the generic sense also to include operations research,
IIYstems analysis, cost/benefit and cost/effectiveness analysis, systems engineering and en-
gineering economics, decision theory, cybernetic management, and much of applied econom-
ics. Science manaBement refers here to the functions and responsibilities primarily of
research directors, sometimes called science managers. and of science policy advisors and
administrators.
- 2 -
advertising, cash management and finance, investment portfolio manage-
ment, mergers and acquisitions, and short-term and long-range corporate
planning.
Notable in its absence from these lists of applications is the field and
functions of science management, including both research management
and science policy. Moreover, reasons are not completely obvious for the
apparent immunity of science management to the penetration of manage-
ment science ｡ ｰ ｰ ｬ ｩ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ occurring in so many other management func-
tions and settings. However, evidence of this immunity is readily avail-
able and may be associated with a number of circumstances. For exam-
ple, science managers are still far more likely to have been educated in
the field of their respective natural or social science discipline than in
management (Wolfe 1974 and Gibbons 1963). Also, in the United States,
attitudes of science managers and scientists alike tend to reflect disbelief
in the applicability of management science techniques to critical
research management concerns, or even in the idea that science efforts
could be managed in any way comparable to the management of produc-
tion or service delivery. What are the characteristics of science manage-
ment that appear to grevent or at least resist application of management
science approaches? What does science management have to offer as a
problem context?
Reverse Images
Science managers may well know the value of rigorous scientific
methods within the substance of their own fields, yet find themselves in
management positions requiring seemingly new and different tools (a) to
shape consensus on plans and priorities among independently minded
colleagues: (b) to fight off encroaching bureaucracy within their science
organization; (c) to maintain the active support of funding sources and
collaborators; and (d) to attract and motivate highly skilled staff using
only persuasion, personal contacts, and moral commitments to institu-
tional goals. In this particular context, science managers may view the
intellectual and quantitative nature of management science as clinical,
detached, simplistic and naive. and not focused on the more critical
aspects of research management. Scientific methods, though fundamen-
tal to the conduct of scientific research, may seem useless in the
management of it. Similarly,to the practicing management scientists, the
realities of research management or of science policy may seem a
morass of goals that are ambiguous, unoperationaL and often hidden:
dominant personality types: situation resolutions that emerge slowly
more from complex interpersonal interactions or major social move-
ments than from any conscious decisionmaking by science managers or
science policy makers; and loose and fluid organizational couplings that
2T1ro significant exceptions are applications of mana.gement science techniques to research
and development (R&D) project selection and to R&D program planning. both found witlrin
ｾ ｡ ｲ ｧ ･ scale industrial or military research efforts.
Many authors identify unique characteristics of R&D management (cf. White 1975,p.2,252
and Freeman 1977), but. do not assess the appropriateness of rnana.gement science ap-
proaches to its problems.
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defy hierarchy or the identification of the locus of authority.
Yet in the contrast of these images lies the source of potential
mutual insight. Research management and science policy offer to
management scientists application contexts that provide greatest expo-
sure to the inherent difficulties, ambiguities, and overly simplifying
assumptions of present management science methodologies and applica-
tions. Equally important, the reconceptualizations and broadening of per-
spectives that are now occurring in management science offer to the sci-
ence manager insights into the complexities of managing his science
organization and to the alternative strategies available to him as
manager. Some of the potential contributions that management science
and science management offer to each other, especially with regard to
theory development in management science, are explored in the following
chapters.
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CHAPfER 1
IlANAGEMENT SCIENCE: AN OVERVIE1r
Hundreds of texts and articles on topics of management science are
now available, each with its own set of terms defining the nature of
management science and many claiming definition a futile exercise. This
paper will make no attempt to resolve the differing opinions on definition
nor will it be comprehensive in presenting all points of view. Rather, it will
consider the totality of approaches under the generic label of manage-
ment science and focus on fundamental characteristics as presented in
basic texts published in the United States and Great Britain.
Fundamental Concepts
Management science is described as being, or being concerned with,
the application of the scientific method to problems in management. Text
authors have included in their definition that the problems addressed by
management science are embedded in systems, and that this ?,stems
approach is fundamental to the management science method. Some
have also stressed the interdisciplinary nature of management science
as ｾ important component, especially in the operations research con-
text. Some also argue that a fundaLLlental component of the scientific
method and therefore of management science is the use of models as
lEmphasis on systems is found, for example, in the introductory books of Ackoff and Sasieni
&l966,p.7); Markland (l979,p.7); and Ignazio and Gupta (l975,pp.lQ-ll).
See, for example, Markland Ｈ ｬ Ｙ Ｗ Ｙ Ｌ ｰ ｾ Ｖ Ｉ and Ackoff and Sasieni (l96a,p.7).
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representatives of the system addressed, 3 though others are quick to
point out that model-building, th.ough essential, is not the central focus of
the approach (Tomlinson 1979). Finally, most all introductions to
management science texts have portrayed the purpose of management
science as an aid to decisionmakirtg or problem solving4
Some authors of management science texts argue strongly that
management science is not simply a collection of tools, techniques, or
methods, but that it is a perspective or approach to solVing problems,
and that to separate the methods from the perspective or approach
would be to relegatlf> the management scientist to the role of technician
rather than analyst However, according to Drucker (1974,p.507), most
managers continue to view the management sciences as a set of tools,
and few have acquired the skills to use them effectively.
Traditional Steps in the Management Science Approach
Text authors also differ in the detail in which they describe the
requisite steps or stages in applying management science as a method,
but usually include the following four in one manner or another:
[1] Formulating the Problem: determining relevant characteristics or
measures of the problem or of system performance relating to the
problem; determining who are the relevant decisionmakers. and
what choices they have or system variables they may effect: and
determining what measures would indicate effects of system perfor-
mance and problem solution.
[2] Constructing a Model of the system in which the problem is embed-
ded.
[3] Using the Model to test hypotheses or derive solutions; including
activities of data collection and manipulation. sensitiVity analysis,
and model validation.
[4] Identifying Solutions or conclusions and communicating them;
including in some cases. testing the associated solutions in the real
system rather than only in the modeled one, establishing controls to
maintain system stability during implementation, and recommend-
ing to gecisionmakers the course of action suggested by the
analysis.
3See• for e:zample, Wagner (1970,p.9); Littlechild (1977.p.23); Ackoff and Sasieni (1968,p.9);
ｾ ｡ ､ ･ and Boucher (1968,p.ll); Markland (1979,pp.8-II); and Stainton (1977).
Decisionmaldn8 and problem solving are sometimes used interchangeably. However, em-
phasis on management science as an aid to decisionmaking is found, for example, in W8Bner
(1970,p.4) and Quade and Boucher (196B,p.2); and emphasis as an aid to problem solving is
;ound in Markland (1979,p.3) and Ackoff and Sasieni (I96B,p.6).
Rejection of man8&ement science simply as a collection of techniques is found, for example,if Ignazio and Gupta (1975,pp.I0,25); Markland (1979,p.7)i and Quade and Boucher (196B,p.2).
Implementation, evaluation, and subsequent recyclings are additional components of the
decisionmaldng process, and many authors include implementation as part of the manage-
ment science approach. However, because implementation responsibilities are predominant-
ly those of the decisionmaker rather than of the analyst (though the latter may assist), im-
plementation is not included here as one of the traditional steps.
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The applicability of management science to various contexts. including
those of research management and science policy formulation. depends
to a large extent on how well these steps are able to be performed within
the relevant context. For the second step. that of constructing a model.
this is determined primarily by the availability of techniques and model
forms which match the problem and system characteristics. One manage-
ment science text (Buffa and Dyer 1978) illustrates this matching by con-
fining the characteristics of the problem/system to include (a) the
nature of the environment as either certain or risky; (b) the nature of
relationships among problem/system elements; and (c) whether there is
a clearly defined. quantifiable function of the decision variables to be
maximized or minimized. The corresponding management science
approaches or models useful in various combinations of these
problem/system characteristics are reproduced in Table 1 on the follow-
ing page. This illustration is neither comprehensive nor does it imply that
there is a best model framework for any situation. If anything. it portrays
the severe limits on problem/system variation within which most avail-
able model frameworks lie.
Traditional Assumptions Underlying Management Science
Three fundamental assumptions underlie the management sciences
as traditionally practiced. (1) Management decisionmaking or problem
solving is basically a rational process and accordingly seeks and uses
processes of rational analysis. Management science is therefore
presented as a rational approach to identifying problem solutions or
evaluating decision alternatives. (2) Management science's two primary
criteria for evaluating alternatives have traditionally been those of effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Efficiency is simply a measure of output per
input, or productivity. in either monetary or physical terms. Management
science applications in industry, military. and government settings have
traditionally focused on identifying solutions which are efficient. Effec-
tiveness is the degree of attainment of output or accomplishment of
objectives. This may include using multiple and also conflicting objec-
tives. and by considering the trade-offs among them. determining an
overall most effective ｳ ｯ ｬ ｵ ｴ ｾ ｮ Ｎ (3) Management science has traditionally
been prescriptive in nature.
Challenges to the usefulness of management science are often based
on challenges to the realism or appropriateness of these underlying
assumptions. Chapter 4 describes some of the current trends in manage-
ment science toward adopting alternative assumptions.
7Chacko (1976.p.123) emphasizes. "An OR/SA (Operations Research/Systems Analysis) study
is not aD academic exercise in which the pursuit of truth is an avowed objective. The end-
product 15 a recommendation; preferably to do something, or not to do somet1tin8, which was
not otherwise obvious." Specifically, Chacko defines "Operations Research is the heuristic art
of prescriptive application of the scientific method to executive-type problems.. ."(p.12).
Wagner (1970,p.5) adds that the principle results of management science studies must have
"direct and unambiguous implications for executive action."
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Table 1
Matching Management Science Approaches
to Specific Objectives and Assumptionsa
Management
Science
Approach:
Objective: Assumption
About the
Environment:
Relationships Among
Variables Can Be
Characterized By:
Probability and Maximize Riskyb
Expected Value; Expected
or Decision Trees Value
Evaluative Models Maximize Either
Based on Utility Expected Certain or
Functions Utility Risky
Forecasting Minimize Risky
Techniques Forecast
Error
Mathematical Models Understand Certain
to Predict System Dynamics;
Performanc e (Markov Test Sensitivity
Chains. Queuing to Changes
Theory, Simulation)
Optimizing Maximize or Certain
Models (Linear minimize a or Risky
Programming, function of
Regression, etc) the decision
variables
Network Models Maximize or Certain
(PERT/CPM) minimize a
function of
the decision
variables
Outcomes derived
from predictive models.
optimizing models, or
subjective estimations
Outcomes derived
from predictive models,
optimizing models, or
subjective estimations
Statistical Measures
State Transition
Probabilities;
Single and Multiple
Waiting Lines and
Service Facilities
Linear
(or more complex)
algebraic
expressions
Networks
of activities
linked by
prerequisite
relationships
aAdapted from Buffa and Dyer (1978, Table 16-1, p.478) where a similar table is used to iden-
tify text chapters correspondin& to different management science approaches described in
the text.
bRisky is meant to imply both that more than one future state may occur and that through
past experience or judgment, meaningful probabilities to each can be assigned.
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Ba.sic Limita.tions
Researchers and practitioners of management science, as well as
users. are quick to point out the inherent limitations of its approach.
Some of the more basic limitations are described below:
[1] Management science results cannot be the sole basis for decision-
making or problem solving in any real situation no matter how
sophisticated the analysis. Results of rational analysis are only part
of the total input to any decision or problem situation involving peo-
ple. institutions, and social contexts. Management science is no sub-
stitute for managers. nor can its analytical frameworks take every-
thing into account.
[2] Solutions found to the modeled problem/system are not necessarily
solutions to the real situation. The important question is whether any
improvements to the real situation can be generated by actions
based on solutions to the model.
[3] Despite the tremendous number of instances of management science
applications to date. there are still few standard model frameworks
or techniques for ready application. Most model formulations are
tailor-made to a large degree (Wagner 1970.p.B).
[4] Tailor-made models emphasize that much of management science is
still an art or craft requiring creativity. ingenuity. and competency
in model design. Talent needed to develop or adapt appropriate
models may not be readily available in any problem situation, or may
be available only at high cost.
[5] As a consequence of [3] and [4]. applications of management science
usually involve fairly large efforts and corresponding costs. A survey
in the early 1970's of the top five hundred U.S. corporations found
that the average duration of management science projects was about
ten months, and that an average of 2.5 people were assigned (Mark-
land 1979,p.632). In another source (Wagner 1970,p.53B). most opera-
tions research projects are estimated to require two to three man-
years and three to four months time. However, when relevant com-
puter programs are available. and relevant data are accessible, and
problem formulations adequately fit the models programmed, then
costs of analysis may be only a few hundred dollars (Buffa and Dyer
197B,p.474).
[6] Models using subjective or probabilistic inputs generate outputs
which are also only probabilistic at best. No systems involving human
interactions are purely deterministic. Consequently, in any social
system, there are no guarantees of anticipated sysaem performance,
despite the scientific method of analysis employe d.
[7] Problems in social systems, particularly in human services areas
including that of research, often pose additional difficulties for
management science applications. These include: (a) unavailability of
data critical to the systems analysis; (b) poor validity or reliability of
BOne of the most delightful footnotes regarding reasonable probabilities associated with hu-
man behavior is in Quade and Boucher (1968,p.355). In true Damon Runyan fashion, we are
advised, "Nothing what depends on humans is worth odds of more than 8 to 3."
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the data over time; and (c) problems of confounding effects caused
by multiple influences on and by the group of people involved in the
system (Hershkowitz and Spindler 1975,p.396).
[8] Management science approaches to situations involving many
independent decisionmakers are still not formulated well, though
situations of multiple objectives for a single decisionmaker or deci-
sion group have been addressed by many authors in the last few
years (cf. Bell eLal. 1977). For cases of multiple decisionmakers, the
critical problem is to determine whose trade-off preferences to use,
or more generally, how to construct aggregate preference functions.
[9] Further limitations to problem formulation, often severe in complex
social systems, occur when goals and objectives are imprecise, uno-
perational, and unable to be quantified, or when measures of system
performance or effectiveness are lacking. Psychological concepts,
for example, pose severe measurement problems.
[10] Finally, there are limitations within the management science profes-
sion itself. especially with regard to attempted applications in social
system contexts. These include: (a) tendencies of analysts grounded
in quantitative manipulation of hard data to avoid, or to treat with
suspicion, social science conc epts and measures; (b) tendencies of
analysts to use sophisticated mathematical methods whether
required by the particular problem context or not; (c) predisposi..,
tions of analysts toward precision in quantitative measures. when
decisionmakers may be more concerned with and sensitive to the
non-quantifiable factors; and (d) tendencies of analysts to lack fami-
liarity with the subject matter of the social system context and with
social science methodology (Hershkowitz and Spindler 1975,p.395).
As noted in the preVious section. the applicability and appropriateness of
management science methods in various management contexts depends
to a large extent on the relevance of the traditional assumptions listed
earlier. Additionally, applicability of management science depends on the
degree to which the methodological limitations listed above are signifi-
cant factors in the problem context.
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CHAPrER2
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The term science management is used here to refer to two rather
separate activities. The first is the management of scientific activity
within a laboratory. a research-related corporate division, or a scientific
institution. This is commonly referred to as research management or R&D
management. Of interest in this paper is the person at the head of the
research unit; his management problems, and the methods or knowledge
available to him to assist in problem resolutions. The second activity is
the formation of national or international policy governing or at least
influencing the growth, distribution, funding, and focus of scientific
activity among the many scientific institutions affected by that policy.
The relevant managers for this paper in this case are the science agency
administrators and policy advisors who shape science policy. Both
research management and science policy strive for the advancement of
knowledge and its application to human needs. Both are also concerned
with incentives, capital resources and their allocation, and the productive
use of scientific talent, among other indirect objectives such as economic
development and national security. Few applications of the methodolo-
gies of management science are evident in either of these two kinds of
activities, at least within the West, and with the exceptions footnoted ear-
lier. The following sections examine the major characteristics of each
activity as an aid to understanding why.
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RESEARCH MANAGEMENT
Research is search for the unknown. The generation of knowledge
happens mostly by meticulous applications of scientific methods, some-
times by serendipity, frequently by the support of large numbers of
independent approaches, sometimes by the effort of large coherent
national programs, and sometimes not at all despite huge investments
and elaborate forethought. For these reasons, research management has
been compared to gambling, or worse, "taking incalculable risks for
unassessable rewards" (Bernal quoted in White 1975,p.ll). Science as a
creative process may be seen as impervious to control or management.
Arguments for such views are based on the nature of research as a pro-
ductive enterprise, and the resulting problems of research management
which differ from problems in other management contexts. Among these
are the allegiance of scientists to a discipline and its career stability out-
side the employing organization; difficulties in evaluating progress, pro-
bability of success, usefulness of results, and required resources; and the
tendency to reject bureaucratic authority as the proper basis for
decisionmaking in scientific matters (White 1975,pp.2, 252).
In scientific organizations, traditional management functions such as
marketing or aspects of finance are either handled by host organizations,
are substituted by other science related activities such as publication
and proposal writing, or are considered necessary but not priority items
for management attention. As yet there is no clear and comprehensive
listing of the functions or responsibilities of research managers. However,
different listings from different perspectives offer insight into the com-
plexities and ill-defined nature of the research management process.
functions and. Responsibilities oj Research Management
Some articles on research management highlight the role of the
research manager as the bridge between top-level goals and concerns of
either the corporate host, the board of governors, or the institution
founders on the one hand; and the individual interests and initiatives of
the scientific staff on the other (Churchman 1970 and White 1975,p.184).
According to Churchman, such a role requires the research manager to
be "sanely schizophrenic" by holding simultaneously two partially con-
flicting value systems and views of the organization. Within this perspec-
tive, the functions of research management may be divided first into
those responsibilities related to overall institutional concerns, such as (1)
keeping higher level management informed of the scientific climate of
relevant substantive and methodological advances, of contextual oppor-
tunities for new research, and of the organization's related technical
competitive position; (2) developing research plans to meet institutional
goals; and (3) maintaining good working relations with other institutional
divisions or collaborating organizations. In contrast are those responsibil-
ities related directly to scientific personnel, such as (1) hiring, firing, and
promotion; (2) establishing an organizational structure and set of task
assignments; (3) developing policies for recruiting and training; (4) deter-
mining or recommending appropriate renumeration and other incentive
systems; and (5) developing a style of management conducive to indivi-
dual creativity, initiative, enthusiasm, and focus on project objectives,
- 15-
time constraints and financial limitations.
Activities of science managers within national funding agencies pro-
vide a second, more procedural view of research management focused
primarily on the program of research rather than on the organizational
setting or the interactions among scientific performers. In one typology
(Wirt et.al. 1975). the research management process is divided into three
categories of activities: program planning, program management, and
program evaluation. Program planning is composed of (a) determination
of priorities among programs; (b) detection and incubation of new pro-
gram ideas: (c) determination of an initial program strategy, intrapro-
gram objectives, and the relative priorities among objectives; and (d) con-
tinual reassessment and readjustment of intraprogram objectives and
priorities. Program management consists of project generation, project
selection, project monitoring, project utilization, and project evaluation.
Program evaluation consists of assessment of substantive and managerial
accomplishments and deficiencies; and recommendations for changes in
program objectives, priorities, management, and organization.
A third perspective is related to the spe cial problems of managing
international cooperative research, where attention to interpersonal
interactions is especially important. Wilson (1980) defines these problems
as (a) those arising from national ethnocentrism about definition of sci-
ence terms, relevant problem dimensions, and professionally appropriate
ways of investigation; (b) those relating to appropriate involvement of
international team members so that research is a cooperative and
reciprocal enterprise rather than a form of academic imperialism; (c)
those arising when team members are spread geographically and have
unequal financing and scientific resources available to them; and (d)
those arising from social and cultural differences which affect percep-
tions of what constitutes effective work arrangements. In the highly prob-
lematic context of international research, effective management requires
attention and appropriate responses to situations that may emerge from
these mant' sources of conflict and that may affect research performance
adversely.
Finally, whether within a host organization or heading a separate
scientific institution, research managers often engage in both
entrepreneurial activity and in activity to restrain, avoid, or cope with
crises. More time and effort may be spent on creating opportunities for
research efforts; building contacts with prospective funding sources,
potential users of results, and potential collaborating institutions; and
containing crises brought on by overly influential outside non-scientific
elements, fear of loss of financial or technical base. or any number of rea-
sons, than on all the routine proc edural elements of research manage-
ment listed earlier. All the different views expressed above are combined
in brief form in Table 2.
lSome of the situations Wilson describes as requiring effective management response in
international cooperative R&D projects are: situations in which project members are un-
cooperative in taking others' views into consideration duriIl8 the problem formulation
stages; situations in which project members differ in how they assign accountability to each
other for the tasks they have to do; and situations in which project members expect dif-
ferent kinds of professional recognition for their work in the project.
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Table 2
Aspects of Research Management
Functions and Responsibilitiesa
Entrepreneurial Aspe cts
Creating Opportunities for Research by Matching Interests of Sup-
porters to Capabilities of the Organization
Attracting and Hiring the Key Research Staff
Building Cooperative Links with Others
Executive Aspectsb
Maintaining Effective Liaison with the Board or Host Organization
Conceptual Planning of Major Research Programs
Budgeting and Major Resource Allocation Decisions
Designing the Basic Organization Structure
Evaluating Progress and Continuing Potential of Major Programs
Establishing Policies on Recruiting, Publications, and Job Security
Psychotherapeutic Aspects
Inspiring Staff to Creative Work
Motivating Staff to Hard Work of High Standards
Providing a Supportive Environment for Creative Scientific Work
Resolving Major Disagreements among Key Scientific Staff. Research
Leaders. or Collaborating Partners
Crises and Perennial Problems Aspects
Responding to or Preventing External and Internal Crisis Situations
Responding to Perennial Concerns (expressed by those outside the
research organization) of costs, efficiency, equities, etc. c
aThis is a highly condensed outline of functions and responsibilities either listed in the text
or implied by it. Little if any literature is available on either the entrepreneurial aspects or
the crisis and perennial problem aspects of research management, though personal experi-
ence within various research organizations leads me to believe that the bulk of time spent by
the research director is on these two aspects, especially the latter.
bplaIlIlin&, budgeting, resource allocation, and evaluation are the functions traditionally
thought most amenable to support from the management sciences. In fact, few applications
are made within the context of research management, with exceptions noted in the text. Wirt
et.al. (1975) provide additional detail on actual management practices used within the exe-
cutive aspects, for some U.S. federal research agencies.
cResponses may include, for example, conducting comprehensive internal administrative re-
views, cooperating with an assortment of external reviewers, and initiating structural reor-
gani2ations to symbolize attention focus on the concerns expressed.
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Required Competencies oj the Research Manager
What does it take to fulfill these disparate functions and responsibili-
ties? A business magazine article listed the attributes of research
managers seen as most important. They included technical knowledge
and ability; ability to get along with people; and conceptual ability, with
the relevant importance of each depending partly on the level of manage-
ment. To this list were added eight other attributes selected by the Indus-
trial Research Institute (IRI) Research Management Study Group as being
most important to a research director: decisiveness, leadership (inspira-
tional rather than coercive), flexibility and understanding in order to deal
with the unpredictable; tempered optimism; independent drive; energy;
articulateness; and ability to initiate and to project into the future (Bowie
1964).
In the context of international collaborative research, characteris-
tics noted by Wilson (19BO) as contributing to effective research manage-
ment are flexibility; patience; openness to change and to others' points of
view; ability to deal with ambiguous situations, different communication
styles, and interpersonal conflict; self-confidence and professional secu-
rity; and ability to show little tension in difficult relations with others and
to manage personal stress well.
Research managers themselves sometimes have lists of characteris-
tics required of them in their jobs of of others in similar roles. Levien
(19BO), listing desirable qualifications for his successor as director of the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), includes: (a)
dedication to the ideals and goals of the institution: (b) haVing a vision of
the research organization's further development that is consistent with
that of the governing board or host institution; (c) experience with the
scientific subject content; (d) experience with managing research
(applied and interdisciplinary in this case); (e) combining a dedication to
excellence with a tolerance for diversity; (f) leadership without egoism
(ability to help others flourish rather than overshadowing them); (g)
experience as a manager of funds and facilities; and (h) willingness to
serve as research manager for an extended term.
Others searching to fill a position of research director may seem
extreme in the qualifications they seek. Sproull et.al. (1976) cite a memo
from the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Health. Education, and Welfare stat-
ing that the first director for the U.S. National Institute of Education
(NIE) , responsible for coordinating all U.S. educational research, should
be:
[1] A humanist...who never loses sight of the gravity and
immediacy of the human problems whose solutions our
research seeks.
[2] An eminent scientist...who can elicit the support of
researchers and practitioners, as well as direct the attention
of other intellectuals currently outside the education re search
area to the solution of education's important problems ...
[3] A capable administrator and representative ...with
-.
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experience in administering large scale research projects or
similar undertakings ... and able to articulate (NIE's) mission
and its value to the remainder of the government and the gen-
eral public.
[4] Politically neutral or independent... (pp.115-116)
In these and other listings of required skills in research management, lit-
tle mention is made explicitly of ability in rational analysis iIla generaL
and of knowledge of or use of management science in particular.
SCIENCE POLICY
A clear definition of science policy is as elusive as one for manage-
ment science. For example, former U.S. Science Advisor Edward David
views science policy as concerned with the infrastructure of science as an
enterprise; with science manpower, education, technological project
management, science communication, etc. (David 1973). Salomon of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines
science policy as the collective means or interventions taken by govern-
ment both to encourage the development of science and to exploit its
results for general political objectives (Salomon 1977,p.45). A similar
view is expressed by Soviet Deputy Chairman of Science and Technology
Gvishiani (1973.p .175) when defining science policy within the Soviet per-
spective as the system of government measures aimed at directing scien-
tific activities. In these views, developing and implementing science poli-
cies addresses similar basic concerns at the national or international
level as research management does at the level of the individual scientific
organization.
Attention to science policy has gained importance only within recent
decades. Science policy goals and roles within different national settings
have also shifted substantially during this time, and continue to do so in
response to changes in social and economic concerns, and issues of
national security. At different times and to different degrees, U.S. sci-
ence policy goals have emphasized military preparations (weapons
development), national standing (space race), national economic growth
and productivity (including related responses to energy needs), improve-
ments in health and disease control (establishment of the National Insti-
tutes of Health and the National Cancer- Institute), and both viability of
the nation's scientific community and protection of the nation's popula-
tion against risks and misuses of science. This last concern of public pro-
tection from science is seen by Nelkin (1979,pp.l0-15) as arising from: (a)
.public unease and fear of potential health ｾ ､ environmental risks result-
ing from scientific advances (such as those stemming from nuclear and
recombinant DNA research); (b) fear of Illisuse or harmful applications of
-, . 2Wolf (1974) ｯ ｢ ｟ ｳ ･ ｾ ･ ｳ the ､ ｾ ｩ ｣ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ･ ｳ that scientists:or ｾ ｮ Ｘ ｩ ｮ ･ ･ ｲ ｳ turned science managers
..- face L and recommends mid-career trainfrig, for those who make this transition, in both
-: :br.oader aspects of science and science policy as. well as managerial skills in organization,
..; - ｾ｢ｴｩ､Ｘ･ｴｨｴｧＬ and personnel. -
..'
.. -
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science (as from genetic engineering and social or behavior control); and
(c) protection of individual freedom of choice against exposure to possi-
ble harm or inconvenience in order to benefit a larger community or
society as a whole (as in regulations regarding fluoridated water, air bags,
and prohibitions of saccharin).
Elements and Issues oj Science Policy
Like research management but on a national scale, science policy is
concerned with allocation of resources, provision of a supportive environ-
ment for creative work, building cooperative links, assigning priorities for
major research thrusts, attracting, training, and motivating scientists,
and responding to prevailing concerns and crises. Also, as in research
management, science policy instruments and interventions are largely
indirect. Incentives in science policy usually operate on organizations in
forms of tax policies. federal standards and regulations, differential finalf
cial support, and the creation of mission-oriented scientific institutions.
No comprehensive listing of science policy issues, elements, or major
questions exists in the literature, nor may one be possible given the
rapidly changing nature and focus of science policy even within a single
nation. However, Table 3 on the folloWing page prOVides a sample of some
of the more important issues or elements which have been addressed
either explicitly or implicitly by science policies as background to later
assessments of the possible role of management science concepts in con-
tributing to the formation of science policy.
Basic Assumptions Underlying Science Policy
Four basic assumptions give rise to the many issues of Table 3 and
explain why science policy has gained the importance it has today. The
first is that applications of science can indeed be directed to practical
needs. The history of science is full of evidence to this effect. However.
for reasons listed earler regarding public risks and fears, whether science
has and always will be directed toward positive ends with positive results
is a matter or public contention, at least in the U.S. Nevertheless. sci-
ence continues to be regarded, according to former U.S. congressman
Emilio Daddario (1973), as a natural national resource.
The second basic assumption of science policy is that science is an
important national resource. In other words, science has become suffi-
ciently important and useful to make significant differences in matters of
economic development. military superiority, and world standing, or that
it can help solve important problems or help meet important national
goals. Again, history offers much evidence in support of this assumption.
3Incentives may also be applied to the overall class of scientists within a nation. In the
U.S.S.R., added indirect incentives include the hish prestige and privileges given to scientists
relative to other occupational groups. In the U.S., relative salaries and perceived status of
scientists is not as high, though scientists generally do enjoy relative autonomy in their work
compared with professionals in profit-oriented organizations.
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Table 3
Science Policy Issues,
Elements, and Questions Addressed
How Much and What Kinds of Science Are Needed
[1] In what directions and to what extent should science be developed;
e.g. related to military objectives, energy goals, space and aeronau-
tics, medicine, and related to basic and applied research.
[2J What should be the proper balance or allocation in manpower and
funds for science objectives and other social objectives.
[3] What kinds of research should not be done.
[4] To what international goals should international scientific activities
be directed, and with what priority.
[5] What supply and training of scientific manpower is required.
How Are These Decisions to be Made
[lJ Are the crucial policy choices to be made by experts serving as sci-
ence advisors, or through the participatory processes of public
representation, or by government bureaucrats or appointed science
a.gency heads.
[2] Should the directions of research be left to the community of indivi-
dual scientists funded by grants from general research budgets, or
should it be directed toward specific national needs.
[3] What are the criteria and procedures to be used for selecting and
funding major scientific programs (big science) as well as small
research grants (little science) and international activities.
What Mechanisms Are Appropriate
[1] What institutional arrangements are best for science policy formula-
tion; for prOViding scientific information, consultation, and advice to
government; and for coordinating scientific activities.
[2J Which methods for deciding budget allocations are most appropriate
to overall science goals: formula allocations, distributions based on
individual merit as judged by peer review systems, or other methods.
[3] What forms of relations should exist between government and
academia and what mechanisms are most appropriate to the rela-
tions: e.g. research grants or contracts, advisory systems, cross
nows of personnel.
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Table 3 (cont.)
[4] Should government support of basic research in universities be
through institution grants, or grants to individuals, or both.
[5] When and to what extent should research be done by government-
owned laboratories and research institutions.
[6] What forms of relations should exist between industry and academia,
and what government mechanisms are most appropriate to develop
them.
[7] What kinds of mechanisms or strategies (such as tax incentives or
standards) should be used to direct scientific effort without stifling
its development.
[B] What organizational mechanisms are best for planning, coordinating,
and implementing international scientific programs.
What is the Proper Role of the Federal Government
[1] Who should pay for what kinds of science efforts (in particular, in
what conditions is government funding justified).
[2] What aspects of science development should be centrally ｰ ｬ ｡ ｮ ｮ ･ ｾ
and what organizational forms are best suited for science planning.
Also, to what degree should government support civilian industrial
research (to help cover high-cost risks).
[3] What is the proper balance of centralized support and control of sci-
ence versus pluralistic and decentralized support and control.
[4] How important is the geographic placement of scientific institutions
to both scientific and other goals of regional development and equity.
[5] To what extent should scientific relations with other countries be
supported.
[6] To what extent should science policy itself be well formulated (how
desirable is a strong coordinated government-industrial-academic
complex).
[7] How far should government go in financing applications and commer-
cializations of re search results in efforts to stimulate industrial inno-
vation.
•Naturally, these and related questions of centralization versus decentralization and autono-
my in science planning are dependent upon national political contexts.
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The third assumption is that without the government support and inter-
ventions which comprise science policy, integration of science efforts and
their focus on national priorities would not be achieved, and so the use-
fulness of science as an important national resource would be less than it
would otherwise be with effective science policies. This is the heart of the
Soviet rational for centrally planned science and the assumption underly-
ing such V.S. programs as Resources Applied to National Needs (RANN)
within the National Science Foundation. Corollary arguments are made to
support science policies as the basis for effective information exchange
and accumulation across national sectors, for international pooling of sci-
ence experience, for standardization of methods and definitions, and for
effective utilization of expensive equipment which without proper exter-
nal coordination of interests would neither be made available to anyone
lab on the basis of its own needs nor fully utilized.
The final basic assumption leading to the issues of Table 3 is that the
principle mechanisms for shaping and developing scientific contributions
toward national goals are the indirect influences of institutional arrange-
ments, funding procedures, tax and regulatory provisions applied to
scientific activity, and other forms of incentives.·ln other words, scientific
advances and applications cannot be legislated or managed in the tradi-
tional direct manner used in the creation of laws or the production of
physical goods.
Certainly these are not the only assumptions underlying U.S. or
other nation's science policy, but they are probably the most fundamen-
tal ones. Other assumptions. however, may help explain more clearly the
particular funding patterns or justifications of public support for science
efforts, such as the controversial "spin-off" and "trickle down" assump-
tions of U.S. supported defense and space research efforts in the 1960's.
All underlying assumptions in any national context are important in that
they shape the issues addressed and may also determine to a great
extent the science choices made.
Formulation of Science Policy
Many of the characteristics of research management listed earlier
are reflected at the national level in the formulation of science policy.
Research managers rely on their ability to solicit and understand the
diverse interests and perspectives of the scientific staff and others, and
to develop agreements which accommodate both these and institutional
objectives. Similarly. science policy formulation involves the solicitation
of opinions from throughout the scientific community and the coordina-
tion of views into an expression of policy. Coordination. persuasion, and
agreement are integral parts of both processes. Making and implement-
ing major decisions in both research management and science policy is
usually a lengthy process of multiple discussions and approvals. Science
policy formulation may require years. Big science projects in the V.S.
involving millions of dollars may take three to thirteen years to pass suc-
cessfully through the stages of receiving support from the scientific com-
munity. acquiring design specifications and cost estimates. being
accepted into the national budget request, receiving authorizations and
appropriations for funding, and beginning actual construction (York
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1973). Science policy postures regarding the use of nuclear energy. for
example, may require even longer to stabilize, with several changes in
government stance along the way.
Part of the reason for the length of the process is that science policy
is basically a political process. The amount of national funds to be pro-
vided in support of science is a political decision. Similarly, the federal
support of science applications to specific military development projects
or major alternative energy projects are also political choices. Two addi-
tional characteristics of decisions of science policy add further length in
time and substantial controversy to the political processes involved. The
first is that science policy decisions usually involve highly technical con-
siderations and that current knowledge of the technologies employed is
less than perfect. This is particularly true in the cases of advanced tech-
nology projects with low probabilities of very high cost and harmful
accidents. In these situations, technical assessments from various
interested parties may differ widely in, the estimates they provide. lend-
ing a great deal of confusion and mistrust to the political procedures
involved. The second characteristic adding to the length of the process, at
least in the U.S., is that science policy formulation is often a form of
adversary politics in which parties are arguing about different and often
incomparable things. In these situations, scientific advice, national
agency objectives. societal interests. and local community concerns
create such a confusion of interests and assessments that those involved
in making policy choices are hard pressed to find either rational
processes on which to rely. or procedures politically acceptable to all
parties with which to reach some consensus position.4
Processes of science policy formulation are by no means uniform
across nations or across situations within anyone nation. A process of
referendum for deciding continued construction of nuclear power plants
is used by some countries and not by others, and by some U.S. states and
not by others. The role and importance of technical analyses. policy ana-
lyses, environmental impact assessments, and hazard analyses varies
widely from case to case. Even mechanisms for routine decisions are sub-
ject to challenge. Periodically within the U.S., attacks are made on peer
review as the primary process wiShin national science agencies for review-
ing individual science proposals. The substance of these attacks may be
on peer review as a form of inbreeding of ideas and of focusing support to
only a limited set of prominent individuals. or for supporting science for
its own sake to too great an extent (Price 1976,p.l03). Even the need for
scientific advisors to government is continually challenged as. in the U.S.,
the position of Science Advisor to the President and various Science Com-
mittees are created, disbanded, and created anew.
40ne example of science policy formulation exhibitinB all these characteristics and for which
research is currently being conducted at IIASA concerns the sit.i..n8 of liquefied energy gas fa-
gilities in relation to nearby residential communities (Lathrop 1976).
A description of peer review as practiced by the U.S. National Institutes of Health is given in
Wirt et.al.(1975). Essentially, panels of scientists in fields related to the research review pro-
posals and assign numerical ratings along various dimensions. Projects are then funded
largely on the basis of these scores. Reviews and score assignments may be done either to-
gether as a group or individually by mail.
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Problems in Science Policy Today
Science policy in the U.S. became fraught with frustrations and diffi-
culties in the 1960's and 1970's largely due to attempted applications of
science strategies and funding patterns, proven successful in military and
space proggams. to major social objectives as means to counter emergent
social ills. Salomon (1977.p.60) describes a number of the problems
encountered in this attempted transfer. First. the technological objec-
tives in military and space achievements drew on substantial knowledge,
techniques, and practical experience. In contrast. the social objectives to
which science was subsequently directed could rely on no proven tech-
niques, nor were the objectives themselves clear and operational.
Secondly, the social objectives were tied to a variety of social, economic,
and political interests and so had to be approached in the difficult con-
text of multiple. divergent, and often conflicting goals reflective of a large
collective constituency. AiJ a consequence, science programs toward
social objectives were continuously adapting to new compromises among
supporting interest groups, new understandings of the problem and of the
viability of alternative approaches. and changing standards such as those
represented in changing legislation on pollution control. In these cases,
the role of research and development in the lessening of social ills is not
at all clear. and recent acknowledgments of lack of successes have
reversed a wide range of science policy positions.
Determining the proper role of the scientific community or science
advisors within the formulation of science policy has been an additional
continual problem. The basic controversy surrounds the requirement for
sound scientific assessments and understandings on the one hand, and
the arguments. summarized in Bozeman (1977.p.63) on the other, that
scientists are ill pr,pared and unsuitable for participation in the political
processes entailed.
A third major problem in U.S. science policy today is the public
attention and reaction given to issues which place national needs against
local community concerns or individual beliefs. Local concerns may
involve issues of environmental quality, personal security threatened by
national computer data banks, or the nearby siting of a large facility of
potential danger. Individual beliefs may simply be in contradiction to the
support of a science activity such as nuclear experimentation. In these
contexts, arguments and analyses are brought to bear by opposing fac-
tions, usually with quite different conclusions, to support respective posi-
tions. Furthermore, resources for conducting sophisticated analyses are
often unbalanced among factions, and so resorting to argumentation
aFor 6 concise and compelling account of this attempted science strategy transfer, see "On
ｾ ｬ ｉ ｃ ｡ ｰ ｩ ｮ ｧ the 'Moon Shot' Metaphor" (Rettig and Wirt 1977).
Bozeman refers to arguments that "scientists are ill prepared for a role in politics because
they lack the lawyer's training in bargaining, compromise, manipulation of symbols, and
negotiation of favors." Greenburger et. al. (lQ76,pp.332-333) argue further that scientific ap-
proaches are incompatible with the political processes of policy formulation. They cite that
political authorities "resent research studies that produce contention, attract widespread
notice, accentuate disagreements, and aggravate conflict." Scientific expertise can thus
serve to inhibit resolution rather than foster it. This is especially true when various interest
groups provide their own sources of scientific expertise and the experts disagree.
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based on highly technical analysis becomes a political tactic to shift the
basis of d.ecision influence to one of greater power inequality.
Perhaps the most perplexing problem facing U.S. science policy
today is how science and technology policies can be used to help increase
the competitiveness of American products in international markets.
Bueche (1973) believes that some of the current U.S. policies may result
in exactly the opposite effects as intended. He cites government bail-outs
of major technology-based private corporations, greater funding of and
use of R&D by the federal government for a broad spectrum of potential
applications, and government induced R&D cooperatives among private
industries, all in support of international competitiveness, as liable to
reduce, in actual effect. both the incentive for private R&D and the
domestic competitive nature of American industry. The effect of the
latter may be, in turn, to decrease competitiveness in either foreign or
domestic markets.
Overall, the formulation of science policy in support of national goals
remains an enigma. Schmandt (1975,p.192) calls the massive use of sci-
ence and technology for the deliberate planning and building of society an
art that man has not yet mastered. Turkevich (1977,p.40) concludes that
the Soviet centrally planned system apparently has also not yet solved
the problem of how to plan science and technology development. Yet sup-
port for the establishment of a science of. sCieftc e continues in the
U.S.S.R. (Gvishiani 1973) and in other countries for the purpose of
developing scientifically planned, organized, and directed national sci-
ence efforts, and for the application of advanced techniques of manage-
ment and control to promote greater science effectiveness.
8Evidence for a growing international interest in developing a science of science is given by
the recent establishment of two journals Sciencll oJ Science: An International Journal of Stu-
dies on Scientific Reasoning and Scientific Enterprise, published by the Polish Academy of
Sciences, Wroclaw Poland; and Scientornetrics: An International Journal for All Quantitative
Aspects of the Science of Science and Science Policy, published by Elsevier Scientific Pub-
lishing Company, Amsterdam. Scientometrics is defined as the study of the quantitative laws
e.nd regularities in the dynamics and structure of science.
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Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con-
ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute or of the National Member Organizations supporting the
Institute.
CHAPfER3
IlATCHING IlANAGEJlENT SCIENCE AND
SCIENCE IlANAGEIlENT: AT FIRST GLANCE
To date, management scientists have given little attention to science
management as a field of potential application. Within the many aspects
of research management, applications of management science techniques
tend to be found only within the executive functions of project selection,
project planning, and capital budgeting for R&D projects, and here only
for large institutions with substantial numbers of projects to consider
(Wirt et.al.1975,Appendix 3 and Souder 1976). Within science policy for-
mulation, management science applications are even less evident. It
seems then. at first glance, that management science and science
management have little to offer each other as approach and context. To a
great extent, this is explained by an apparent mismatch in favorable con-
textual conditions.
1Analytical tools for improving the effectiveness of national science policies are described in
Long and Wright (1975,pp.9-10) as including budget analysis. manpower studies, analysis of
the character and productivity of different fields of science, and assessments of the impacts
of technology. Other formal techniques such as cost-benefit comparisons or technology as-
sessmEmt techniques are also found in science policy formulations. None of these, however,
represents the full management science approach as described earlier .
..::
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Favorable Conditions for the Application of
Management Science
In any problem context, conditions affecting the sUitability of
management science and the probability of successful implementation of
findings pertain to: (a) problem characteristics, especially problem defin-
ition clarity; (b) attributes of the system in which the problem is embed-
ded; (c) attributes of the system environment; (d) attitudes and values of
those to whom the management science analysis is directed: and (e)
characteristics of the organization or social context within which the
problem is to be resolved. Major favorable characteristics are described
below:
(a) Characteristics of the Problem or Decision Favorable to Management
Science Application:
[1] The problem or decision is well- defined; Le. characteristics
determining successful outcome or desired degree of improve-
ment in system performance can be stated a priori and can also
be measured.
[2] The problem or decision is perceived by or is the responsibility
of an individual or single interest group.
[3] The nature of the problem or decision does not change during
the search for a solution or the deliberation among alternative
approaches.
[4] The problem is sufficiently important (worthy of management
science efforts and costs) and does not require an immediate
solution (time for application of a management science
approach is available).
Additional favorable conditions which further characterize the well-
defined nature of a problem or decision are that: (1) the alternative
actions or choices are known, and new alternatives are not generated
during the approach process; (2) the consequent outcomes of each action
or choice alternative are also known or can be measured; and (3) the
degree of system improvement or successful outcome can be expressed
in a ｱｵｾｮｴｩｴ｡ｴｩｶ･ objective function or single rank ordering of action out-
comes.
(b) Characteristics of the System in which the Problem or Decision is
Embedded Favorable to Management Science Application:
[1] The system, or relevant parts of the system in interaction with
relevant parts of the environment, is relatively bounded (or
closed) and of few kinds of relevant parameters and variables
(system elements).
[2] Relationships among system elements are of known causal
direction and can be represented by mathematical expressions
or programmable statements. This tends to exclude most
psychological constructs as system elements, and most human
behaviors as system variables.
2Simon (1955) first identified these conditions as requirements for the "classical" concepts
of rationality in decisionmaking.
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[3] Conditions [1] and [2] may apply only after considerable
analysis and experimentation has occurred, involving the testing
of alternative system structures in models and the estimating of
model parameters. Accordingly, conditions favorable to
management science application in the immediate absence of
the previous two conditions are those identified by Beck (1981)
as helpful in model structure design. These include: (a) that
experiments can easily be conducted. or outcomes of natural
experiments observed, to identify system behavior; (b) that a
priori theory is capable of predicting accurately the system
behavior that is observed; and (c) that data accumulated
through system behavior observation are data relatively error
free. Such enabling conditions allow successive model testing
and design modification for developing (or acknowledging the
absence of) the earlier conditions [1] and [2].
[4] The system remains unchanged during the period of analysis;
Le. is not naturally evolving or undergoing transformations in
unpredictable ways, and is not changing as a consequence of the
analysis performed on it. This tends to exclude many social sys-
tems in which changes in key personnel have major effects on
system behavior, and many institutions for which rapid develop-
ment and maturity alter system structure and relative impor-
tance of performance criteria.
[5] Data on system behavior and performance are available at low
cost.
(c) Characteristics of the System Environment Favorable to Management
Science Application:
[1] The most favorable conditions are if the system environment
can be forecast with certainty, and the relations between
environmental change, if any, and system performance can be
represented by logical or algebraic expressions of system and
environmental variables.
[2] If the environment cannot be forecast with certainty, and
environmental changes cannot be related to performance
effects directly, then the next most favorable condition is if pro-
bability distributions of possible environmental changes and
their effects can be determined.
(d) Prevailing Attitudes, Values, and Motivations Favorable to Manage-
ment Science Application:
[1] Attitudes and values of those to whom the analysis is directed
reflect reliance on expertise, rational analysis, and a system-
wide perspective as the appropriate basis for problem solving or
decisionmaking rather than personal experience, tradition.
dogma, cultural imperatives, coercion, or interorganizational
rivalry (Vertinsky et.al.1975.p.254 and Smith 1966).
[2] Motivations of the parties involved reflect or support the goals of
the system or organization in which the problem is embedded,
rather than personal objectives or interest group positions on
important issues of the problem.
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(e) Favorable Organizational Conditions3
[1] High level of managerial support, understanding, and accep-
tance of management science activities;
[2] Location of the management science group within the organiza-
tion conducive to effectiveness (in data gathering and imple-
mentation, for example);
[3] Adequacy of resources made available:
[4] Enabling nature of the charter given to the management science
group;
[5] Low strength of opposition to management science activity
within the organization;
[6] Existing high reputation of management science activity within
the organization, and general perception of high level of success
of efforts.
Neither research management nor science policy readily provides these
conditions favorable to the application of management science. Rather,
they seem to present the worst case situations in many ways. Conditions
within various research organizations naturally vary widely according to
size, host environment, and nature of the research addressed. Similarly,
conditions surrounding the formulation and choice of science policy alter-
natives vary widely according to social and political context, national per-
ceptions of the role of science and science policy, and the nature of the
contextual issues addressed. However, despite these variations, some
general characteristics of the problems, systems, environments. and pre-
vailing attitudes of those who might apply management science
approaches in science management settings can be described to portray
the apparent contrasts to the favorable conditions mentioned earlier.
Decision Characteristics in Science Management
Research management entails a wealth of both routine decisions on
hiring, publications approvals. and expenditure authorizations; and
important design decisions regarding the organization and management
of research efforts. Some of the design decisions are indicated in Table 4.
Generating alternative design choices is usually not a major difficulty;
diversity in management approaches is quite evident and various manage-
ment procedures and structures are well documented (cf. Wirt et.al.1975,
Levien et.al.1971, Smith 1966). What makes these design decisions ill-
defined is that there are no dominant management solutions, even for
specific situations. Each alternative has its many advantages and disad-
vantages, and the relevant criteria for judging are often diverse and con-
flicting. Furthermore, overall organizational criteria for assessing
3According to studies at Northwestern University by Rubenstein (Markland 1979,p.633), the
organizational conditions listed here determine success or failure of management science
groups. In addition to these organizational conditions, Rubenstein stresses both high techni-
cal and organizational competence of the individuals in the management science group, and
relevance and practicability of the projects they undertake as important factors in deter-
miIrlng success of the group.
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success may themselves be conflicting, unoperationaL or even hidden.
Some of the many relevant criteria for judging research management
approaches to decisionmaking or problem solving are given in Table 5.
The great difficulty in measuring or even making subjective assess-
ments according to most of these criteria is what makes research
management decisions particularly unfavorable for application of
management science approaches such as those using ranking models for
choosing among decision alternatives. Additionally, because of lack of
resources, time, and confidence, research managers may feel that
attempts to apply management science approaches simply aren't worth
the effort in most research management problem situations. Nor is there
any evidence that uSing a formal model which combines assessments on
all criteria deemed relevant to the situation produces choices which
research managers would agree are better or equal to those they would
make based on personal experience, intuition, or expert advice.
Science policy problems pose different though even stronger obsta-
cles to management science applications. Certainly science policy prob-
lems are sufficiently important to warrant analyses of the scope and
effort usually found in management science applications elsewhere, and
usually time for these efforts is potentially available. Impeding applica-
tions in the U.S., however, are at least two major problem characteristics
of science policy least favorable to the management science approach:
(1) the political nature of science policy as manifest in multiple interest
groups presenting various perspectives, criteria, and political power; and
(2) the changing nature of the problem context and problem definition as
experience with science policies accumulates and is reassessed within
changing social concerns.
The political nature of science policy formulation, including the polit-
ical determination of the extent to which science policy should be a politi-
cally influenced process, is discussed throughout the science policy
literature (cf. Schmandt 1975,p.196; Price 1976,pp.107-111; Bueche 1973;
and Shenin 1978,pp.330-331) and explains much of the difference between
national approaches, as for example that of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Within a
political context where differing perspectives, aims, and prohibitions
draw public attention, as in the U.S. where government agencies, citizen
groups, and industry representatives participate in political debate on
science issues, it becomes highly unlikely that any particular science pol-
icy problem can be defined with clarity. or that alternative options can be
evaluated with non-conflicting measures of success. Rather than present-
ing well-defined problems to be solved with specified measures of success,
science policy in the U.S. presents a host of issues and concerns for which
satisfactory responses. largely perceptual, are hard to find.
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Table 4
Alternatives in the Design
of Research Management Systems
Organizational Decisions and Alternatives
[1] Structure of lines of authority:
pyramidal (conventional hierarchical); or matrixa
[2] Major direction of span of interest:
horizontal (encompassing related or complementary
research areas or topics); or
vertical (building on core research by adding suppor-
tive activities of dissemination. service and training.
and interaction with users)
[3] Locus of decisionmaking and degree of collaboration with others:
centralized. internal decisionmaking; or decentral-
ized, collaborative decisionmaking
[4] Basis of organizational subdivisions:
by discipline; or
by problem addressed or subject area; or
by R&D component function (planning, research.
experimentation. development. applications); or
by organizational unit (geographical units. specialty
units)
[6] Structure of administrative services:
centralized; or decentralized
Management Decisions and Alternatives
[1] Management Style:
directive; or intervening; or laissez-faire.b
high degree of participation in decisionmaking by
host. client. governing board. or constituency; or low
degree of participation.
8Matrix structures in research organizations are described in Wirt et.al.(1975)j Stuki (1960);
and Levien et.al. (1971). Their common benefits and problems are discussed in Davis and
kawrence (1976) and Greiner and Schein (1961).
These styles of management are refiected respectively in the management approaches to
programmatic. service-oriented. and basic researcn. as illustrated in Wirt et.al.(1975).
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Table 4 (cont.): Management Decisions and Alternatives
[3] Balance of management focus:
toward achieving research of high technical quality;
toward increasing relevance of the research to impor-
tant practical problems;
toward applying results of the research;
toward building a supportive constituency;
toward attending to auxiliary organizational goals.
[4] Allocation of Management Effort
on development aspects of identifying, selecting,
funding, and planning of research projects:
on oversight aspects of coordinating, monitoring,
evaluating, and modifying of approaches and methods;
on recruitment of key personnel;
on relations with external collaborators and the
host/client institution or governing board
[5] Approach to budget allocation decisions:
comprehensive (zero-based); or incremental.
based on bottom-up requests; or top-down allocations.
competitive; or colleagial.
focused on outputs (program accompli!?hments and
interest in products); or on inputs (line-item expendi-
tures relative to of other research units').
[6] Uses made of advisory and liaison committees:
substantive criticism and recommendations (pro-
grammatic functions); or
dissemination and communication links with scientific
or user communities (outreach functions); or
sources of potential personnel and potential funding
(capacity development functions): or all of the above.
[7] Balance of continuity and fleXibility:
fixed-term short contracts for scientific staff; or per-
manent or tenured staff positions.
finite-length programmatic research efforts; or ongo-
ing knowledge-accumulating research efforts.
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Table 5
Criteria for Judging Research Management Apgroaches
to Decisionmaking or Problem Solving
Criteria Related to the Technical Quality of the Research Produced
(tendency of the research management approach to:)
1. Promote interaction among scientists from various parts of the
organization and with the scientific community
2. Concentrate or focus research activity into coherent strands of work
3. Attract quality scientists and research leaders
4, Remain open to new ideas
5. Provide adequate technical and contextual information for effective
decisions on project selection and methodological approach
Criteria Related to the Extent to which Results will be Applied by
Others (tendency of the research management approach to:)
6. Incorporate interests and concerns of potential users during the
stages of problem formulation and project selection
7. Encourage participation by potential users in the performance of the
research
8. Provide effective communication linkages to user communities and
multiple avenues for implementation of results
Criteria Related to External Support and Flexibility (tendency of the
research management approach to:)
9. Attract a supportive constituency or to maintain good relations with
the host or client institution
10. Maintain flexibility and responsiveness to changes in priorities
11. Keep financial costs of administration low
12. Avoid undue bureaucracy
13. Process proposals for new projects or changes in plans quickly
aMuch of this material is adapted from earlier unpublished work conducted in association
with Wirt et.al.(1975) in support of evaluating alternative management approaches for the
then proposed U.S. National Institute of Education.
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Table 5 (cont.): Criteria for JUdging Research Management Approaches
Criteria Related to the Overall Goals of the Research Organization
(tendency of the research management approach to:)
14. Reflect in its procedures the goals and values set for the organization
as a whole (This is especially important for research organizations
With auxiliary goals such as international cooperation, prestige
attainment for the host organization, or public service regarding
information dissemination or field assistance.)
Criteria Related to Matters of Procedureb
(tendency of the research management approach to:)
15. Employ expert advice on important decisions
16. Search for additional information when warranted prior to commit-
ment to choice
17. Identify alternative courses of action and assess probable outcomes
prior to commitment to choice
lB. Experiment, test assumptions, and modify choices when reasonable
to do so on the basis of further knowledge gained.
Further limiting the application of a management science approach, pub-
lic issues and concerns surrounding major science policy questions tend
to change significantly over time reflecting prevailing political, economic,
and social conditions. In describing the history of science policy, Salomon
(1977,pp.51-57) focuses on changing public attitudes toward the role of
science and associated perceptions of science policy issues in three dis-
tinct periods of time. The first he calls the starting period of euphoria fol-
lowing World War II, reflecting faith in science to resolve post-war prob-
lems. The second is the age of pragmatism from 1955 to 1967 in which sci-
ence policy was directed toward strategic concerns, economic advance,
and social problems. The third is the age of questioning and disenchant-
ment arising from the threat of nuclear war, environmental deterioration,
awareness of limits to economic growth, and the war in Vietnam. As a
consequence of these changing social climates, the way in which science
policy problems are formulated and the indicators of successful problem
resolutions have themselves undergone considerable change, making any
analytical approach toward a stable science policy posture quite difficult
if not impossible.
bArguments for criteria focused on the procedures for decisionmakiIl8 or problem solving
rather than on outcome or solution merits are found in Simon (1976 and 1978).
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System Ot.araeteristics in Science Management
System conditions described in an earlier section as favorable to the
application of management science rarely exist either for the system of
scientific inquiry found within a research organization, or for the system
of science advancement within a nation. For research management, the
relevant system is comprised of two parts. The first is the system of
interpersonal interactions among the scientific staff. and between them
and collaborators and information sources elsewhere. The second part of
the system are the effects of organizational conditions, management
style, and the nature of the research substance addressed, on produc-
tivity and the coherent aggregation of individual efforts among the scien-
tific staff. In this system, boundaries are purposefully vague (communica-
tion and cooperation with outsiders encouraged, except in cases of confi-
dential industrial processes or military secrets); system parameters and
variables numerous, psychological, and ill-understood (as in creativity);
and difficulties in expressing relationships among system elements by
mathematical or programmable statements exceedingly great. Conse-
quently. models of research management systems are rare, at least in the
West.
Natural experiments in research systems. observed as behavior
changes following major reorganizations within scientific institutions or
the implementation of new r2search strategies, are documented in rather
abstract or general terms. Few specific hypotheses are examined in
these histories regarding how the changes or decisions discussed affected
the complex relations of system elements, and how this in turn affected
system behavior. Consequently, only few lessons can be learned from
these histories for system modeling. Furthermore, little if any a priori
theory is capable of predicting accurately what system behavior will
result from specific decisions of organization or management. Theory
which is relatively applicable generally pertains to contexts considerably
different from those of research organizations, focusing instead on organ-
izations of hierarchical structures. reliance on authority of position, and
functional specialization.
Additionally, in the context of research management. the system of
scientists. their interactions. and the influence on them by organization
and management decisions, changes continually and often in unpredict-
able ways. New personnel either on the scientific staff or in the research
management often have profound and unpredictable influence on system
behavior and output. Even without any external source of change. institu-
tional maturity may alone bring about increases in bureaucracy.
avoidance of risky research, and subunit insularity, and decreases in
morale. flexibility, and overall quality (Argyris 1965). Both lack of
relevant theory and continual system change pose added difficulties for
modeling efforts.
'See. for example, Smith (1966) in connection with the history of the Rand Corporation.
Levien (1977) on IIASA development, Stuki (1980) on structure and management within a
large pharmaceutical lab, and Wirt et.al. (1975) on research management evolutions within
certain U.S. federal research agencies.
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In the context of science policy. the relevant system is the national
network of science institutions and the effects on the behavior of this net-
work made by government interventions. Science policy is viewed as the
mechanism for encouraging advances in science and for directing those
advances toward other national goals. To und"lrstand this system requires
that scientific research as a whole be submitted to a systems analysis.
The purpose of such an analysis would be to find principles or at least
develop hypotheses for the subsequent improvement of science policy.
Within the U.S.S.R.. such a pursuit led to the beginnings of psychological
and sociological studies in the 1920's aimed at the planning of science.
These efforts were abandoned in the early 1930's and then revitalized in
the 1950's (Graham 1975.pp.21-23). Within the West, Price of Yale in 1963
first proposed the quantitative analysis of scientific data and productivity
as an approach to the analysis of scientific institutions in what he termed
a science of science (Salomon 1977,p.51). The belief that science develop-
ment can be made subject to principles which are ascertained through an
integration of a wide variety of social science disciplines is today the
backbone of Soviet science policy formulation and the special branch of
Soviet research on the science of science. Gvishiani (1973) states the pur-
pose of this branch as follows:
...to work out both the theoretical foundations for organizing.
planning, and directing scientific activity and a concrete set of
measures dictated by the objective logic of the development of
science and technology. Thus. it ensures the optimum rate of
scientific and technological progress and the increased effec-
tiveness of scientific investigations and development, forming
a theoretical foundation for working out science policy
priorities.(p.175)
To date. results from the Soviet experience are mixed. Certainly the
tremendous increase and maturation of the U.S.S.R. science system in
the last two decades must be acknowledged. Yet the same system prob-
lems plaguing Western science seem to be also plaguing Soviet science
today, described by Graham (1975) as tensions:
...between political administrator and researcher, between
central direction and autonomy. between pure science and
engineering, between research and teaching, between indus-
trial advancement and conservation. between expansion of
knowledge and satisfaction of immediate social needs, and
between research for military or strategic purposes and
research for the improvement of human life.(p.54)
Whether or not any national system producing science advances can ever
be modeled and subjected to approaches such as those of management
science today remains controversial, though much may be learned from
current Soviet attempts. In any case, the system conditions listed earlier
as most favorable to application of management science are certainly
absent, and attempts at modeling and system control. such as those of
the U.S.S.R., are proving to be Herculean tasks.
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System Environment Characteristics in Science Management
Major elements of the system environment facing managers of
research organizations include: (a) relevant scientific communities and
the flow of new knowledge and talent emerging from them; (b) similar and
competitive research organizations (outside the collaborative network
considered as part of the system); (c) the host, client, or sponsoring insti-
tutions for which system performance is monitored and appraised, and
other supporting and user organizations; and (d) the social, economic,
and political milieu. None of these environmental elements is particularly
certain, and each in unpredictable ways can have major impacts on the
behavior and performance of the research system of a particular organi-
zation. Emerging ideas and progress on research results elsewhere, com-
municated through pUblications, professional meetings, or personal con-
tacts within the scientific community, may cause research managers to
adopt new approaches or switch priorities in the work of their own organi-
zations, or may help them skip a number of research steps based on the
accomplishments of others. The important impacts on research that
these environmental elements often make force research managers to
stay closely in touch with developments in the scientific community..
Similarly, comparable and competitive research organizations may
also have profound effects on the system structure, behavior, and perfor-
mance of a specific research organization. Emulation of organizational
arrangements, management style, substantive focus, and of goals, prac-
tices, tactics and strategies is seen by Vidmer (l979) as one of the main
ways organizations learn from their environment, especially about innova-
tions that seem successful. Such emulations may explain the recent
adoptions by so many research organizations today of a matrix structure,
problem rather than discipline orientation, a think-tank general purpose,
use of formal advisory committees, and an interdisciplinary character.
Competitive organizations (or key personnel in competitive organizations)
also may have strong influence on the behavior of a research organiza-
tion, as dramatically illustrated in the competition between Crick and
Watson of the Cavendish labs in England ｾ ､ Linus Pauling and his staff in
the U.S. for finding the structure of DNA. Environmental interactions of
these kinds simply cannot be represented by probability distributions of
possible events and impacts. The process of scientific discovery is based
too much on unanticipated events and serendipitous findings to allow it.
Host, client, and sponsoring institutions play an especially important
role in determining system behavior and even survival of the research
organization also often in unpredictable ways. For example, changes in
the strategy of an industrial enterprise from concentration on new pro-
duct development to cost savings on existing product lines may have pro-
found effects on the nature of research and the system structure of the
company R&D organization. Changes in key personnel in the host institu-
tion or client institution may alter or even lead to the demise of a sup-
porting R&D organization. A case in point is the short life and rapid dem-
ise of the New York City-Rand Institute following the succession of New
5An account of this scientific competition is found in DoubLe Hdi:f: from the viewpoint of
Crick and Watson (Watson 1968).
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York Mayor Lindsay by former City Comptroller Beame, described by
Greenberger (1976, Chapter 7) as an important lesson in the potential
impacts of changes in supportive constituencies.
Changes in the social and political milieu, as well as changes in the
economy, are also important and usually unpredictable elements in the
environment of R&D organizations. For example, between 1967 and 1972,
negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.H. for the establishment of
IIASA represented the newly prevailing interest in detente emerging from
the Cold War era. The negotiations were concluded successfully and the
Institute continues to flourish. But certainly the political climate has
changed recently. While celebrating IIASA's second triennial conference in
1980, first IIASA director Raiffa lamented that were negotiations for IIASA
to begin then rather than thirteeI1;years earlier as they had, IIASA would
probably never have been created.
Science policy environments reflect this changing political climate
even more strongly as indicated in the periods of different public atti-
tudes toward science mentioned earlier. As in research management,
unanticipated exogenous events often playa crucial role in shaping major
decisions and policies. Kunreuther (1980,pp.14-17) emphasizes the impor-
tant role of exogenous events in throwing substantial support to some
interest groups involved in influencing science policy formulation even
though the events may be basically irrelevant to the specific issues. He
cites a number of unanticipated and sometimes irrelevant events occur-
ring in the context of siting decisions for liquefied energy gas facilities
which resulted in reversals or reinvestigations of decisions not yet final-
ized. Kunreuther's contention is that parties involved in science policy
decisions scan and interpret environmental events for their own purposes
and by doing so can trigger new coalitions and new legislation imposing
additional constraints on policy alternatives under consideration. Both
changing political climates and use of unanticipated exogenous events to
reshape constituencies, booster support, and affect legislative context
contribute to the highly uncertain nature of the environment within which
many science policy problems must be resolved.
Attitudes and Values in Science Management
In principle, most research managers would naturally favor exper-
tise, rational analysis, and a system-wide perspective as the proper basis
for decisionmaking. However, in routine matters or with regard to prob-
lems of no great consequence, few research managers can afford the time
or expense required by typical management science approaches nor
might they think the benefits worth the costs. In these situations, per-
sonal experience or tradition may generate satisfactory solutions at little
or no cost of analysis.' Examples are in publications ordering and inven-
tory management, cash management, internal charges for corr mon ser-
vices, equipment ordering and distribution, and location of facilities used
by many units. Sophisticated management science approaches exist for
handling all these routine matters. Few research organizations apply
6Keynote speech published in lIASA's newsletter Options 1980, Volume 2, p.2.
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them. Costs of data collection and analysis are usually not justified, and
reliance on experience and standard heuristics are judged adequate.
For matters of great consequence in research, however, manage-
ment science approaches are generally less relevant, or are at least
judged so on the basis of the characteristics listed earlier as unfavorable
for management science application. Sensitivity to the various perspec-
tives and interests of scientific staff, host or client organizations, or other
constituent groups also tends to' limit the political feasibility of purely
rational approaches to important decisions. Finally, not all parties
involved in a research organization necessarily reflect or support all the
institutional goals to which the research is directed. and so would not
necessarily support a research program rationally deduced or structured
from those goals. Individual careers may be paramount to some of the
staff and loyalty of scientists is generally to their discipline rather than to
their employing institution (White 1975,p.2).
Within science policy formulation, strict reliance on expertise and
rational analysis is highly suspect. Arguments for a science court in which
debate is limited to questions of fact, and scientists are seen as removed
from political considerations are long-standing and viewed by Nelkin
(l979,p.19) as anachronistic and dangerous. Often, the questions of sci-
ence are not what the political debates are about in the first place. Nelkin
contends that protests by community groups against science and tech-
nology advances or by industry against government regulations are actu-
ally protests against prevailing power relationships among them. These
situations are obviously better handled through participation, public
debate, and political evaluation of policy alternatives than through reli-
ance on rational analysis.
The Ma.tch Resisted
Within the relatively sparse literature on research management,
almost no mention is made of management science, outside the specific
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｢ ｬ ｾ ｭ contexts of project selection and capital budgeting for R&D pro-
jects. This in itself is one indication of the prevailing negative attitude or
attitude of indifference toward management science held by research
managers. As an example. Levien, director of IIASA and author of many
articles on systems analysis and its applications. recently received
suggestions by IIASA's U.S. advisory committee to apply systems analysis
to IIASA's own operations and exert a stronger management role in the
selection. planning. organization, and guidance of research. and in the
support of area managers' own determination of priorities and scope of
activities. His reply may typify the attitude of many research managers
7Within these two contexts, attitudes are mixed. Results of quantitative models for ｣ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｾ
inB projects and project sets are used as guides only, and even so with mixed support.
Souder (1970) recommends B.8ainst the use of capital budgeting methods for project selec-
tion decisions, B.8ainst the use of cost prediction formulae for estimating required invest-
ment as a basis for selection, and against scoring and ranking techniques also for selection
decisions, despite the favor in them found among some research managers, especially in in-
dustry. ·Only resource allocation models and PERT/CPM project schedullilg techniques ap-
pear to pass Souder's standards of formulation without serious defects.
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toward the applications potential of management science in research
management:
The proper management style for IIASA would be a topic
worthy of considerable study and it warrants far more discus-
sion than is possible here. While I accept these comments in
the helpful spirit in which they were presented, I feel they
miss the reality of an Institute that strives to have high quality
and distinguished leaders and staff (who cannot simply be
ordered around), that is subject to many sources of advice and
recommendations (17 National Member Organizations, 6
Advisory Committees, evaluation groups, distinguished visi-
tors, policymakers, senior staff), and that draws non-
permanent staff from disciplines, settings (academia, indus-
try, government) and nations having widely differing traditions
of research management. To make IIASA work, it is absolutely
essential to find a management style that balances overall gui-
dance with independence and delegated responsibility, single-
mindedness with fleXibility, and coherence with tolerance of
diversity. There is no doubt that we have not yet evolved an
optimal management system, but the style of systems analysis
appropriate here is more that of "adaptive management" than
of PERT charts and centralized control. (From IIASA Draft
Research Plan 1981-85: Comments and Responses, September
1980; unpublished)
In the context of science policy, negative attitudes toward manage-
ment science approaches are more pronounced. Reviewing the use of
models in policy making, Greenberger et.al.(1976,pp.2S-24) document
that a large fraction of models are never put to use; that from one-third
to as much as two-thirds of modeling efforts fail to achieve their avowed
purposes in the form of direct applications to policy problems; and that
when used, models of analysis, guidance, and problem solving tend to be
directed toward providing political validity to specific positions or alter-
natives. Freeman (1977) also cites ways in which formal techniques and
sophisticated methods of management control are manipulated for politi-
cal purposes and warns of the dangers of "naive, technique-based
approaches, such as systems research" being substituted for a more
integrated approach of social sciences in cooperation with technologists
(p.265). Even within the system of U.S.S.R. research where applicability
of quantitative methods in science policy matters is examined and
encouraged. quantitative analysis in the science of science is judged by
Shenin (1978,p.21) as "having an ancillary role to play for the time being."
Science management's lack of conditions favorable to management
science accounts for much of the absence of attempts of applications
there. But management science has generated both disappointment and
criticisms even in contexts of much more favorable conditions. To a great
extent, these same criticisms may be reflected in the attitudes of science
managers. In the next chapter, some of these common criticisms are
described.
RM-77-2
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
An Introduction
M.A. Keyzer
January 1977
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con-
ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute or of the National Member Organizations supporting the
Institute.
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CHAPfER4
GENERAL CRITICISMS OF MANAGElD:NT SCIENCE APPROACHES
Criticisms of management science, many of which are what Quade
and Boucher (196B) refer to as common pitfalls of analysis, focus both on
the tools and techniques employed in management science, and on the
behavior of management scientists in overworking the tools they use.
Extensive unsatisfactory experiences with management science have led
Drucker (1974) to consider it a disappointment: "It has not lived up so far,
to its promise. It certainly has not revolutionized the practice of manage-
ment. Few managers. indeed, pay much attention to it." (p.50B) Many of
the faults attributed to management science and its applications fall into
five categories:
[1] Management science as practiced and researched is often seen as
overly mathematical and attentive more to the model created for
analysis than to the problem addressed.
[2] Management science tends to ignore the unmeasureable variables
even though they may be highly important.
[3] Management science is seen as preoccupied with economic rational-
ityas the basis for prescriptive results.
[4] Management science tends to ignore the social sciences, and
[5] Management science is criticized as being simplistic, oversold, politi-
cally naive, and uncritical of itself.
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These categories of criticism, though clear and explicit, convey little of
the diversity and strength of perceived weaknesses within the categories.
FollOWing are references given to convey some of this diversity.
Overly Mathematical
McLean (1978.p.973) observes "the tendency of systems researchers
to use elaborate mathematical formalisms in their work," cites others'
criticisms of "mutual incomprehension between the policy-maker and the
analyst," and argues that "preoccupation with technicalities has been
observed to deflect attention from assumptions and issues." He refers to
these and other behaviors of management scientists as "tendencies
towards complexity and mystification" (p.975). Bonder (1979) questions
the relevance of mathematical developments characteristic of current
operations research and relates this to individuals "who have more of a
disciplinary allegiance to mathematics and economics than to operations
research" (p.64). Ignazio and Gupta (1975,p.23) warn that some practi-
tioners of management science see the concentration on mathematical
theory development as "the development of complex, esoteric solutions
to simple or non-existent. hypothetical problems." Lastly, Quade. and
Boucher (l968,p.348) cite the common pitfalls of much systems analysis
including overconcentration on the model, excessive detail, and over-
working concepts of statistical uncertainty (in attempts to transform
ignorance into states of subjective probabilities).
Ignoring the Unmeasureable
Minzberg (1979,p.121) criticizes, "In fact, analysis cannot handle the
soft data, which is critical." He argues further that it takes time for
events to be recorded as facts and that some facts important to
managers such as emotional responses, political positions, group dynam-
ics, and personality traits never do become recorded as facts. In policy
formulation. this neglect of unmeasureables may be disastrous; as indi-
cated by Minzberg quoting Wilensky on the role of analysis in the Vietnam
War:
...analysis of the easy-to-measure variables (casualties suf-
fered by the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese) was driving
out consideration of the hard-to-measure variables and long-
run costs (the nature of popular support for a South Vletnam
government, the effect of the war on the Western alliance and
on domestic civility, the effect of the bombing on the will to
resist) ... (p.122).
This bias toward the easily quantified and neglect of the intangible
and unquantifiable is also observed by Majone and Quade (1980), Quade
and Boucher (1968), and Dror (1971a,1971b). Furthermore. the proxy
measures commonly used in management science for the quantification
of unquantifiable attributes (utility, benefits, effectiveness) are criticized
by Bonder (1979,p.66) and Majone and Quade (1980,pp.27-29) as poor.
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Preoccupation with Economic Rationality:
Criticisms of management science's heavy reliance on economic
rationality focus on three arguments. First is that such reliance incapaci-
tates management science to deal with conflicting, noncommensurate
values: with problems that are ill-defined and lack clear criteria for
choosing among alternatives (Dror 1968,1971b) or which are basically
ambiguous (Sproull et.al. 1978 and Minzberg 1979) and with how to retain
future options and develop "versatility" or adaptability to future condi-
tions instead of simply choosing the best alternative at the time (Bonder
1979,p.69). Secondly, economic rationality is not supported very well by
empirical studies of decisionmaking behavior. It gives inadequate treat-
ment of intuition and other modes of thinking and action bases (Minzberg
1979,pp.133-148) and fails to consider explicitly the psychological
stresses and ｩ ｮ ､ ｵ ｾ ･ ､ biases of individual decisionmakers, or the group
dynamics and institutional contexts which shape issues and restrict alter-
natives, or the political realities which interpret situations and constrain
decision processes (Lynn 1980). Third, economic rationality is seen by
Minzberg (1979,pp.123-130) as a mask of supposedly value-free, objective,
open-minded, impartial and amoral analysis for what is in actual practice
found to be sometimes filled with "deliberate distortion and partisan
bias," advocacy, systematically favoring operational goals (often
economic in nature) over other less operational goals (often social in
nature), hard data over soft data, and actually creating and altering goals
and alternatives as part of the analytical process.
Ignoring the Social Sciences
This is a common theme of Dror (1968,1971a,1971b). The separate-
ness of systems analysis from organizational theory and decision theory
from general systems theory tends to give "fragmented and disjointed
views" of decisionmaking which reflect a "dichotomy between behavioral
and normative approaches." This increases the difficulty of embedding
greater understanding about reality in decisionmaking into prescriptive
approaches or at least into improved practices, and is seen as a major
weakness in management science overall.
Simplistic, Oversold, Politically Naive, and
Uncritical oj ItselJ:
Drucker (1974,p.509) finds in management science an emphasis on
"techniques rather than on principles, on mechanics rather than on deci-
sions, on tools rather than on results, and above all. on efficiency of the
part rather than on performance of the whole." He also faults manage-
ment science applications in business for focusing narrowly on where to
use a given technique rather than on the more fundamental questions of
what the enterprise should be; and for having as an implicit goal the elim-
ination or minimization of risk when risk-making is what supports
economic progress. Additional pitfalls cited by Majone and Quade (1980)
as common in management science include overambition. irrelevance of
the model. unquestioned acceptance of stated goals and constraints,
inflexibility, disregard for limitations, and an underemphasis on adequate
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problem formulation. Dror (1968,1971a) views management science as
young, still narrowly focused in its field of application (predominantly mil-
itary and industry), concerned too much with selling itself in order to be
a part of the decisionmaking system. neglectful of institutional context
and political needs for consensus-building .and avoiding confrontation.
inadequate in its explication of value assumptions, incapable of handling
primary uncertainties or major shifts or reversals of strategy (focusing
instead on incrementalism), inadequate for analysis of very large or com-
plex systems as a whole (without resorting to decomposition and subop-
timization), and fixating on conventional research methods rather than
embedding new knowledge or engaging in social experimentation.
McClean (1978,pp.976-977) comments on the "relative lack of genuine cri-
ticism of system methods by those working in the field" and recommends
methodological pluralism as a necessary ingredient of all systems
research. Minzberg (1979) adds that management science approaches
usually fail to consider dynamic factors such as delays in information and
recycling in problem approaches, and that pressures toward superficial-
ity and premature closure (by time constraints, emphasis on verbal
media, action orientation, discontinuity in problem context, inability to
handle unmeasureables and nonoperational goals, and ｾ ｡ ｣ ｫ of extensive
direct experience with the problem context) lead to management science
studies that are "little more than a hasty compilation of platitudes
swathed in mathematical macrame" (Minzberg quoting Hoos, p.145).
In addition to the criticisms of the categories above, management
science has also been attacked as an avenue for greater centralization
and bureaucracy (Vertinsky et.al. 1975,p.265: and Minzberg 1979,pp.130-
133); and subject in practice to "tunnel vision" by tending to make pre-
cise estimates for a small number of alternatives or future states rather
than providing partially accurate information on many options and conse-
quences (Bonder (1979,p.67); or by considering only the narrow range of
alternatives for which changes can be measured or which relfect the
user's preferences or point of view (Majone and Quade 1980). Finally,
management science is accused of being misnamed as a science.
Minzberg (1979,p.155) argues, "By no stretch of the imagination do OR/MS
practitioners practice a science." Bonder (1979) supports this view by
bemoaning insufficient knowledge to teach analysis or how to perform
many of the steps and activities basic to management science.
To a large degree, all these perceived deficiencies and the ensuing
reputation of management science help explain why science managers as
well as managers in other contexts have not adopted management sci-
ence approaches: or at least have limited attempts at application to those
areas where experience with management science has been generally
positive and where economic payoffs are clearly foreseeable. The situa-
tion is not, however, necessary pathological, though the trend in manage-
ment science development may be pointing in that direction. What is
needed are opportunities for trend reversals, and these in turn require
new bases for empirical observations and insights. The field of science
management may offer such a base, as discussed in the next section.
Part II
TOWARD RESPECTING REALITIES
OF PROBLEM CONTEXTS
RM-77-2
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An Introduction
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ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
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INTRODUCTION TO PART n
It will not be easy for practitioners of management science to over-
come the criticisms and limitations outlined in the previous chapters.
and to have their analytical approaches gain acceptance as credible
management tools for the more social and less well-defined problem con-
texts such as science management. To do so, management scientists
must reject many of the tools and conceptual frameworks formulated for
well-defined problems. This is basically a step toward greater humility in
the management science approach. It requires respecting the realities of
application contexts and attempting to deal with them. rather than
assuming them away to fit exiting conceptual frameworks. These are not
easy developments, and so examples which clarify their necessity and
provide contexts for new insights may be helpful. In this regard, science
management offers a rich empirical base of visible problems and discer-
nible decision processes requiring and encouraging the emergence of new
analytical formulations for both descriptive and prescriptive studies in
decisicmmaking.
-.
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Adopting a More Humble Perspective
Earlier chapters of this paper stressed that management science
makes extensive use of models. and that models are based on simplifying
assumptions that help limit the complexity of the problem addressed to
levels at which the problem can be analyzed with known techniques and
tools. It was also stressed that solutions found in this approach are actu-
ally solutions to the modeled problem rather than to the real problem.
but that often these solutions help point the way to actions or decisions
which would lead to improvements in the real problem situation as well.
However. many of the criticisms of management science listed earlier
stem from allegations that analysts pay too little attention to the realities
of problems they face and accept too readily that the simplifying assump-
tions they make do not invalidate their analyses,1 Greater humility is
obviously needed when management scientists or users act as if they
really know what is to be done based on results of analysis (when realities
of actual problems make no alternative best with absolute certainty); or
when analysts believe that what they are doing is correct, Le. applying
appropriate scientific methods (when in actuality the absurdity of some
of the simplifying assumptions is obvious). In most real problem contexts,
there are no a priori correct answers or actions. only guesses backed dif-
ferentially and often obscurely by data and analysis. A healthy skepticism
and sense of humility is basically in order.
Realities of many of the problem contexts which management sci-
ence is asked to address often reach beyond complexity into perplexity.
Respecting these realities requires rejecting some of the earlier held
notions and simplifying assumptions that have been the bases for concep-
tual frameworks in much of management science. Advances in under-
standing and new techniques have already allowed analysts to avoid many
of the simplistic concepts of classical decision theory and to acknowledge
some of the complexities of actual problem contexts. Table 6 indicates
most of these transitions in its first two columns. Despite these advances.
however. analytical capabilities have not kept pace with the growing
understanding of actual problem contexts. Column 3 of Table 6 indicates
that even the more sophisticated and complex natures of problem formu-
lations used today are in fact gross over-simplifications of reality. Furth-
ermore, little is known about how to handle the realities that are recog-
nized.
The resulting perplexities have led some management science theor-
ists to reexamine the nature of goals, decisions. dec isionmakers, and
problems as terms meaningful for existing analytical approaches. or at
least to question the way they have been operationalized in management
science practice. Some new ideas and analytical formulations have
emerged as a consequence and are described later in Part III.
IVe.lidation of model framework, stI:ucture. and parameterization; and of data relevance are
discussed at leD8th in Iss'U8s in Model Validcdion by A. Lewandowski (UASA Working Paper
WP-B1-032 March 19B1). -
--
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Table 6
Management Science: Progress in •
Respecting Realities of Problem Contexts
From Rejecting Simplistic
Concepts of
Classical Decision Theory
Goals are explicit
and decomposable to
expressions of uni-
dimensional dependent
variables (e.g. profit,
market share, expected
value, and other
effectiveness measures).
Alternatives are
known or are
easily deduced.
Decisions are guided
by economic rationality
(as in optimization
techniques).
Analysis is objective
and useful primarily
for prescriptive
purposes.
•Continued on the next 'page.
To Acknowledging
Complexity
(Current State of
Management Science)
Goals may be
multiple and even
conflicting, and
are influenced by
current levels of
attainment.
Additional alterna-
tives are sought or
are purposely generated
through analysis.
Decisions are gUided
by bounded rationality
(as in goal adaptation
and search heuristics).
Analysis aids under-
standing through
testing options and
effects of changes.
To Facing Perplexity
(Adopting a More
Humble Perspective)
Goals are often
ambiguous, opaque,
hidden, and changing;
a dynamic mixture of
knowns and unknowns;
or only post-hoc
abstract statements
to explain behavior
but not guide it.
Alternatives may
disappear and new
ones emerge out of
happenstance.
Decisions are guided
by bias. mistake
propensities, intuition.
consensus, and context.
Analysis is subjective
in part. advocative
in use, and only one
input to any decision
situation.
From Classical
Decision Theory
Decisions are made
by people in positions
of authority
(decisionmakers) who
are influenced by
analyses.
Action or choice
automatically follows
knowledge of best
alternative (infor-
mation is key).
Analysts operate
outside the
decisionmaking
system.
All required infor-
mation is available
with calculable error;
all variables are
certain or can be
expressed as statis-
tical measures from
past data.
•Also continued on the next page.
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•Table 6 (cont.)
To Acknowledging
Complexity
Institutional arrange-
ments influence and
limit decisionmakers'
behavior and must be
taken into account
in the analyses.
Care must be given
to presentation of
results for effective
implementation
(argumentation is key).
Analysts must interface
with the decision-
making system for
greater understanding
and effective
implementation.
Information is usually
not all available or
with calculable error
but can be purchased
or improved according
to "value of informa-
tion" techniques. Some
variables need to be
expressed as subjective
probabilities based on
related knowledge or
expert judgments.
To Facing
Perplexity
Decisions (in the
classical sense) are
rarely made; the
decisionmaker is
largely a myth: the
role of analyses is
unclear.
Knowledge. acceptance.
and intent may still
result in no action
or unrelated actions.
Analysts become part
of the decisionmaking
system and thus
change it (as in
psychoanalysis) .
All information is
perceptual and subject
to bias: attempts to
improve information
are influenced by
attitudes toward un-
certainty. Ignorance
abounds; there may be no
grounds for meaningful
subjective probability
estimates for certain
key variables.
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Table 6 (cont.)
From Classical
Decision Theory
Accountability is in
the decision consequence;
was the decision the
correct one (subjective
rationality approach).
Analysis is a service
for the decisionmaking
client (and is amoral).
"Best" choices are
sought by analysts
for real problems
confronting decision-
makers.
To Acknowledging
Complexity
Decision effects may
be too complex to
measure; accountability
is in the procedures
followed; better made
decisions will generally
be better decisions
(procedural rationality
approach).
The ultimate client
(social service beneficiary)
may differ from the
(bureaucrat) decision-
maker. (The analyst is
then faced with the moral
issue of whom to serve.)
Some problems and
choices are basically
perceptual; the
analyst must under-
stand the perspective
of the decisionmaker.
To Facing
Perplexity
There is no empirical
evidence that better
procedures lead to
better decisions in
consequence (though
those involved may feel
more comfortable with
their choice).
There may be no
obvious client and
no immediate decision-
maker. (The analyst is
then faced with his own
motivations for analysis.)
The meaning of choice
may vary; sometimes
choices seek problems
so that they may be
implemented. issues
seek decision situa-
tions so that they
may be aired.
Facing Realities Squarely: The Use of the
Science Management Context
How can the field of science management help in the development of
new analytical formulations more accurately reflecting the realities of
problem contexts? Development of theory or of new analytical frame-
works benefit from a rich empirical base, where data .::; accessible.
processes are discernible, and the challenges to existing frameworks are
clear. Science management provides .all three characteristics.
ｾ -.:
,- .-
- 54-
The nature of goals, decisions, and decisionmaking in research
management and especially in science policy are characterized most
clearly by Column 3 of Table 6. The next three chapters illustrate how the
realities of science management in all these regards may serve as a basis
for new model frameworks and new analytical formulations, especially in
descriptive studies of decisionmaking.
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CHAPfER 5
REAI.JTIES OF GOALS
Most management science efforts rely on an unambiguous operation-
alization of goals or objectives as part of their formulation. These opera-
tionalizations serve either as the basic function to be optimized or as
evaluation mechanisms by which alternative actions or decisions are com-
pared. The complexities and ambiguities of many real problem contexts,
however, may make traditional operationalizations seem quite naive. In
these cases, the whole notion of stated goals as being susceptible to
rational means-ends analysis, or even as determinants of behavior or
rational choice becomes suspect.
The Exceptional Nature of Science Management Goals
The following examples in science management illustrate the per-
plexing situations often encountered which so far have eluded manage-
ment science formulations:
o Science Management Offers Clear Cases of Unclear Goals.
Goals in science policy are often purposely vague (to attract broad
constituent support), purposely ambiguous (to avoid explicit choices
which would undermine consensus), and are continually changing
(reflecting changes in environmental conditions and institutional
developments).
- 56-
Goals which typically are stated in a way to have greatest chance for
obtaining consensus support are also those typically least operationaliz-
able. This permits various constituents to interpret the goals as suppor-
tive of their own interests or at least does not make explicit that they are
not. Such strategy, common in science policy as well as in education,
health, welfare, military, and economic policy, serves well to get pro-
grams going, but provides little guidance to program administrators for
what to do, how to do it. or how much success is either sufficient or desir-
able.
Goals of this unoperationalizable type usually are stated in non-
specific terms such as:
to improve; to enhance; to reinforce; to strengthen; to raise the qual-
ity of; to promote; to upgrade; to service; to expand; to ｣ ｯ ｯ ｲ ､ ｩ ｮ ｾ ｴ ･ ［
to stimulate; to augment; to assist; to develop; and to make viable
At least two things are missing in each of these cases. One is the designa-
tion of the level or condition which would be considered the successful
accomplishment of the goal. The second is the specification of measures
or evidence which would verify attainment of that condition. How do
research organizations behave in these situations of unclear goals? How is
overall performance directed? Studies of the behavior of science organi-
zations facing such clearly unclear goals may lend insight into the
development of alternate model formulations of organizational behavior
which differ substantially from current goal-oriented ones.
o Science Management Offers Problem Issues That Resist Trade- Off
Analysis.
In traditional management science formulations. operationalized
goals are usually expressions of utilitarianism; in science policy
matters, utilitarian tradeoffs may appear to be both unacceptable
and yet unavoidable.
Rights and moral traditions believed to be non-negotiable to parties in a
science policy debate are antithetical to management science notions of
trade-offs and overarching utility functions by which conflicting objec-
tives are handled. The sacredness or value of life, for example, is held by
some to be incapable of measurement in dollar terms. Trade-offs for
expenditures on estimated lives saved. lives lengthened. and quality of life
improvements are rarely explicitly addressed. A growing interest in risk
assessment represents the search for acceptable levels of risk for dif-
ferent hazards. yet some simply reject the notion that a calculatable
acceptable level of risk can be determined (Starr and Whipple 1980 and
Otway and von Winterfeldt 1981). Yet in fact. trade-offs of lives and dol-
lars. and lives and life improvements are made either implicitly or by
default in a wide variety of public and private settings. These are the real-
ities of many science policy issues. When are rights to be treated as con-
straints and when as competing objectives? When will trade-off analysis
2These are listed as "fuzzy terms" in goal specification by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (1973. pp.12-13).
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help lead to an acceptable compromise and when will explicit statements
of trade-off retard the resolution process? Traditional notions of goals
have largely ignored issues of rights and moral traditions treated as non-
negotiable. Real problem contexts of science policy are rarely without
them.
o Science Management Offers Cases Where Satisfactory Measures of
Goal Attainment are Unlikely.
Some goals of science policy or research management are simply
impossible to quantify satisfactorily and thereby remain immune to
management science approaches.
Science related goals concerned with quality of life, for example, often
recognize that material well-being is not the only measure relevant to
populations affected by policy options. Community groups potentially
affected by hazardous facilities may argue strongly that freedom from
risk, or at least from potentially dangerous situations, defines their qual-
ity of life to a great extent. How can such notions be adequately quanti-
fied?
In the related context of research management, project goals simi-
larly unoperationalizable reflect research as an uncertain search for
greater understanding. Traditional academic measures of number of pub-
lications, quality of science produced, and number of citations simply fail
to capture adequately how much greater understanding has actually
occurred. As an extreme case, most international research organizations
include as a major goal that of achieving international cooperation, or
mutual understanding and better relations among countries. Problems of
satisfactory measures associated with such goals are usually seen as
ｩ ｮ ｳ ｵ ｲ ｭ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｢ ｬ ･ and substituted instead with expert te'stimony on accom-
plishments.
o Science Management Offers Cases of Goal Uncertainty and Search
Uncertainty Different from the Event Uncertainty of Traditional
Management Science Formulation.
3For example. goals of programs of scientific exchan&e include such difficult to quantify no-
tions as; "to promote better relations between the United States and the nations of Asia and
the Pacific" (actual goal of the East-West Center in Hawaii as legislated by the U.S. Congress);
"to strengthen international collaboration; to contribute to the advancement of science and
systems analysis; and to achieve applications to problems of international importance" (ac-
tual goals of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis as stated in its charter);
and "to understand other nations better," "to see ourselves as others see us," "to help other
nations develop," "to bring about a flow in two directions of personali2ed information, experi-
ence, and understanding," "to broaden the outlook of educators and leaders," "to advance
knowledge and to strengthen the world community of education, science, and culture," and
"to develop abroad an understaI 1ing of U.S. culture and institutions" (all these and many
more are goals attributed to the U.S. Fu.lbright Program of scholarships abroad). In each of
these cases, individual testimony has dominated as the critical evaluative mechanism for
continued budget support. Quantitative studies have tended to focus on input measures (dol-
lars, participants by disciplinary field and country, etc.) and not on outcomes.
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In research management. project goals are often actually loose dep-
ictions of what might be attainable. without clear means-ends chains
or search procedures available a priori to guide actions and choice.
or even to test whether achievement of the goal is feasible.
Research project goal statements are notoriously vacuous and often with
good reason. Scientists often simply do not know in advance what their
final outcome, conclusion, methodology, or product will be, or even it if
can be produced. Consequently, they tend to couch their goal statements
in terms of what activities they are going to do, rather than in what those
activities are intended to accomplish. Research managers are then faced
with such goal statements as:
to study; to investigate; to attempt to find; to test alternatives; to
analyze; to explore the nature of; to conduct a workshop on; and to
prepare a paper on.
In these situations, the scientists involved may simply be unwilling to
state, and with good reason, that they will develop a methodology. or
find an answer, or even achieve a better understanding of a phenomenon.
Instead, they are willing to commit themselves only to the conduct of the
research and to specified formats of activity. but not any results. Facing
realities in science management problem contexts requires not only the
operationalization of ambiguous and complex goals, but confronting the
uncertainty in goal attainment as well.
o Science Management Offers Visible Cases oJ Hidden Goa.ls.
Hidden political goals (unstated yet often dominant) in science policy
are common in many political settings, and usually ignored by
management science formulations.
For example, geographic placement of large scientific facilities may have
less to do with optimal natural environmental conditions than with provid-
ing employment opportunities for specific locations. Dror (1980) focuses
on different goal orientations of management science and politics in the
following manner. Management science approaches focus on goal attain-
ment in an "open mind" approach to alternatives; with a single decision
focus; a substantive solution orientation; concern for the issues involved
and in a time orientation reflecting the natural life cycle of the issues;
and in a clinical, detached manner. In contrast, Dror sees many matters
of policy being determined according to concerns of "high politics" which
focus instead on practice and doctrines essential to maintain consensus
and save time in problem solving: on policy packaging for consensus and
balance rather than a single decision orientation; on the symbolic and
expressive aspects of solutions rather than strictly on their substantive
aspects; on political time cycles as well as the life cycles of issues
involved; and on achieVing an emotional zeal for policy acceptance rather
than on a detached and objective analysis.
Political concern for consensus. packaging, and symbolism are not
necessarily opposing the concerns represented by stated goals; often
they are aimed at promoting politicai acceptance of decisions and actions
analyzed as optimum. fQr goal_ ｾ ｴ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｮ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ Ｎ Furthermore. management
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scientists are often aware of the political processes that will be brought
to bear on their analyses and recommendations, and wish to incorporate
political concerns somehow in their analytical formulations. How to do so
is still rather a mystery. Dror's concepts and principles of policy science
(1968, 1971a, 1971b) offer a step in this direction. However, translations
of these concepts and principles into management science frameworks is
yet to be done.
In research management, individual goals of key scientists are often
never explicitly revealed because of their personal character, involving
for example, career advancement or personal visibility. Yet these indivi-
dual goals and motivations play no small part in shaping the work of the
respective organizational unit.
New Frameworks for New Notions About Goals
Modern organizational theory suggests some interesting and plausi-
ble alternatives to the traditional management science frameworks of
goal seeking decision behavior. Yet none has been developed to the point
of supplanting the traditional normative frameworks. Simon (1970), for
example, argues that individuals and organizations don't really pursue
particular goals; instead, they seek in their actions and decisions to
satisfy a whole set of requirements or constraints. Singling out anyone of
them as the "main" objective is largely arbitrary. In this regard, goals act
more as criteria, either in testing the satisfactoriness of proposed solu-
tions or helping in alternative generation.
A second framework is suggested in the context of organizations as
coalitions of indiViduals with widely varying preference orderings. One is
tempted to suppose that the goals of the organization are then
represented by some sort of joint preference ordering. But Cyert and
March (1975) show that this is not well supported by evidence. "Studies of
organizational objectives suggest that to the extent to which there is
agreement on objectives, it is agreement on highly ambiguous goals. Such
agreement is undoubtedly important to choice within the organization,
but it is a far cry from a clear preference ordering. The studies suggest
further that behind this agreement on rather vague objectives there is
considerable disagreement and uncertainty about sub-goals; that organi-
zations appear to be pursuing one goal at a time and another (partially
inconsistent) goal at another; and that different parts of the organization
appear to be pursuing different goals at the same time." (p.79) As an
alternative to the traditional framework, Cyert and March explain the
nature of goals by referring to the process by which they evolve, including
(a) bargaining among the participants which form the coalition; (b) inter-
nal organizational processes by which objectives are stabilized (in budg-
ets, allocation of functions, and adherence to precedents); and (c)
responses to experiences of environmental change.
In a third perspective, Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) and March and
Olsen (1976), accept goals as ambigUOUS or unknown or even discovered
through action, and postulate a model in which organizations make
choices without consistent or shared goals. In their model are different
streams of problems (concerns requiring atteI!tion); solutions
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(somebody's answer looking for concerns to satisfy); participants (who
come and go and offer varying amounts of energy for supporting solu-
tions); and choice opportunities (occasions when it is expected to pro-
duce decision behaviors). Solutions are accepted to problems not in any
framework of overall goal support, but as a "consequence of different
rates and patterns of flow in each of the streams and different pro-
cedures for relating them."
How goals function to influence, guide, or determine decision
behavior (if they do) is still a mystery. To sort it out, management scien-
tists need empirical studies as a base for new model development. Sci-
ence management, in which goals are clearly ambiguous, or hidden, or
unmeasureable, or disparately supported, yet in the context of which
decisions are visibly made, may provide an extremely useful empirical
base for this exploration.
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CHAPrER6
REALITIES OF DECISION PROCESSES
In complex, social situations, decisionmaking in the sense of rational,
analytical determination of choice as a paradigm of goal-directed
behavior is largely a myth. So is the concept of a decisionmaker (an indi-
vidual identifiable as the one responsible for a particular major decision).
In reality, when a person identifies a decision that he or someone else has
made, he usually is referring either to a formal statement, document, or
other symbolic form which represents commitment to a particular action
or choice, or the action or choice itself which infers the decision made.
Yet the person or persons responsible for enacting the symbolic
representation or even carrying out the choice or action may not neces-
sarily be the one(s) who formulated the commitment and/or ordered its
execution. Nor does choice or action necessarily mean conscious
decisionmaking except in a tautological sense.
For management scientists, the concepts of decisions and decision-
makers have been both useful for defining and delimiting the role of
management science, and blinding to the realities in which actions and
choices are often made in actual problem situations. Management scien-
tists willing to be accountable for the rational formulation of their recom-
mendations according to principles of scientific method and the limita-
tions of data and resources, but not willing to be accountable for the
consequences of the actions taken on the basis of their recommendations
need to separate the role of analyst/consultant from that of accountable
official. By referring to others as decisionmakers, analysts provide them-
selves with justification for focusing their own attention on problem
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analysis. and avoiding questions of who is responsible for the commitment
to action. and how that commitment is formulated (the realities of the
decisionmaking process). This also serves to separate identification and
communication of the recommended choice (the primary role of manage-
ment science) from acceptance and implementation of the recommenda-
tions made (often a matter of organizational or national politics). Some
management scientists. "however, have focused specifically on the latter
processes of argumentation. participation of interest groups, consensus
development. and formulation of action commitments. Their published
experience has added significantly to the management science literature
regarding realities of decisionmaking in social and political contexts.
Some of those realities are listed below.
Aspects oj Decisionmaking Realities
[1] The dynamic reality of the formulation of commitment
In complex situations. there is usually no single act of conscious deli-
beration leading to an intended commitment. but many deliberations
by many interested groups, each requiring resolution of differences.
trade-offs of interests. and persuasion of others. Unanticipated
events. new actors in the problem situation. and new formations of
coalitions. positions. and alternatives. all influence the dynamics of
the processes leading to decision representation.
[2] The political reality that no single choice may dominate
In many social situations. there are often legitimate disagreements
on goals and legitimate differences on the importance placed on vari-
ous criteria. Whose values are to be used in making trade-offs? How
are equity considerations to be handled? How are long-term impacts
to be valued and compared to short-run gains when long-term
interests may not adequately be represented? Rational analysis may
have little to offer in these situations of differing values.
[3] The cultural/legal reality that processes of decisionmaking or policy
setting (at government levels) are shaped by cultural and legal tradi-
tions influencing who can participate. how arguments are to be
presented. and how power is employed
The usual notion of a "best" solution does not reflect the role of
power or institutional traditions in the way commitments are formu-
lated in real contexts. For example. in the science policy questions of
development of standards and regulations. or in the site and safety
decisions for hazardous facilities, the cultural heritages of different
nations impose structure to the ｰ ｯ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｾ processes by which deci-
sions are made. Table 7 by Jerry Ravetz shows how these cultural
styles set the tone and form of many government decision processes.
"Dr. Ravetz was a participant in an IIASA seminar in 1980 on Risk Management: Siting of
Liguid Energy Gas Facilities. The presentation of material in Table 7 was impromptu and no
published version is believed to exist.
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Table 7
Influences of Cultural and Legal Heritages
on Policymaking Processes R.egarding
Hazardous Facilities
U.S.A.:
U.K.:
France:
Economic
European
Community:
Rules and Style of Regu- Style of Rule
Regulations latory Power Setting
Formalistic; Participatory Litigious: Use
Encyclopedic (function of of experts
history)
Informal: Paternalistic Consultative
Jterative (reflecting among agencies
(responding a sense of (citizens have
to events) fair play) no legal power)
Informal Elitist Consensus
(though (dependent in Private (e.g.
deductive) on experts) in Tribunals)
Rationalistic Elitist Bure aucratic
source of
Arguments;
Rules negotiated
along with
other issues
, Ideas and assessments in this table are attributed to Jerry Ravetz.
[4] The human reality that any particular commitment to action may be
more a response to cognitive limitations, stress, and anxiety than a
response based on rational evaluation and selection among alterna-
tives
Limits to rationality in human decisionmaking is seen by March and
Simon (1964) as being a result of cognitive limitations in humans as
information processing devices. In Simon's concept of "bounded
rationality," alternatives and their effects are not all known in
advance but are discovered through information search procedures.
Pure rationality would require a complete preference ordering of all
the possible alternative actions based on evaluations of their respec-
tive effects. Bounded rationality in humans is instead characterized
by satisficing (searching until a satisfactory solution is found and
then adopting it and ending search) rather than optimiZing (requir-
ing generation and evaluation of all possible alternatives). Cognitive
ｾ ｬ ｩ ｭ ｩ ｴ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ Ｌ stress, and anXiety also lead humans to adopt informal
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rules or heuristics which govern how they search for alternatives and
their effects, and a system of concepts and cues influencing what
they perceive, and how they interpret resulting information. Deci-
sions made or information communicated not on the basis of the evi-
dence itself but on the basis of inferences drawn from the evidence
and influenced by the concepts and cues created by an individual are
products of "uncertainty absorption" according to March and Simon
(1964, p.165). Dror (1980) refers to similar phenomenon as "mistake
propensities" and "uncertainty distortions and repressions" caused
by continually reinforced ways of perceiving situations which, though
functional in some settings, may be dysfunctional in others.
Avoiding decisions is a further means for controlling stress. Decisions
imply discretion on the part of the individual, at least discretion and/or
responsibility to choose among available options. The exercise of discre-
tion itself may be stress inducing. For example, Thompson (1967) sug-
gests general plausible propositions about discretionary behavior in
organizations in response to anxiety:
When the individual believes that his cause/effect resources
are inadequate to the uncertainty, he will seek to evade dis-
cretion. (p.119)
This may occur by his perceiving the situation as one to be based on pre-
cedent or formula and therefore not requiring a decision identifiable as
his own. A second proposition is the follOWing:
The more serious the individual believes the consequences of
error to be, the more he will seek to evade discretion. (p.120)
Here, discretion is substituted, for example, by objective testing, as in
personnel placement or educational promotion.
Within organizations, precedents, institutionalized rules, standard
operating procedures, routinized programs of action and classifications of
situations for determining what is the proper rule, procedure, or program
to use, are all common ways to limit the exercise of discretion and
thereby limit deviation in organizational response to normal situations
encountered. Of course, discretion is not completely evaded. since using
one of these institutionalized mechanisms is a decision in itself. The point
is that institutionalized rules for response often impose severe limits on
the considerations of alternative actions and on the generation of new
alternatives. Stress and anxiety may often lead individuals to resort to
these rules rather than proceed with information search and action
choice based on principles of rational analysis.
[5] The social/interaction reality that achieving consensus for commit-
ments to a course of action may be based less on the identification of
a most preferred alternative and more on the acceptable conduct of
a participative, open-minded process of fact-finding. exchange of
views, and compromise
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In complex government policy matter, decisionmaking has become
somewhat of a social ritual. Participation by groups of affected or
even only interested groups are now mandated in the U.S. in some
circumstances. Various government agencies and levels, all affected
by the interdependent consequences of their separate policies and
programs, consult, coordinate, interact, and in other ways engage in
the decisionmaking processes of each other. Studies may be ordered
which then spawn further studies to examine the conflicting or unc-
ertain results of earlier ones. Social experiments may be conducted,
polls or referenda taken, and political positions formulated. The
entire process may take years before a policy is finally adopted or
action program begun.
Much of this ritual is a reflection of the cultural/legal/political tradi-
tions and changes to those traditions that are now occurring. Objec-
tions and demands by citizen groups in the U.S. are often more
directed to the processes of government agencies in making policy
decisions than to the actual policies that are adopted. To many
interested parties, participation may symbolize power or standing;
or at least acknowledgment of their particular viewpoint. All the
ritual and inclusion of so many groups may indeed benefit the search
and evaluation of alternative policy choices, or may instead bog it
down or redirect it toward more politically acceptable but less
analytically optimal solutions. The evidence that fair and open pro-
cedures actually lead to "better" solutions is hard to come by. even
in a post hoc decision review.
First Ord.er Responses by Management Scientists
As a response to these and other realities about decisions and
decisionmaking, some authors have proposed alternatives to the rational
model of goal-directed l:>ehavior as a description of decisionmaking
processes actually used. Most of the following alternative models have an
organizational context, with the relation between the individual and his
organization influencing decisionmaking behavior strongly.
Organization Process Model: This is a model proposed in Allison (1971)
and expands on the notion of decisions in large organizations being for-
mulated less on rational analysis and more on the basis of standard
operating procedures and routine patterns of behavior (programs and
repertoires). Similar and earlier arguments were made by Downs (1966)
and March and Simon (1964).
Bureaucratic PoLitics Model: When more than one person or group is
involved in the decisionmaking process, differences in goals, perceptions,
and resources plus territorial ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ･ ｳ ｴ ｾ and quests for increased power
tend to introduce bargaining behavior, formation of coalitions, and situa-
tions requiring conflict resolution. This model is used to help understand
decisionmaking in large ｯ ｲ ｧ ｡ ｮ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ and bureaucracies as a competitive
bargaining game among players' positioned hierarchically. March and
Simon (1964) view bargailung and politics as two ways organizations
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handle conflict (along with problem solving and persuasion). At its
current state of development, game theory may help explain some deci-
sion behavior, but evidence that people in real decision situations involv-
ing conflict act in accordance with gaming solutions is sparse.
Disjointed Incrementalism or the "Muddling Through" Model: More closely
consistent with reality in advanced countries where organizations have
achieved relatively stable relations with their environment is Lindbloom's
theory of "muddling through" first proposed in 1959 and developed over
the following decade. In this theory, decisionmaking leads usually to
incremental changes toward agreed-upon policies closely based on past
experience. Lindbloom, like Simon. basis his arguments on the limits of
information processing capabilities in humans, and similarly concludes
that all alternatives will not be considered, but only those near the status
quo. The critical test of decision merit is if all parties agree to it. Criti-
cisms of Lindbloom's theory by Dror (1971b, pp.257-263) focus on two
aspects. First. Dror argues that for a strategy of incremental change to
be useful. present policies must be generally satisfactory and the nature
of problems encountered and ways of dealing with them relatively con-
stant, conditions not usually found in developing countries or in others
facing rapid change. Secondly, Dror sees the "proinertia and antiinnova-
tion" aspects of the theory as blocks to stimulating administrations to
seek new ideas and attempt novel solutions. This latter argument is
interesting in that it points out the differences between descriptive and
prescriptive models and how they might be related. Kickert (1980, p.48)
interprets Dror's arguments as indicating "prescriptive (normative)
models should indeed by based on a description (model) of reality but the
descriptive model cannot simply be equalized to a normative one." The
major differences evident in the model of rational analysis, which
requires evaluation of all possible alternatives. and the model of muddling
through. which severely limits alternative consideration. indicates the
current polarities of models of prescription and others of reality.
Intuition: Though no formal theory of intuition as a decisionmaking pro-
cess has yet been formulated, many authors do include discussions of
intuition or other "extrarational" processes such as judgment, ｳ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ Ｌ
and moral values in their descriptions of how decisions are made. To a
great extent. the descriptions of what intuition is or how it works are for-
mulated in rather imprecise terms. What is made clear. however, is that
models of rational analysis seem inadequate in describing common recog-
nizable acts of creativity in alternative generation. or insight into a pre-
ferred solution. or seemingly direct leaps to an appropriate conclusion.
Certainly the acknowledgment of these phenomena is helpful in maintain-
ing a proper perspective and sense of humility when approaching such an
unclear. complex phenomenon as human decisionmaking with the
simplistic decision concepts currently available to us.
5See for example Cowan (1975) ｡ ｾ ､ Morris (1968, pp.199-207).
--
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Organized Anarchy or the "Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice:
Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) have focused on universities as charac-
teristic of organizations with inconsistent and ill-defined preferences: ill-
understood processes by which they operate, learn, and cope with emerg-
ing problems: and fluid participation, to develop a model of organized
anarchy. In situations characterized by the above. decision opportunities
are ambiguous stimuli for "choices looking for problems, issues and feel-
ings looking for decision situations in which they might be the answer,
and decision makers looking for work" (p.l). Principles of the model are
use d by Sproull eLal. (1978) to help understand decisions regarding the
early history of the U.S. National Institute of Education, and by March and
Olsen (1976) regarding the selection of a dean, the location of a college,
and other decisions within educational contexts.
Other models offered as alternatives to the model of rational analysis
include "System Models," "Policy Models," "Models of Cognitive Style," and
"Policy Content Approaches" all discussed briefly in Lynn (1980, pp.9-22)
plus the "Mixed Scanning Model" proposed by Etzioni and the "Cybernetic
or Homeostatic Model" of Steinbrunner based on principles of Ashby and
Simon discussed briefly in Kickert (1980. pp.48-50). Kickert also presents
a more detailed survey of most of the alternative models listed above.
Diversity among these models provides a clear indication of the compleje-
ity and uncertainty surrounding actual decisionmaking processes. In
some of the perspectives represented by these models, rational analysis
has only a small part to play if any at all.
The Exceptional Nature oJ Decisionmaking in Science Management
What can the field of science management offer? First, better under-
standing of the complexities of real decision processes requires a rich
source of decision behaviors indicative of the complexities involved.
Secondly, these processes must be highly visible or discernible so that
analytical or modeling efforts are feasible. Science management offers an
empirical base of both characteristics.
o Science Management Offers Visible and Discernible Complex .Decision
Processes.
Science management. including both research management and science
policy formulation, is illustrative of most of the decisionmaking realities
described above, and of many of the perspectives represented in the
alternative models of decisionmaking. Table 8 summarizes many of these
realities and points out where each is reflected in key science manage-
ment decisions. Some of the latter items (in italics and double brackets
in Table 8) are clarified below in examples of actual processes used and
described in published documents.
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Table 8
Decision Processes in Science Management
Realities of Decision Processes
[a] complex dynamics: many steps each requiring resolution of differ-
ences and influenced by unanticipated events, new actors, and new
problem formulations
[b] no single correct or opti:m.al decision: legitimate differences in goals
and importance placed on various criteria make no dominant solu-
tion possible
[c] decision processes are shaped by cultural/legal traditions
[d] cognitive limitations, stress. and anxiety all limit the number of
alternatives examined
[e] decision processes as social ritual: reflecting acceptable conduct of
search and evaluation procedures
[f] reversions to standardized operating procedures: avoiding decisions
by using institutionalized rules and response behaviors instead
[g] bargaining: and coalition formation which influence decision out-
comes
[h] incrementalism: in decisions introducing change
[i] reliance on intuition
[j] choices looking Jor problems: and issues looking for decision situa-
tions, and solutions looking for issues. all as more representative of
actual situations than classical decision theory suggests
Research Management \>ecisions and Decision Process Realities (indica-
tive of the listing above)
(1) Choosing major topics of the research agenda: [[a]], [b], [d], [[e]],
[gJ. [[i]], [j]
(2) Choosing key research staff: [[b]], [c], [d], [e], [g], [[i]], [j]
(3) Planning a research program: [[a]]. [b], [d], [[e]], [[f]], [g]. [i]. [[j]]
(4) Project selection and budgeting: [a] or [f], [[d]], [[e]], [g], [[h]],
[[i]], [j]
(5) Designing the organizational structure: [[a]]. [b], [c]. [d]
•Items in italics and double brackets are discussed in the ｴ ｾ ｸ ｴ Ｎ
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Table 8 (cont.)
Science Policy Decisions and Decision Process Realities (of the same list-
ing above)
(1) Choosing priorities for science development (e.g. basic versus
applied research; and the relative support of science for military.
energy, space, health, etc.): [a]' [b], [c]. [e]. [g], [h]. [j]
(2) Setting the science budget (Le. allocations to science agencies; to
manpower training; and to institution building; etc.): [a], [b]. [c], [e],
[g], [h], [j]
(3) Funding of specific science projects (both large and small): [a] or [f].
[b], [d]. [e], [i]
(4) Choosing proper mechanisms for directing and encouraging science
development (e.g. tax incentives. formula allocations to regions, and
peer review processes for proposal acceptance): [b], [c], [f]. [h], [i]
(5) Choosing and/or designing organizations for science policy advice:
[a]. [b]. [c], [g], [i]
Decisionmaking realities within the context of research management are
illustrated in the practices employed in the following processes:
(1) Choosing major topics of the research agenda (Le. identifying the
priority disciplines. topics. or problems on which to focus the
research program). Characteristic of this process are:
Complex dyna.mics and d.ecision processes as social ritua.l; The major
topics or problems on the research agenda of a scientific organiza-
tion are rarely if ever deduced directly from the organizational char-
ter or mandate. Enabling legislation or founding statements provide
notoriously little guidance on what specific ally is to be addressed in
making contributions toward abstract or lofty goals. Instead, deter-
mination of the research agenda is usually a complex social process
of solicitation of priorities from interested parties and mediation
among them.
For example. in setting the initial research agenda (list of projects)
for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Levien
(1977, pp.7-9) mentions discussions with the more than a dozen
national member nations as the process used for developing a bal-
anced portfolio responding to the multiple interest groups (national
member scientific organizations). multiple goals, and the capabilities
and interests of the research staff. For the U.S. National Institute of
Education. Sproull (1978.pp. 36-59) describes the variety of activi-
ties of outside consultants. special planning units. and congressional
hearings contributing to the alternative listings of program
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initiatives (research agenda items) proposed, and (on pp.162-201)
the many forms of deliberations and reformulations of the agenda
that occurred. For the Rand Corporation, major topics of research
are arrived at in a variety of ways. According to Smith (1966,
pp.165-171), many arrive through formal and informal negotiations
with a client leading to agreements reflecting both client interest
and Rand interest and capability. Others are self-initiated based
solely on the interests of research staff, and still others are some
combination of the two. In all three cases, processes used stress
extensive discussion, a style of consensus rather than authoritarian
decisionmaking, and attention to the interests of constituent groups.
Reliance on intuition: Also in all three cases above is the lack of any
analytical way to predict that the topics chosen would yield to
research efforts successful in promoting overall organizational goals.
Here, as in other science decisions, the judgment and intuition of the
single top manager of the organization (research director) is often
critical.
(2) Choosing key research staff (Le. identifying candidates and choosing
among them for research leader positions):
No single correct or optimal decision, reliance on intuition: Person-
nel decisions, especially for key positions, are laden with uncertain-
ties. incomparable dimensions (personality traits), and varying views
of what is important. As in marriage, there is no best choice out of all
possible choices; only choices that end up working out well or not
well. In key personnel decisions, reliance on intuition and efforts for
ensuring a proper search and evaluation process are common. These
latter efforts promote fair decisions, but not necessarily optimum
ones.
(3) Planning a research program (Le. not the approval of the plan, but
the input, analyses. and drafting involved in the plan preparation):
Complex dynamics, social ritual, a.nd issues looking for d.ecision
situations: Wirt et.al. (1975) document the wide range of activities
for program planning found in U.S. federal research agencies, includ-
ing planning workshops and conferences; use of adVisory councils;
internal staff planning meetings and generation of issue papers and
program proposals; studies of needs assessments, program alterna-
tives, social experiments, and policy research into underlying causes
of problems, conducted by outside consultant groups or special
staffs; use of formal planning techniques (frameworks of objectives
and decision criteria); and variations in the role of the program off-
icer in formulating plans. For specific research organizations, plan-
ning conferences are routine and plans are prepared in relation to
specific prestated criteria such as multidisciplinary character, clar-
ity of accomplishable objectives, interrelations with other research
units within the organization and with external cooperating institu-
tions, and clear relevance to institutional goals. Yet the process of
program planning may be anything but straightforward. For
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planning the initial programs of the U.S. National Institute of Educa-
tion, Sproull et.al. (1978) portray a process fraught with ambiguity,
recycling of drafts, and inability to reach closure, all despite a desire
to implement a rational model of decisionmaking for the planning
process:
Rather than consider alternatives simultaneously,
the NIE system examined them sequentially. As
each alternative cycled through its iteration, events
external and internal to the institute continually
reshaped the criteria against which the solution was
judged. The development of alternatives, the desire
for and belief in deliberation, and the press of
events led to situations in which the alternatives
under consideration were out of phase with the cri-
teria used to evaluate them. The processes we have
described came to closure only when an important
external deadline required it - in the case of the
budgets ... or when staff exhaustion and a deadline
impelled it - in the case of the planning process. In
each case the final de cision was made despite
desire for further deliberation. (p.200)
(4) Project Selection and Budgeting:
Cognitive Limitations and anxieties limiting alternatives examined;
d.ecision processes as social ritual; and reliance on intuition:
Processes for selection of R&D projects and for their funding
comprise a major proportion of the literature on research manage-
ment. What is available for review ranges from detailed descriptive
accounts of specific selection decisions to highly mathematical for-
mulations offered as general prescriptive aids. In most R&D settings,
the number of possible projects of potential relevance is unlimited.
Consequently, organizations either conducting research or funding it
elsewhere develop ways for encouraging project proposals in areas in
which they have programmatic interest. These include Requests for
Proposals, Calls for Papers, publication in external media or in
research plan documents of organizational interests in funding
research of specified focus, and in the case of organizations conduct-
ing research, hiring scientists with established reputations in
research fields of interest. Project generation processes are impor-
tant components in project selection decisions because they help
create the alternatives considered for funding.
Some of the current diversity in both project generation and selec-
tion processes among U.S. federal research agencies is presented in
Wirt et.al. (1975). These processes range from reliance on the scien-
tificcommunity to submit unsolicited proposals, and use of struc-
tured panels of peer scientists to review and select projects recom-
mended for funding; to processes dominated by the personal
knowledge and initiatives of program officers or of internal program
management committees. Unlimited project alternatives, major
uncertainties about project success or usefulness of findings, and the
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personal consequences on individual careers often resulting from
major selection decisions, all have contributed to the rather ela-
borate selection processes found in the U.S. These included use of
science panels, of formal project evaluation forms, and of advisory
boards and multiple authoriZing authorities, especially when govern-
ment funds are involved. Even where more quantitative formulations
are suggested (cf. Cardus et.al. (1980), Sigford and Parvin (1965),
and Wirt et.al. (1975, AppendiX C)), the determination of probability
of success, probability of utilization, and valuation of potential bene-
fits require some measure of intuition backed where possible with
consensus and/or enthusiasm for support.
Incrementalism: Managers of research rarely act in the characteris-
tic manner of a military officer deciding for himself the proper
course of action, then leading the troops to battle; rather, their
actions are more like that of a sheepdog running around the edges of
its herd and making loues noises just to keep everybody moving in the
same general direction. Approval of projects and setting of budget
levels are two of the few management tools available for influencing
the direction of research (another is hiring) and are usually focused
on marginal adjustments rather than trend reversals or other major
discontinuities (To do otherwise may lead to the herd dispersing in
confusion or simply ignoring the irritating barks). Major research
programs do not usually conclude and disappear; they spawn other
related research, revive in other gUise, and hopefully cumulate
toward desired results beyond the scope of anyone project. In this
way, research capabilities. contacts, and investments are not lost fol-
lOWing the scheduled completion of a program. Few research organi-
zations could survive continued major shifts in programmatic focus
or internal budget SWings. Equally important, project approvals and
budget levels often connote status in the organization. Unequal or
changing distributions of internal funds may be interpreted as sym-
bolic of different or changing status of people. disciplines, or prob-
lems, or of the arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the
research manager. Consequently, many research organizations.
especially international or interdisciplinary ones. exhibit· not only
incrementalism in decisions of program budgeting. but also equality
in funding (program areas increment equally) despite lack of evi-
dence that research in one area. even if as important as research in
another, is equally costly.
(5) Designing the Organizational Structure:
Complex dynamics and cogniti:ue limitations: Published accounts of
the issues and circumstances surrounding the initial organization of
a research institution. and its many reorganizations are also avail-
able (cf. Smith (1966) regarding the history of c""ganizational struc-
tures of the Rand Corporation, Levien (1977) on the initial and
current structure of lIASA, and Wirt et.al. (1975) on structures in
SA ｣ｨ｡ｲ｡｣ｴ･ｾ｡ｴｩｯｮ voiced by Roger Levien, director of qASA.
--
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U.S. federal research agencies). Other accounts of organizational
history are readily found in internal documents, published reviews by
outside agencies (cf. the U.S. Government Accounting Office's pub-
lished report on the East-West Center (1978)), and consultants'
reports, obtainable 1rom the individual research organizations. In
many cases 01 organizational change, the resulting structures are
reflections of the dynamics and complexities of constituents or sup-
porters, and are symbolic of changes instituted in response to crises
(cf. Selbst (1978), Smith (1966), Government Accounting Office
(1978)).
Similarly, the realities of decisionmaking listed in Table 8 are illustrated
throughout the context of science policy formulation. Overall, probably
more has been written about science policy than about research manage-
ment, both in general terms and with regard to specific examples. The
general literature on science policy includes material on science and
technology policy history, developments, and perspectives; on methods
for policy analysis and formulation; and on the relation of science and
technology policy to society. Specific policy studies include analyses of
science policy formulation processes within specific nations, or compar-
ing processes across selected nations; and the legislative histories of
specific science projects. This combined literature is a rich base of
detailed information surrounding science policy decisions and decision-
making in a wide variety of contexts. Regarding science policy formula-
tion, perhaps the most ｩ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｭ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ is available on the processes used in
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. All the realities of decisionmaking processes
listed in Table 8 are clearly evideIIt in both these cases, and most likely in
all cases 01 industrialized nations.
7For example, an article by York (1973) titled "The Nuts and Bolts of Science Policy"
describes the lengthy U.S. process of science policy formulation in most cases, from ideas
generated in the science community, through the relevant national science agencies, then
throU4lh the complex Executive and Conuessional budget and appropriations processes, and
finally to the agencies responsible for carrying out the policy or program. In a similar
fashion, Turkevich, in an article titled "Soviet Science Policy Formulation" (1977), describes
Soviet science decisionmaking involving the First Secretary of the Party, the Politburo of the
Central Committee, the Central Committee itself, the State Committee on Science and Tech-
nology of the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the Presidium of
the U.S.S.H. Academy of Sciences, the relevant ministries, etc. Both of these articles are
ｾ ｲ ｩ ･ ｦ and readable, though others may be more exact in their descriptions.
Rather than attempt here to exemplify the obvious and similar characteristics of decision-
making realities for science policy formulation as was done earlier for research management,
I focus on science policy formulation in the context of the roles of scientific analysis, as
described. ｭ Ｎ ｴ ｨ ｾ next chapter.
RM-77-2
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
An Introduction
M.A. Keyzer
January 1977
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con-
ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute or of the National Member Organizations supporting the
Institute.
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CHAPfKR7
REAIJTIES OF THE ROLES OF ANALYSIS
The role of scientific analysis within either management or policy
formulation in any setting is shaped to a great extent by both the nature
of scientific analysis itself, and the nature of the context in which it is
employed. This section focuses on the realities of scientific analysis in
general (including management science analyses) and the roles it
currently plays shaped by the realities of its present nature. Examples in
science policy formulation are used to provide illustrations of the nature,
limitations, and productive uses made of scientific analysis.
Earlier chapters of this paper addressed the nature and limitations
of management science. Additional characteristics of scientific analysis in
general pertinent to its role in science policy include the following.
Realities of the Nature of Analysis in Policy Related Roles
(a) Within science policy contexts (and elsewhere), scientific analysis is
no longer viewed by participating parties as being value-free or
purely objective.
Not only is it becoming increasingly recognized that analysis is a process
incorporating subjective judgment and selective perception in problem
formulation. choice of analytical framework and evaluative criteria, data,
and perspective for interpretation of results, as well as cognitive distor-
tion and tendencies to prefer hard data over soft and measureable
- 76-
characteristics over hard to measure ones; it is also becoming recognized
(as argued by Ravetz) that these craft and creative aspects of scientific
analysis cannot be disassociated from the alleged objective and imper-
sonal results and knowledge derived from the analysis. In other words, as
products of a subjective and value-laden process, analytical results neces-
sarily carry the subjective and craft characteristics of those processes.
(b) Scientific analyses on any particular policy issue usually occur in
multiple amounts, focusing on various aspects of complex decision or
policy contexts.
Rarely can one analysis encompass all aspects of a complex issue, and
rarely do alternative analyses on the same aspect produce identical con-
clusions. Consequently, policy issues are typically fraught with competing
and conflicting analyses on similar issues, or with analyses which focus on
different and incomparable issues supporting competing general conclu-
sions. Even when many analyses are performed on various different and
complementary aspects, there is usually no overarching or integrative
analysis (or methodology for performing one) pulling all the analyses
together.
(c) In practice, scientific analyses differ in breadth of scope, depth of
study, and employment of sophisticated techniques, according to the
kinds and amounts of resources provided: and parties to policy
issues usually have unequal financial resources or political standing
with which to support their analyses.
Competing scientific analyses therefore are not usually competing in
their application of scientific principles alone. As indicated in an earlier
chapter, referral to sophisticated scientific analysis may be one way of
shifting the argumentation to a base whereby the inequalities in
resources may be exploited to political advantage.
(d) Decision structures assumed by analyses may not match the actual
institutional structures responsible for decisionmaking.
Lathrop (1980) argues that most analyses infer a single decisionmaking
process to make tradeoffs among conflicting objectives and that in reality
(as in cases of siting decisions for liquid energy gas facilities in Califor-
nia), the institutional structure responsible for decisions is largely disag-
gregated and diffuse in focus.
(e) Despite the social and value-laden aspects of most policy issues,
scientific analyses are usually focused on technical or engineering
aspects.
For example, scientific analyses of energy futures tend to focus on the
technically feasible rather than the politically or economically feasible
(ef. IIASA's energy study and the WAES stUdy). Similarly. for space
exploration, analyses are most often focused on what is technically possi-
ble rather than what is socially desirable, relative to other social
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improvements. Perhaps most striking in this regard is the focus of ana-
lyses conducted to measure or reduce the risks surrounding hazardous
facilities. Here, analysis is conducted predominantly on the engineering
and materials reliability of systems developed to prevent or handle
accidents, when recent events of nuclear reactor accidents, liquid energy
gas leaks, and off-shore oil blowouts have shown that system failureg
often occur in management systems as well as in engineering systems.
Only recently has much attention been directed toward analysis of the
adequacy of training in crisis management, of the procedures employed,
and of personnel selection practices for these situations of potential
hazard.
(f) Scientific analysis in usage is commonly advocative.
In their book Models i3t the Policy Process, Greenberger et.al. (1976, p.xv)
view policy modeling (employing mathematical formulations of system
interactions) as "becoming more widespread and more patently political
in character." Various political functions served by analysis in this regard
are listed below.
Given the nature of scientific analysis as partly subjective, diffused in
focus, biased toward the technical and engineering aspects. and advoca-
tive in usage, what roles are suited to this nature and evident in practice?
Also, if the complexities. uncertainties, and value conflicts of most policy
settings prevent analysis from playing a prescriptive role in practice,
what roles are useful to the policy formulation process?
Different Roles Played by Scientific Analysis in Policy Formulation
[1] Information generating roles of scientific analysis, especially within
certain components of a decision or policy context:
Analysis performed on specific aspects of a policy context are common-
place and provide valuable information relevant to issues clarification and
alternatives examination. Typical in science policy formulations are:
tech.nical analyses: focused on engineering feasibility, availa-
bility of reqUired materials, predictions of system perfor-
mance. and reqUired advances in science or improvements in
technology.
economic analyses: focused on costs or on effects on employ-
ment, economic growth, or distribution of income.
9Fischer (1980) compares the nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island and the North
Sea Bravo oil blowout of 1977 to Sllggest patterns of accident formation, including the failure
of management or crisis-handling teams. .
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commercial analyses: focused on questions of transfer of
scientific advances to commercial applications. profitability of
resulting products in relevant markets, patent restrictions of
commercialization, etc.
social or env1:ron'I'TI.Bntal impact analyses: focused on possible
or probable effects of a program or policy on environmental
quality. social institutions and interactions. social or political
development. or any of a wide range of influences on the qual-
ity of life for an effected population.
risk or hazard analyses: focused on measuring associated
risks and comparing them to risks of approximately e.qual
magnitudes in nature or in other man-made settings 1U, or
focusing on the reliability of components (human and techni-
cal) in determining overall risk measures.
Analyses performed to generate information are educative in pur-
pose. They are not necessarily meant to prescribe what course of action
to take, but rather to lend greater understanding or insight into the prob-
lem addressed or the alternatives available. For example, by making
assumptions and factual bases explicit and visible, analysis can at least
help prevent use of wrong information or misinformation about the
nature of the problem of the existence of considered choices. Similarly.
sensitivity analyses can provide information on the effects of changes in
assumptions or choices made on various aspects of the problem formula-
tion. Analysis can further clarify who the stakeholders are within a policy
issue and how they might react to positions along various dimensions of
the problem; or conversely, why certain parties may be supporting par-
ticular positions. Greenberger et. al' (1976. pp. 24-25) describe three
common ways analyses are used to produce relevant information or
understanding: (1) unconditional forecasting: arriving at predictions
about conditions that policymakers are likely to face in the future (as in
econometric modeling); (2) conditional forecasting: formulating likely
consequences of policy decisions (or the absence of policy changes. as in
the Global 2000 Report to the President); and (3) simulations and
scenario writmg: articulating or focusing attention on policy problems,
issues, or options and their potential consequences.
[2] Process-supporting roles of scientific analysis:
Scientific analysis is supportive of movement or closure in at least three
phases of policy formulation:
lOSee for example Eng (1960) including comparisons of days of life expectancy loss, by age,
in different industries such as coal mining. construction, and railroad work; and probability
of deaths per yea:r for various environments sUch as road transport, air transport, and facto-
ry ｳ ･ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｓ ｉ compared with probability of death by natUl'al causes. also by age.
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constructive function of analysis (helping to get deliberations
started and/or initial policies stated): in this role, analysis
serves to clarify issues, define concepts and measures, focus
attention, and explicate opposing viewpoints.
critical function (exposing arguments and their supporting
evidence or logic to criticism): here, scientific analysis is used
to test or evaluate the foundations of opposing views, and to
bring the results of these tests to public scrutiny.
ritual junction (ensuring proper procedures): analysis of
environmental impact, or effects on employment across cer-
tain segments of the population, are now legislated in certain
contexts and become part of the normal ritual surrounding
policy or decision formulation and review.
Whether scientific analysis actually produces new relevant information
when performing the third of these functions is not paramount in this
particular role. Rather, analysis is used to ensure that due process is
being taken in allowing any new information to emerge.
Lathrop (19BO) provides two examples of scientific analysis serving
these functions in relating the role of risk analysis in the siting of hazar-
dous facilities in California. He describes analysis useful in the drafting of
initial legislation (constructive function) and in the presenting of cases
before a hearing process (critical function). In the former example,
analysis is used to produce specific numbers as legislated limits to action
(e.g. no facility within 10 miles of a city; nor more than 100 units of radi-
ation per time period). In the latter example. analysis is used to support
arguments of opposing parties within an appropriate public setting.
[3] Political Roles of Scientific Analysis:
Analyses are used in a variety of ways to promote political ends, including
but not limited to the marshaling of support for particular positions.
Greenberger et.al. (1976. pp.45-46) describe three different political func-
tions:
providing poLitical validity: earning a place for the issue in
question on the political agenda, especially important when
unusual decisions are required and when the number of
interested parties is large. Scientific analysis (policy model-
ing) is useful here for focusing attention and converting dimly
perceived problems into defined political issues.
submerging or defusing issues: pressures for immediate
action may be evaded by referring hot issues to study teams
tor detailed analysis. This tactic has almost become a cliche;
yet its persistence is indicative of its usefulness in ｦ ｯ ｲ ･ ｾ ｴ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｮ ｧ
action until a better understanding of the situation (or the
positions of interested parties) is known.
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ma.rshaLing support lor a particular political position: Green-
berger and his colleagues find evidence that policy research.
including modeling as one form, is shifting away from a focus
on the identification of policy problems and the invention of
policy options, and toward the systematic testing of particular
policies (Greenberger et.al. 1976, p.23). As a result, they are
increasingly being used as "instruments of political advocacy."
As political instruments, scientific analyses carry the prestige and
status of objectivity and rational reasoning. Yet highly quantitative
analysis offered as "scientific" may be anythings but reasonable or objec-
tive in its approach. For this reason, scientific analysis serves another
role in raising political debates to more reasoned levels of contention.
[4] Role of scientific analysis in promoting maturity in argumentation:
With experience in the introduction and use of scientific analysis in policy
formulation, sophistication in the analyses themselves is also growing. For
example, early analyses in the context of hazards of nuclear plant melt-
downs or other possible manifestations of advanced technology were often
either "Valium reports" based on probability of accident estimates lower
than normal life risks, or "Doomsday reports" ignoring probability of
occurrence and focusing instead on worst case scenarios. Proper treat-
ment of very low probability events with catastrophic costs is still not well
formulated (cf. Kunreuther 1980). Yet experience with blatantly one-sided
analyses, and with more objective analyses which attempts to synthesize
information from each side, helps, but does not ensure, proper reaction
to such biased analyses and thus maturity in subsequent analytical sup-
port of argumentation.
Attending and adapting to the realities of goals, decisionmaking
processes, and roles of analysis in management and policy formulation
are some ways in which scientific analysis, including management sci-
ence, can develop improvements in its approach and applicability. The
context of science management has been shown as a rich empirical base
illustrating these realities in a visible and discernible manner and offering
a wide variety of problem contexts for testing alternative analytical for-
mulations that reflect realities more accurately. Additionally. trends in
the problems and issues of science management point toward directions
for useful methodological advances in scientific analysis and encourage
their development. In the next part, these trends are described and
related to emerging and still needed developments in management sci-
ence.
Part III
ENCOURAGING CURRENT TRENDS
IN MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
RM-77-2
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
An Introduction
M.A. Keyzer
January 1977
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con-
ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute or of the National Member Organizations supporting the
Institute.
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INTRODUCTION TO PART ill
Acceptance of the need to reconceptualize management science for-
mulations to conform to problem realities is a necessary step in the
further development of management science. It is in this step that sci-
ence management is exceptional as a problem context for management
scientists to address and to use in developing new formulations. To sci-
ence managers, goal ambiguities, performance unmeasureabilities, con-
siderable use of intuition, and the complex, dynamic, and interpersonal
nature of decisionmaking are long accepted facts of life. To a large
extent, the recognition of these realities is what may have prevented
traditional management science formulations from appearing as relevant
to science management. Where better to turn. then, for learning how
decisions are made in the face of these acknowledged realities than to
science management as a problem context.
Secondly, science management focuses both on the individual scien-
tist; his characteristics, motivations. and behaviors, as well as on the
organizational. political. and social systems in which and for which sci-
ence efforts are directed. In addressing needed developments in manage-
ment science formulations. Dror (1971,p.51) calls for a merging of the
management sciences with the behavioral sciences partly in recognition
of the differences between traditional management science approaches
and the realities of decisionmaking discussed earlier. Science manage-
ment is a context well suited for incorporation of behavioral aspects;
indeed, much of the literature in research management is based on
empirical findings concerning behavioral phenomenon.
1 See for example the excellent text Scientists in Orgcmizations: Productive Climates for
Research and Development (Pelz and Andrews 1976).
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Thirdly, certain of the problems and issues of science management
listed earlier in Tables 2 and 3 relate directly to current trends in analyti-
cal formulations emerging in the management sciences. Addressing these
science management issues may then aid in the developments of the
emergent analytical trends. In the following section, these trends and
related science management problems and issues are discussed.
Trends in management science reflect some, but not most, of the
realities of goals, decisionmaking processes, and roles of analysis
described previously. In some cases, these trends represent a positive
adaptation to realities and a corresponding broadening of perspective
and scope of potential contribution. In other cases, they represent an
enlightened retreat in expectations associated with manag2ment science
applications and a restatement of appropriate aspirations. Table 9 indi-
cates some of the trends in management science formulations. Most are
highly interrelated and are various manifestations of a few basic shifts in
focus discussed in the following chapters. .
2The retreat in expectations refers to changes away from an orientation of management sci-
ences focused on providing answers or solutions to problems, and toward an orientation
focused on increasing understanding and insight, sharpening intuition and judgment, and
gaining familiarity with the complexities of real problems (cf. Tomlinson 1979 and Quade and
Miser 1960). In all fairness, I should add that the authors named above and others (Charles
Hitch, Alec Lee, Alain Enthoven, and Gene Fisher to name a few) have insisted all alo!18 on the
latter orientation, despite the more enthusiastic advocates of management science in their
wake, and the vail of higher mathematics and optimization routines prevalent in today's
management science journals.
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Table 9
Recent Trends in
Management Science Formulationsa
Earlier Theoretical Focus
and Analytical Formulations
(circa 1940's through 1960's)
Economic considerations
of efficiency or effectiveness
are paramount
Emphasis on quantification
of analysis for specific issues
Focus on "best" or optimal
solutions (via maximization
or optimization approaches)
Emphasis on solutions
analytically derived from
well-defined problem
formulations
Emphasis on hard models
(in the style of the
physical sciences)
Focus on prescription
(from a theoretical
framework)
Current Theoretical Focus
and Analytical Formulations
Focus on broader social
goals as context for
economic considerationsb
Emphasis on systems-behavior
and interactions among issue sC
Emphasis on "what if" questions
and adoption of contingency
or situational approaches
Focus on postulated systems
with no analytical solutions
Adoption of soft model
elements (incorporating
behavioral and attitudinal
aspects of the social sciences)
Focus on description
(from an empirical base
of case studies and
social science findings)b
aThis list is neither exhaustive nor are the bifurcations into earlier and current focus as
sharp as implied. The intent of the table is simply to provide an overview of some of the high-
ly related trends in focus evident in management science literature, often as a response to
failures in the earlier mode. The table continues on the following page.
bEach of these the trends marked with superscript b (representing changes in the concepts
of, or importance of, efficiency and effectiveness, rationality. and prescription) refiects an
alteration !:rom the traditional assumptions underlying management science listed in
Chapter 1.
CManagement science in this paper includes a systems orientation as a fundamental concept.
This particular trend represents a recognition of the systemic interactions among the
economic, political, and social systems in which the systems addressed are embedded.
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Table 9 (cont.)
Earlier Theoretical Focus
and Analytical Formulations
Emphasis on substantive
rationality
(evaluation of
decision consequences)
Focus on the choice
situation: selecting
from among alternatives
Focus on deductive reasoning
(applying "laws" for stable
and well-regulated systems
to specific instances)
Focus on the individual
decisionmaker (or the
organizational unit as if
it were an individual)
Emphasis on multiple character
of objectives or criteria
Interaction with user limited
to early phases of needs
assessment and problem
formulation. and late
phases of implementation
Current Theoretical Focus
and Analytical Formulations
Emphasis on procedural
rationality
(evaluation of
decision processes)b
Additional focus on the
structures in which
decisions are made, and
post-decision problems
of implementation
Focus on inductive reasoning
(developing new alternatives,
new models, and new under-
standings for less stable,
less regulated systems)
Focus on larger and more
complex institutional forms
in which multiple decision
units are recognized
Toward frameworks of ｡ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｹ ｾ ｳ
for multiple decisionmakers
Emphasis on interaction with
user throughout entire
process
dThe word "toward" is significant. As yet, no frameworks reflecting realities of coalition, alli-
ance, and cooperative/competitive behaviors for n>2 persons exist. Game theory and oligo-
poly theory do not reflect or explain behavior well. Some progress toward multiple decision-
maker analysis is being made. however, as discussed later in the text.
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CHAPI'ER B
ADOPTION OF A BROADER AND
MORE SYSTEllIC PERSPECTIVE
In both the public and private sectors, experience with analysis using
traditional management science formulations has shown those formula-
tions to be too narrowly focused to capture all the important dimensions
of the problems or issues addressed, or not attentive to critical issues of
the larger systems in which the systems under study are embedded. For
example, in the public sector, Dobell (19BO,pp.12-14) argues, "The impor-
tance generally attached to economiC criteria in government decisions
has, in practical terms, declined substantially." Why? "First, broader
social goals increasingly dominate economic considerations, calling for
measures which protect people and enterprises from the misfortunes of
the market and even from the pressures for mobility, adjustment and
adaptation to which market signals might otherwise lead." In the face of
these broader social concerns, "representations based on the criterion of
economic efficiency are no longer very persuasive."
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Non- Economic Criteria
Experience with management science approaches as aids to
decisionmaking in hospitals, libraries, blood banks, and other public ser-
vice institutions has similarly argued for a broadening of measures, cri-
teria, and constraints beyond those of economic considerations. Though
no new frameworks or analytical procedures have stabilized in practice
for dealing with these broader perspectives, many current management
sciences approaches to public service problems are forced to deal with
them in one way or another (e.g. introducing additional variables
representing social concerns, performing impact analysis on various addi-
tional issues, or employing multi-objective decision frameworks).
In the private sector, the ,situation is similar, though perhaps even
more difficult because of the long history of profit maximizing formula-
tions. Empirical evidence for profit maXimizing behavior remains rare.
"Moreover, such empirical evidence as we do have on the decision-making
processes of business executives largely contradicts the hypothesis that
business firms behave explicitly as profit maximizers" (Simon 1980,p.74).
Partly as a consequence of this shift away from economic efficiency
or effectiveness as the one main criteria for choice, management science
has redirected itself toward examining the effects of a variety of system
changes on a wide range of system performance measures. Here, the
trend is away from maximization/ optimization frameworks and toward
sensitivity analyses, scenario writings, and contingent/situational solu-
tions. "Contingency theory is a reaction to the 'one best way' approach in
the 'it all depends' direction" (Kickert 1980,p.191). Why is this occurring?
First, conflicting values and consequently different weightings of impor-
tance of different objectives or criteria may defy an acceptable formula-
tion of an optimal solution. Secondly, conditions change; what may be
optimal at one time may be unpreferred at another. requiring a highly
adaptive approach instead. Thirdly, the complexities of real problems
may present numbers of alternatives far too many for assessment of
each, so that only heuristic-based rather than optimal choices are possi-
ble. Ignorance, exogenous influences, and unanticipated events may
further prevent optimal solutions from being specified. Accordingly,
management scientists have begun to shift from formulations focusing on
optimal solutions to frameworks in which system behavior can be better
understood and assessed within larger contextual concerns.
Scenario writings convey internally consistent portrayals of possible
futures, often. as is done in sensitivity analysis, to point OllS major
changes that may follow from critical choices or developments. Sensi-
tivity analysis is also neither used commonly for prediction nor optimality
(though it can help in the latter). Instead, it allows addressing the "what
if" questions. For example, what if an assumption is proved false, a
parameter is estimated differently, or the system structure is altered or
3The Global 2000 Report to the President (Barney 1980) is basically a scenario of the world
future 'UIlder the (relatively improbable) condition of no changes in U.S. policy. IIASA's Ener-
gy Study (Haefele 1981) provides two scenarios of world energy :futures, one in a high energy
consuming world and one in a low one. None of these scenarios are predictions. They do, how-
ever, help our 'UIlderstanding of the impact of system changes (or non-changes).
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represented in another way? Here, the focus is clearly on the system, its
behavior, and its performance along a wide range of dimensions, rather
than on any particular solution and its optimality.
A third, highly related trend in this regard, is in the examination of
issues in interaction with each other rather than in isolation. Traditional
management science formulations tend to focus on specific issues, such
as inventory management, production scheduling, and facility siting. A
more common approach in contemporary applications is a systems per-
spective allowing a ｢ｲｯ｡､･ｾ view of what issues are related or more suited
to the problem addressed.
Critical questions encountered in this emerging shift in management
science toward adopting a broader, more systemic perspective are given
below:
(a) If economic considerations of efficiency and effectiveness fail to cap-
ture broader social concerns, what kinds 01 criteria seem to appear
as important in a wide variety of settings and in relation to broad
social contexts, and how are these criteria measured and incor-
porated within decisionmaking processes?
(b) What are the socio-economic-political conditwns in which certain
broad criteria seem to be more important than others? How can
these contingencies be modeled?
(c) What is the role 01 individual perception and evaluation in the
assessment of choices with respect to various broad social criteria
(as in risk assessment)?
(d) What analytical Jrameworks seem best suited to these broad social
issues and the relations among them, and how can these frameworks
be strengthened?
Relevant Examples in Science Management
Science management problems and issues provide a rich and
relevant context for addressing these critical questions. For example:
o Concern in science management has always been in support oj
broader non- science objectives 01 the host organization or govern-
ment
In both the management of research and the setting of science policy, a
major focus of activity is on meeting or contributing to the objectives of
the sponsoring organization and of society (Dean and Goldhar 1980,p.l
and White 1975,p.4). For research management, two factors make this
process of science in support of non-science objectives highly
4For example, Dror (1971,p.13) indicated, "...by taking a broader systems view, we can often
reformulate tile decision problem in a way permitting better solutions. Thus, instead of ask-
ing ourselves how to improve peak-hour transportation, we may reformulate tile question to
how to reduce peak-hour traffic demand - which may brin8 up for consideration completely
different alternatives (e.g., staggering work hours, changing physical planning to have people
live nearer their place of work, or encouraging shopping by mail or through wired-
television) ."
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problematic. The first is the multiplicative and confusing nature of goals
associated with the R&D function. The second is the highly uncertain con-
nection between R&D activity and the goals assigned to it. Radnor and
Rich (1980,p.122) describe four highly interactive aspects of R&D goals
which together give rise to their multiplicative and confusing nature: (1)
variations in goal sources, including sources internal and external to the
R&D activity, to the host organization, and to the sponsorship; (2) varia-
tions in goal content, pertaining to product, process, service, policy, etc.;
(3) variation in the process of goal determination, regarding how goals
are set and changed and what negotiations are included: and (4) varia-
tions in the target for R&D results, including the type of impact sought on
other functions, on policymakers, on ultimate users, and the various
evaluation criteria used in judging R&D performance. Specific goals for
R&D thus result from contextual determinants within which the R&D
activity is embedded.
In this regard, Radnor and R,ich argue that questions of "how" to
motivate R&D personnel (for which there is much knowledge available)
are useful only in connection with "for what" R&D activity is to be
motivated, and the conditions under which it is to take place. Few authors
discuss the question of "for what" in terms of direct economic considera-
tions. For example, in industrial R&D, the focus may be on improvements
in the marketing, production, service delivery, or planning functions.
In a purposive and contextual approach to R&D management (as
opposed to traditional context-free and goal-free internally focused stu-
dies of R&D organization design, information flow, and leadership), the
question of how R&D relates to ｾ ｭ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｶ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ in other functions is both
paramount and quite uncertain. Studies of economic returns to R&D are
not uncommon. The important point is that depending on the purpose and
context of R&D, economic considerations may be irrelevant. Actual pur-
poses may have more to do with building growth capacity, market share,
quality improvements, or SUrvivability of the host organization.
In the arena of science policy, the "for what" and the "how does R&D
relate" questions are even more apparent. In modern societies, the
advancement of science and technology for its own sake is not well sup-
ported. On the contrary, industrialized nations are increasingly question-
ing whether they really desire the benefits of science in light of its per-
ceived costs, and whether or not there are alternative ways to science for
meeting national objectives. These issues arise most often in the annual
development of science budgets in the federal government. Table 10 sum-
marizes the issues of "for what" and "how does R&D relate" found in ana-
lyses of the U.S. federal budget for R&D for the years 1977 through 1979
(Shapley 1976, Shapley, Phillips, and Roback 1977, and Shapley and Phil-
lips 1978).
5For example, Radnor and Rich (1980,pp.119-120) state/'The returns [to R&D] are frequently
difficult to identify with any precision or confidence, especially given the longer time horizon
involved in the activity, as compared to the more immediate returns to be observed from
operational production and delivery (marketing functions). The literature has not been defin-
itive in demonstratin& the macro-economic benefits of R&D. Similarly, studies of its impact
on public policy-makers have produced quite equivocal results."
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Table 10
Problems and Issues of Science Policy.
in the Service of Non-Science Objectives
[1] Are the nature and importance of the external objectives (external
to science development) of federally supported R&D understood and
properly assessed? Are science supported objectives of high prior-
ity?
[2] How does science help? Are the relations of federally supported R&D
to the external objectives understood and properly assessed. includ-
ing the questions of:
(a) The potential contributions of the R&D to the specific external
objectives:
(b) The potential for side-benefits and spin-offs;
(c) The relevance and assessment of national interest criteria
(defense, international policy. national prestige, long-term
economic growth, etc.);
(d) The availability and merits of alternative non-R&D approaches
to the same external objectives.
[3] Whose assessments are to be used for [1] and [2] (the relevant R&D
agency. prospective users or beneficiaries. or a third party such as
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the U.S.)?
[4] What roles are to be taken by government as opposed to private
industry in R&D for external objectives?
(a) What factors will govern the degree to which industry will
invest in R&D?
(b) If current restraints that inhibit R&D and innovation were
removed or mitigated. would industry actually perform
more R&D than projected? Would more innovation be
introduced?
[5] What is the relation of the use of science (and technology advance) in
support of external objectives and in the generation of negative
side-effects in the social fabric of society (e.g. in the centralization of
social control, alienation, changes in values. effect on the environ-
ment. and threats to world survival)?
•Most questions in this table are taken directly from the texts of Shapley et.al. 1977 pp.35-38
and 1978 pp.66-83. --
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Questions of how R&D relates to these objectives are basically
unanswered. Shapley and Phillips (1976, Chapter 4) review the literature
on How Does R&D Help the Economy. and come to the following methodo·
logical conclusions:
Economists trying to measure how and how much R&D helps
the economy have not come to clear conclusions ... Neverthe-
less, oversimplified models of basic research, and R&D in gen-
eral, as causes of advances in economic welfare are pervasive
in current discussions of R&D policy. (pp.72-75)
The fact seems to be that conceptuaL modelling, and data lim-
itations have prevented the development of a generally
accepted way to measure the economic benefits of federal
support of R&D. (p.78)
The reasons:
First, the horrendous complexity of the problem. Secondly,
the absence of an adequate theoretical structure which
reflects the realities of the present U.S. economy and the ways
in which technological changes affect it. Third. the difficulty or
impossibility of getting the data needed - accurate data,
current data, and data that are disaggregated in ways needed
for meaningful analysis. Fourth, the conceptual and practical
problems of finding ways to measure outputs of R&D other
than by cost or other inputs. (pp.78-79)
In science policy problems, how science advances relate to the gen-
eration of negative side effects is orten seen to be as important as how
science advances relate to meeting national objectives. In this regard, the
broader. more systemic perspective is focused on the social and political
impact of science advances as indicated in Table 10 item 5. Associated
criticisms of modern technology (and science as its major producer)
include the following:
technology tends to destroy human values; Le. technology imposes
demands inconsistent with individual preferences (and seen as infe-
rior to them);
technology alienates the individual; producing resentment of forces
beyond his comprehension and control;
technology thrives on a hedonism promoted by business for profit;
thus discouraging religion and undermining the viability of society;
technology is not "natural"; and interferes in the relation of man and
nature;
science is a limited and misused tool for understanding self and
environment; it describes reality only in terms of objects within a
time-space set (unlike religion or art); is an instrument of power; and
serves the self-interest of its institutional networks. (Raffaele 1978,
pp.77-89)
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The purpose of this section is to illustrate that science management is
already concerned with broad, systemic aspects. Interactions between
science advances and the economy, social change, and individual values
are critical issues demanding new analytical frameworks. The clarity and
Visibility of problems in science management in this regard make them
appear unique; yet they parallel problems of analysis in business and
other settings. The latter may simply be hidden by the history of
approaching them through the narrowly focused perspective of tradi-
tional management science frameworks.
o Oriteria. in science management have generally not focused on
economic considerations.
Criteria used in science management, both for evaluating alternative
actions or decisions and for evaluating alternative management systems,
focus only very little on economic considerations. For example, Table 11
illustrates non-economic criteria used (explicitly or implicitly) in project
selection decisions. Earlier in chapter 3, Table 5 lists criteria for judging
research management approaches to decisionmaking or problem solving.
Of the 18 criteria listed, only one pertains to fiscal considerations. Finally,
in the design, operation, and focus of the national science budget system,
most criteria are concerned with issues other than economics (Table 12).
These tables support the contemporary notions of goals held by
Simon. Cyert and March, and others, that organizations seek to satisfy a
whole set of objectives and considerations rather than optimize on any
one of them. Few of these goals may be economic in nature. This means
that frameworks for expressing the system effects and interactions indi-
cated in the tables cited need to be developed. as well as ways of relating
decision alternatives to them. So far, management science approaches to
project selection have addressed these system effects and considerations
only in simplistic schemes of subjective ratings (checklists, weighted rat-
ings. or delphi consensus).
o Individual perception and evaluation playa large part in the assess-
ment of alternatives along science management criteria.
The relation of specific decisions or actions by individuals, organizations,
or governments to broad social concerns is largely perceptuaL Even in
retrospect, it is extremely difficult to assess their influences. To a large
extent, these influences are perceived differently, evaluated differently,
and provoke different responses among various groups and interested
parties.
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Table 11
Non-Economic Criteria in •
R&D Project Selection Decisions
Importance of the Project
[1] Importance to the R&D organization or its sponsor of the problem or
opportunity addressed by the project
[2] Importance of the anticipated project results to the resolution of the
problem addressed or to being able to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity encountered
[3] Importance of the project to maintaining organizational expertise in
the area of the project; to maintaining the reputation of the organi-
zation; to maintaining cooperative ties with other institutions: and to
attracting additional support to the organization
Probability of Technical Success
[1] Relative to the state-of-the-art of technical knowledge
[2] Relative to the state-of-the-art of supporting knowledge
[3] Availability of required manpower, technical resources, and funds all
within the project schedule
[4] Existence of a detailed technical plan
[5] Length of project duration as planned relative to time available
Probability of Utilization
[1] Relevance to host organization goals
[2] Ease of understanding by prospective users
[3] Ease of implementation
[4] Compatibility with existing norms, past experience, and procedures
and facilities available to users
[5] Accessibility of research results or products to potential users
[6] Observability or demonstratability of usefulness
[7] Trialability on a small scale before major or irreversible commit-
ments must be made
[8] Credibility of anticipated findings
[9] Relative advantages over existing products or practices
•Many different criteria and systems of criteria are found in organizations throughout the
R&D commWlities in different CO"UIltries. Most of the ones listed here are taken directly from
Cardus et.al. (1980) as illustrative of those found in government R&D settings.
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Table 11 (cont.)
[10] Patentability of anticipated results
[11] Potential sales of anticipated products resulting from successful pro-
duct development. or market share from product introduction
(items 10 and 11 are particular to profit oriented R&D)
•Fit Within the Project Portfolio
[1] Fit of time demands on resources and equipment; dovetailing of
research results from other projects
[2] Support for other projects and support by other projects
[3] Effect on geographic distribution of total project budget, or distribu-
tion among R&D units
[4] Balance achieved or distorted with regard to sponsor interests and
multiple R&D objectives
•Compatibility fit rather than economic fit.
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Table 12
Non-Economic Criteria in •
Science Policy Formulation
Criteria Related to the Fit of the National Science Budget System Within
the National Government
[1] The federal R&D budget decision system must function within the
framework of the overall political system of the country (Le. within
the normal processes of planning and coordinating among com-
ponent political structures)
[2] R&D budgeting must also fit into the overall pattern of the federal
budget process
Criteria Related to the Operation of the National Science Budget System
[1] The system should be designed to minimize "single point failures"
from a bad decision at any level (through suitable provision for con-
sultation and review - in both Eastern and Western systems - and - in
Western systems - public appeals and debate)
[2] The system should provide for a relatively quick reaction capability
in restructuring budget allocations
[3] The system should avoid the misuse of plausible decision criteria
such as relevance tests, cost-benefit analysis, or marketplace tests
of value, in contexts where these tests are not applicable or where
the underlying assumptions of the tests are not valid
Criteria Related to the Context of the R&D Programs
[1] The system must give visibility to future implications of current
budget decisions (Which restrict response to unanticipated future
events) and provide capability for timely control of major R&D com-
mitments
[2] The system for R&D budget decisions should give appropriate con-
sideration to the broader implications of the R&D programs (implica-
tions for the national economy, national security, international
cooperation, international competition in science and technology,
and other national non-science objectives)
•These sets of criteria are derived from the textual material of Shapley et.al.(1976, 1977, and
1978)
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Table 12 (cont.)
Criteria Related to the Current and Future Productivity of the National
Science Community
[1] Both the science budget system and the science policy formulation
process should encourage the development and maintenance of a
supportive science constituency among the population
[2] The science budget system and the decisions deriving from it should
reflect the need to preserve and enhance the nation's capabilities to
perform R&D (including the need to maintain effective institutions
and facilities for R&D both in and outside of government support)
and a continuing supply of well qualified scientific, technical. and
management personnel.
[3] The science budget system should provide incentives and rewards for
high quality work and creativity in R&D
For example, attitudes about the value of alternative energy sources, and
particularly about nuclear energy, are based on a wide variety of beliefs
about their likely effects and the nature of the risks involved. In a series
of reports based on interviews with members of the Austrian public, and
subsequent interviews with Austrian policymakers (Otway and Fishbein
1977 and Thomas et.al. 1980a and 1980b), attitudes for and against
nuclear energy were shown to be reflections of differences in strength
along 39 different belief dimensions. These include beliefs about the
economic benefits offered, the likely social changes resulting from adop-
tion of nuclear energy, the risks to the environment, and the nature of
associated hazards as being uncontrollable, a threat to mankind, arising
from a technology not well understood. and affecting large numbers of
people at the same time (categorized as psychological risks). The follow-
up study tested to see whether the beliefs of policymakers accurately
reflected public beliefs about nuclear energy, and whether policymakers
when asked to do so could accurately describe the public beliefs of both
those for and against nuclear energy. Conclusions were given as follows:
...the difference in overall attitudes between policymakers
and the public was primarily due to the fact that, for the pub-
lic, psychological risks were strongly associated with thE use
of nuclear energy, while environmental risks made only a
minimal positive contribution toward their attitude. A similar
analysis of the policy makers' own personal responses showed
that here psychological risks were associated only to a small
extent with the use of nuclear energy, whereas environmental
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issues were perceived as a substantially positive aspect. (Tho-
mas et.al. 1980b,p.23)
Could the policymakers reproduce accurately the general attitudes held
by the portion of the public in favor of nuclear energy and the portion
against it when asked to do so? Generally, yes, with the exception of a
tendency to overestimate the positive attitudes of the group in favor of
nuclear energy, and a tendency to underestimate the influence of per-
ceived psychological risks:
The accuracy of the policy makers' perceptions was somewhat
diminished, however, by their failure to recognize the extent
to which issues of psychological significance contributed nega-
tively to the public's attitudes, irrespective of whether they
were in favor or or against the use of nuclear energy. The pol-
icy makers underestimated the public's negative evaluation of
psychological risks and they also underestimated the public's
belief that the use of nuclear energy would lead to such risks.
(Thomas eLal. 1980b, pp.24)
Evaluations of risk may be based on belief structures such as these,
on comparisorn to accustomed hazards, or in relation to an array of con-
sideratiorn such as whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, of
immediate effect or delayed, with no alternatives available or many,
encountered occupationally or not, or with reversible cornequences or
irreversible ones. In science policy (including technology adoption), these
evaluations are often critical. In U.S. cities, for example, public referen-
dum has been used to decide the issue of public water flouridation, and in
Austria, the first nuclear power plant, a 730 Megawatt facility at Zwenter-
dorf near Vienna remains unoperational as a result of a November 1978
public referendum.
Here are cases that typify the power of broad social concerns in
deciding matters of policy, and that explore ways to measure aspects of
those concerns and examine differences in public and policy settings.
Practitioners of traditional management science frameworks pay no
attention to them, except in indicating that policymakers must take
them into account in addition to the solutions or choices resulting from
their own analyses. Current approaches in management science may
attempt to address them by incorporating representative dimensions in a
multi-dimernional objective function approach. Alternatively, by examin-
ing both decision processes in science policy and studies such as the ones
given above with respect to risk-related beliefs, these broad social con-
cerns may be more appropriately integrated into a framework for
descriptive analyses of how these kinds of issues are resolved in practice.
o Science policy questions are basically "what if' questions rather
than those suited to optimization frameworks.
Earlier chapters presented many reasons why science management has
resisted the traditional management science frameworks of optimality. In
both research management and science policy formulation, substantial
focus is on the design and functioning of the relevant systems, and on the
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anticipated effects on system performance of changes in resource input,
interactions, knowledge gains, and demands for contributions to non-
science objectives. These are basically "what-if" questions, and usually
are made with respect to incremental changes, such as changes in fund-
ing, project portfolio, and estimations of probability of success for various
program components. No where is the what-if nature of questions so clear
as in considering alternative budget levels for individual major R&D pro-
grams, or for the overall R&D effort. Shapley et.al. (1977, p.94) list the
folloWing general questions associated with U.S. federal budgeting for
R&D:
If the R&D budget were at one level rather than another, or
oriented toward certain non-science objectives rather than others,
what would be the implications Jar:
(1) the goals and objectives of the R&D programs?
(2) the goals and objectives the R&D program is intended to
serve?
(3) the achievement of science and technology?
(4) the national economy?
(5) the position of the country in the world vis a vis national
security, competitive position in world trade, international
cooperation in science, and international competition in
science?
(6) the institutions that perform R&D including universities,
national laboratories and other government R&D installa-
tions, contract research centers and nonprofit institutions,
and industry R&D?
(7) the future capabilities of the country in science and tech-
nology?
In this what-if framework, two characteristics of the decisionmaking pro-
cess emerge as critical. First, the decisionmaking system for budget set-
ting in practice is based on incrementalism and the cumulative history
and consequences of previous incremental decisions, rather than on any
overall planned budget configuration. This does not mean that planned
incremental changes (5-year and lO-year plans) are not evident: only that
de novo plans are not. Secondly, advocacy rather than rationality is the
dominant decision process in practice. Arguments are based on answers
to these what-if questions simply because there exists no way of rationally
deducing any single best budget configuration from scratch.
Furthermore, the influences of these argumentations on decisions
made (budget allocations) are documented in the Congressional Record,
in committee hearings, and in committee reports. This is important in at
least two ways. First, the science management context may provide gui-
dance to management scientists of crucial what-if questions about system
behavior and performance. The empirical record in science may show,
for example, relations between contextual conditions and the prevailing
balance between concern for system resilience, sustainability, or stabil-
ity, and concern for meeting relatively short-term or medium-term per-
formance objectives. Or, the record may show that in certain conditions,
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what-if questions about system structure (e.g. what if the government
were to encourage a more active role by industry in R&D through tax
incentives?) may dominate argumentation rather than questions about
the annual setting of system parameters (e.g. what if the federal budget
for R&D were increased/decreased by a certain amount?). Secondly.
current trends in management employment of decision support systems
and structured information systems aimed at providing capability for
what-if analysis represent a focusing on improved decision inputs and not
on a descriptive or prescriptive decision process. How the improved deci-
sion inputs are used in the making of decisions is still a matter of interest
to management scientists. The documented cases of budget setting and
other decisions in science management (siting of hazardous facilities. use
of nuclear energy, setting of standards and enactment of regulations)
may provide both insights and an empirical base for development of new
models of decisionmaking incorporating the incremental and advocacy
aspects of argumentation based on what-if
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CHAPfER 9
SYSTEMS FOR WHICH ANALYTICAL SOLUTIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE
Traditional management science approaches employ frameworks for
which solutions can be analytically derived (e.g. the linear programming
framework has a solution found by the simplex method; maximization
frameworks may be solved using principles of calculus). More contem-
porary management science applications have found these frameworks
for which solutions can be analytically derived deficient in being able to
capture the richness of problem characteristics. As a result, current
management science is increasingly employing systems formulations,
"soft system" modeling, and heuristic-based models. Actually, these are
all quite different developments, though one is tempted to lump them all
together into a general loosening of rigor in favor of apparent relevance
to realities. Such interpretation is qUite incorrect, and this brief section
will attempt to sort out what these developments are.
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Simula.ted. Systems Behavior
The shilt from a predominant reliance on analytically derived solu-
tions to the investigation of systems for which there are no "solutions"
but only system behaviors and multiple measures of performance is
perhaps the most fundamental shift. In the typology of management sci-
ence approaches of Table 1, this reflects an increased concentration of
the use of simulation models to understand system dynamics and to test
sensitivity to changes, as opposed to finding optimal solutions.
This systems orientation represents recognition of the realities of
complexity in real problems, including the importance of side effects,
interactions among system components, interest in multiple performance
criteria, and effects of exogenous influences and unanticipated shocks.
Simulation models do not necessarily imply any softening of science or
explicit introductions of uncertainties. Environmental systems, ecological
systems, climatic systems, and materials flow systems may be modeled
with the same scientific rigor as found in the physical sciences elsewhere.
However, related to this shift in focus toward systems analysis are
methodological adjustments reflecting the soft character of many of the
systems addressed. These adjustments represent a qualitative change in
the reliability and verifiability with which representational systems can
be developed. This does not necessarily follow from the introduction of
the vagaries of human behavior, but from problems of data, theory, and
experimentation, found in physical as well as social systems. Beck
(1981,p.234) defines "hard systems" as those in which "experiments can
easily be conducted to identify the behavior of such systems, and a priori
theory is capable of predicting accurately what the nature of that
behavior should be." In contrast, "soft systems" are ones for which "a
priori theory is strongly colored by the opinions of the analyst, existing
theory is unlikely to lead to accurate prediction of future behavior, and
planned experiments with the system are particularly difficult, if not
impossible, to implement." Though Beck was concerned with physicaL
environmental systems (water quality - ecological systems), his charac-
teristics of soft systems certainly apply to economic systems, energy
demand systems, food and agricultural systems, regional development
systems, health care systems, urban dynamics systems, and others.
Methodological adjustments to soft systems include incorporation of
uncertainty, attention to model structure design (model calibration
becomes not simply a problem of parameter estimation based on field
data; data must first be used in calibrating system structure), and con-
sideration of alternative theories or model frameworks to represent sys-
tem behavior (e.g. in economic systems one can use either input/output
analysis or econometric frameworks).
The third related development began with the introduction of
behavioral science Ipolitical science variables and postulated relation-
ships into management science formulations representing the soft social
systems of business and government. "Models turned softer as a higher
percentage of effects were attributed to behavioral factors" (Starr
1974,p.78). Additionally, models based on heuristics (rules of thumb)
rather than tested scientific findings, and adjusted by Bayesian statistical
treatments allowing management participation in the setting of
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probability estimates, became commonplace. Increasingly, management
science frameworks focused on decision situations in which behavioral,
attitudinaL and interorganizational interactive elements were addressed,
though crudely. "Thus, over time management science has become less
similar to physical sciences roles and more similar to social science"
(Starr 1974,p.86). Still, the modeling of behavioral and political processes
leaves much to be desired.
Two critical questions are often encountered in this second shift in
management science toward soft systems modeling, especially for sys-
tems involving human behavior and attitudes, perceptions, and varying
degrees of knowledge in the making of decisions:
(a) What empirical bases are there for developing descriptive models of
decision behavior under uncertainty? What heuristics or decision
procedures are used in different situations? What are the conse-
quences for system performance?
(b) What kinds of models can be developed to represent systems of pro-
gressingly decreasing uncertainty (learning systems)?
Relevant Science Management Examples
Here again, science management processes provide a rich source of
behaviors of individuals and systems for use in developing improved
model frameworks. For example:
o Science management decisionmaking incorporates a variety of
behaviors in the face of uncertainty;
o Science management provides cases of explicit estimation of proba-
bilities through integration of multiple subjective judgments; and
o Integral to science management is the implicit incorporation of
Bayesian type adjustments on the basis of new information.
All three of these characteristics identify science management as the
management of exploring and learning systems in the face of uncertainty.
Cancer research, for example, is abundant, but whether cures for cancers
can be found is uncertain. Research for development of new methodolo-
gies or for confirming or rejecting abstract hypotheses embark in the
face of uncertainty regarding whether they will be successful in accom-
plishing their aims. Yet behind these and most other kinds of science ini-
tiatives are a host of procedures and mechanisms through which subjec-
tive judgments of technical quality, problem relevance, and probability of
success are widely solicited, compared, and revised on the basIs of incom-
plete and often preliminary information about previous work, work-in-
progress, related work elsewhere, and the general reputation of the inves-
tigators contributing to the effort. As a response to the general uncer-
tainty inherent in science, managers of science often make use of
mechanisms both for the solicitation of judgment and input from
throughout the scientific community. and for group assessments and
recommendations based on collective judgment as a basis for decision-
making. These mechanisms include peer reviews and mail reviews both
for input (quality assessments) and for decision recommendations (on
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project funding); assessment workshops; consultant meetings; delphi-type
procedures for coalescing around probability estimates or likely conse-
quences; annual reviews for updating estimates of the probability of pro-
ject success based on progress-to-date and annual funding patterns to
allow changes in support on the basis of those reviews; and pilot projects,
multiple-path approaches, and the funding of duplicative programs to
increase the chance of success somewhere among the efforts.
These science systems are purposely redundant, search oriented,
collectively guided, and attuned to new information and knowledge gains
from throughout disparate fields of endeavor. Though some literature
exists about the nature of such learning or inquiring systems
(cf.Churchman 1971). few decision models if any simulate their behavior
or internal processes. Yet models of this nature may reflect more accu-
rately the realities of decision systems in business and government than
do those of traditional decision analysis. New model frameworks and
analytical formulations recognizing and incorporating these features may
lead to greater understanding of real decision processes and improve-
ments in both descriptive and prescriptive analysis. Science management
offers a wide variety of case examples of such systems, many of which are
well documented with respect to the procedures they use.
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CHAPrER 10
FROM SUBSTANTIVE RATIONAlJTY TO PROCEDURAL RATIONAIJTY,
PRESCRIPrION TO DESCRIPTION, AND
DEDUCTIVE REASONING TO INDUCTIVE REASONING
Fundamentals of management science listed ip. Chapter 1 include
rationality as a basic assumption. The rationality assumed in traditional
management science formulations is the rationality of utility maximiza-
tion. Simon and others have indicated that experiments conducted to
confirm empirically behavior according to this rationality have failed. "A
fair summary of the findings of these experiments is that actual human
choices depart radically from those implied by the axioms [of subjective
expected utility theory] except in the simplest and most transparent
situations" (Simon 1980,p.75). As a result. Simon poses a different kind of
rationality. called procedural or bounded rationality. to better explain
behavior observed. The difference is clarified in the following definitions.
"Behavior is substantively rational when it is appropriate to the achieve-
ment of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and con-
straints." In the classical economic goal of utility maximization, there is
usually only one correct substantively rational solution. In contrast.
"Behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate
deliberation" (Simon 1976,pp.130-131). Appropriate deliberation is
related to the thinking process of reasoning and recognizes "...man as an
organism of limited computational ability and possessing limited informa-
tion and limited imagination. seeking to survive in a world rich in com-
plexity" (Simon 1980. p.75).
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Assessing the New Trends
Real world complexities and uncertainties combine with human limi-
tations in information processing capacity to favor a procedurally
rational approach to problem solving over the search for a substantively
rational one. Procedurally rational behaviors indicated by Simon include
using target values to reflect satisfactory levels of goal achievement
(satisficing); means-ends analysis to guide search for appropriate actions;
experience to identify important problem features; and intelligence
activities, buffers, and diversification strategies to reduce harmful effects
of uncertainty.
Not everybody finds this trend toward procedurally rational
approaches acceptable. Dobell (1980,p.15) cites Gordon's review in The
Journa.l oj Politica.l Economy contrasting procedural principles of ethics
(good actions emerge from proper procedures) with the consequential
principle (an act is good which yields good consequences independently
demonstrated to be so), and arguing that "end-state" tests for desirable
outcomes are unavoidable even if it is not clear what tests are appropri-
ate. But as Dobell remarks, "Gordon is swimming against the tide."
Closely linked with the emergence of procedural rationality as an
approach increasingly used in management science is a shift away from
prescription and toward description. Moreover, authors of management
science literature have great difficulties in sorting out the role of descrip-
tive analysis in the formulation of prescriptive statements, and even in
the nature of prescription within a scientific approach. For example.
Kickert (1980, pp.255-257) argues, "Science serves to formulate explana-
tory theories on empirical reality. Consequently, methodology of science
is restricted to the procedure of obtaining explanatory theories. In other
words, there is no explicit methodology of prescriptive science." Kickert
views classical organization science as an example wherein theories do
not arise out of empirical reality but are only tested against it. "From
'practical experience' with organizations, prescriptive statements are
derived that should be applied to solve practical problems. In extreme
form these prescriptions are given without any underlying empirical con-
firmation. In still more extreme form almost universal validity is more-
over attributed to these statements. Apparently. this has little to do with
science, not withstanding the fact that the proposed prescriptions might
appear to be very practical, useful and effective."
Changes in approach from prescription to description and substan-
tive rationality to procedural rationality are both recent and pervasive.
Dobell (1980,p.14) comments, "In public administration, the literature of
the sixties filled with formulae, matrices, and algorithms describing how
complex decisions should be made in government, has given way to the
literature of the seventies, describing how decisions are made." Part of
this change is an emergence from naivete, especially in regard to the
recognition that managers and government officials have goals of their
own that they pursue not necessarily identical or even consistent with the
professed objectives of the institutions within which they make decisions.
Accordingly, Dobell characterizes this change as one from "normative
optimism" to "descriptive pessimism" and refers to " ... the burgeoning
literature insisting that the process of policy decisions in governments is
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so bound up in games and bureaucratic tangles that economic rationality
is a fool's dream." But if the descriptive and procedural approaches have
represented a retreat from analytically derived optimal solutions as one
set of guides to problem solving. they have also created other guides.
Associated with the descriptive and procedural approaches is an
orientation toward inductive rather than deductive thinking. Deductive
thinking is predominant in the application of postulated laws to specific
instances. In the management sciences, these laws are actually the laws
of calculus or computational analysis. Inductive reasoning uses available
facts to develop new forms of model frameworks. or new alternatives to
consider. Commenting on the change in emphasis in management science
from deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning, Starr (1974. p.79) indi-
cates. "The creative ability of the model builder is less mathematical and
more architectural." Actually, this shift in orientation may be the most
fruitful for management science as a practical aid to decisionmaking.
Increasing the ability or even the tendency to think up new alternatives
may be a far more important practical contribution than increasing the
ability to find a "best" alternative among a given set.
Further improvements in descriptive decision models, in understand-
ing rational procedures and their impacts. and in creating new model
frameworks may build on answers to the following critical questions:
(a) How do decisionmaking procedures evolve? How do constraints and
their systemic natures affect their development and performance?
(b) What mechanisms are used for new alternative generation? Can
these mechanisms be modeled?
In these regards. the study of science management has much to offer.
Potential Case Studies i:n Science Management
o Science management offers a variety of decisionmaking procedures
i:n a variety Of settings far investigating both general and specifiC
features of decision systems and their relevance to other non-
science contexts.
o Often i:n contexts of science management are discernible histories of
the evolution of the decisionmaking systems and of the conditions
shaping those evolutions.
Perhaps the greatest aid to understanding how a management or
decisionmaking system works or why it is structured as it is and employs
the procedures that it does. is knowing about the history of challenges,
responses, and adaptations occurring during its development. Decision
systems, especially those in large organizations, rarely spring full blown
and stable (unless they are direct imitations of systems elsewhere) and
usually carry with them procedures and heuristics which were adopted
over the years in response to crises and criticisms particular to the
organization. Most of the management science theory focused on describ-
ing the structure and functioning of decision systems (Cyert and March
1963, March and Simon 1964. Lindblom 1959) tend to take a snap-shot
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approach of the management system and observe its simulated behavior
in response to environmental inputs over time. Some theorists provide
hypotheses of how certain subsystems or heuristics develop in decision
systems (Thompson 1967) but do ｮ ｯ ｾ attempt to simulate an evolution of
the whole decision system structure.
Models and analytical frameworks used in the field of self-organizing
systems (Allen et.al.1981, Haken 1978, and Beer 1966) may be applicable
in modeling the evolution of complex management systems, though no
one has yet made the attempt to do so. Such exercises may help under-
stand why decision procedures and common targets of attention have
developed as they have. Certainly, a basic requirement for the modeling
of deciSIon system evolution is a rich base of empirical data encompass-
ing both a wide variety of decision systems and a wide variety of environ-
ments associated with their respective histories. Secondly, these data
must be accessible; and thirdly, the systems themselves should be rela-
tively simple or discernible so that modeling efforts can focus more easily
on alternative perspectives and frameworks without getting mired in
complexity. In these regards, science management offers many case his-
tory evolutions of research management systems (Table 13).
o Science management offers a wide range of strategies and pro-
cedures for developing new alternatives as well as for choosing
among them.
Traditional management science frameworks have focused on ways for
selecting among alternative choices (narrOWing the options to be con-
sidered by decisionmakers): while current trends in management science
seem to be oriented in part toward gaining understanding of system
behavior in order to develop new or improved alternatives (widening the
scope of perceived options). Accordingly. better understanding of
mechanisms used for generating new alternatives through analysis or
through search and scan procedures is needed to understand their opera-
tion and influence in decision systems. Some literature in management
science already exists in this regard. For example, Thietart and Vivas
(1981) describe the use of sales personnel for obtaining strategic infor-
mation on market changes and the activities of competing organizations
as input to research and new product development functions; and Wilen-
sky (1967) describes a variety of similar organizational intelligence
mechaniSms.
6Development hypotheses posed by Thompson (HI6?) include the following: Organizations: (1)
"seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical core with input and
output components" (p.20); (2) "seek to smooth out input and output transactions" (p,21);
(3) "seek to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes which cannot be buffered or lev-
eled" (p.21); (4) "The organization facing many constraints and unable to achieve power in
other sectors of its task environment will seex to enlarge the task environment" (p.37); (5)
"Organizations with capacity in excess of what the task If' "lvironment supports will seek to en-
large their domain" (p,46); (6) "The organization component facing a stable tasx environment
will rely on rules to achieve its adaptation to that environment" (p.71); and (7) "When the
r8!l&e of task-environment variations is large or unpredictable. the responsible organization-
al component must achieve the necessary adaptation by monitoring that environment and
planning responses, and this calls for localized units" (p.72).
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Table 13
Samples Histories of the Evolution
of Research Management Systems
Rand Corporation
Smith (1966) and Dickson (1971) provide detailed accounts of
the growth and development phases of Rand in its organizational
structure. management team structure, relation to sponsors,
and patterns of diversification in disciplines, areas of expertise,
and sources of income.
Research Services of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Numerous fascinating and published accounts exist of the four-
step evolution of attempts to manage research utilization by the
USDA.a This history of trail-and-error appears to be repeated'in
fields of national health and education as well.
U.S. National Institute of Education (NIE)
A recent and compelling account of the initial years of the NIE
(Sproull et.al.1976) describes the evolution of tactics. responses
to external demands and changes, and attempts at rational
decisionmaking by the early research management teams, espe-
cially with regard to the management of planning.
6rn brief, shortly after its inception in 1662, the USDA constructed Agricultural Extension
Stations throughout the country. These stations were to be responsible to the needs and
questions of farmers and were to promote the implementation of achievements from federal-
ly supported agricultural research. In practice, farmers simply did not interact with the sta-
tions as anticipated. Party, this was because they did not trust the federal experts; and part-
ly they were not willing to risk the use of their land on alleged improvements in seed or farm-
ing methods without proof of payoff. In any case, few major changes in the practice of agri-
culture resulted from the institution of experiment stations in the 1880's. The next step of
USDA was to adopt a strategy of sending people from the stations out to the farmers. Dis-
semination was still treated separately from R&D performance in research labs, but was now
a main focus of USDA manll8ement. Station personnel traveled throughout the country in
....histle-stop tours spreading the word on research findings and new farming methods
developed in the labs. The problem here was that farmers were unable to understand the ex-
perts of to translate what they had to say into meaningful changes for themselves. Also, they
....ere still reluctant to believe that results produced in the labs would also work on their own
lands. USDA again responded with a totally new approach, but one which again treated utili-
zation as a function managed separately. The new method of dissemination was based on a
flood of pa,mphlets and practitioner guides on how farmers could apply the results of R&D to
their own farms. Additionally, agricultural libraries and outposts were built to help distribu-
tion in massive programs of pamphlets, brochures. and guidebooks. Again. few major changes
in the agricultural practice occurred as a result. USDA's most recent and successful evolu-
tionary step involves the use of extension agents which couple utilization with R&D perfor-
mance. Extension agents work among agricultural researchers, and county agents work
among farmers and with extension agents to mobilize research efforts to specific farmer
needs and support experimentation directly on farmers' lands.
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Table 13 (cont.)
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the
East- West Center (EWC)
These are two academic, international, interdisciplinary, and
problem-oriented institutes. The first focuses on international
scientific collaboration between Soviet-bloc nations and western
nations. and the second focuses on scientific cooperation
between the U.S. and the nations of Asia and the Pacific.
Together they provide a wide range of (some) published and
(mostly) internal documents on the evolution of their respective
research management systems. Moreover, the many similarities
and differences of the two organizations help identify the advan-
tages and disadvantages of their respective management sys-
tems as they have evolved.
Bell Labsb
Reich (19BO) presents a concise account of the early years of
American Bell Telephone Company research based on a defen-
sive strategy of patent coverage and achievement of long-
distance telephony to protect a monopoly position in telephone
service (against competitors and radio transmission
approaches); then a strategy of expansion of research into non-
telephonic fields to promote technological innovations and lead-
ing to the incorporation of a separate Bell Labs. The influence of
specific research managers and of corporate objectives for
research is emphasized.
U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH); National Cancer Institute (NCI);
Office of Naval Research (ONR); Cooperative State Research Service of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); and other federal research
agencies
Brief histories of the evolution of many U.S. federal research
agencies and the research management systems they employ
are found in Wirt et.al. (1976). Each case also has extensive
literatures on their individual histories and management
procedures.c
bHistories of other industrial research labs are also published, for example see Kendall Bier's
Pioneering in Industrial Research: The Story of the General Electric Research Laboratory
ｾ ｗ ･ Ｎ ｳ ｨ ｩ ｮ ｧ ｴ ｯ ｮ D.C. 1957).
Wirt, Lieberman, and Levien (1976) actually cover rune U.S. federal research agencies in
their comparative study, including the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH); the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO); the NASA/Goddard Space
Flight Center, and the U.S. Arr Force. Brief historical material concerning the development
of the research management systems used. however. is included only for some of these.
- 111 -
Science management uses these and a variety of other mechanisms
for search and scanning of the environment. In non-profit R&D organiza-
tions, decision systems make extensive use of intelligence mechanisms
for finding out what research ideas and progress is being make
throughout the relevant scientific community. and for incorporating
these ideas into their own programs. These mechanisms include calls for
papers; science conferences; visits and short-term assignments of scien-
tific staff to other institutions (within the scientific community, in govern-
ment, in business, or in sponsoring organizations); professional journals,
newsletters, and annual meetings; advisory committees, liaison commit-
tees, and science boards; external reviews of draft publications; joint
sponsorship of meetings and workshops; and direct collaboration with
other institutions in a variety of manners. Profit oriented industrial R&D
organizations make use of many of the same mechanisms, plus formal
and informal interactions with marketing, production, and planning
departments in their host organizations.
This tremendous amount of input sources for decisionmaking on pro-
gram direction, project selection, staff hiring, and research focus pro-
vides a constant stream of potential alternatives for research managers
to consider. Some of these mechanisms reflect problem-initiated search
as discussed by Cyert and March (1963,pp.120-122); and others reflect the
mixed-scanning approach of Etzioni mentioned earlier. Responses of
decision systems to a strong flow of alternatives has not been the focus of
much analysis in modeling. In traditional frameworks, either alternatives
are fixed and given at the time of decisionmaking, or decisionmaking is
purposely postponed while search for new alternatives is initiated. The
exceptional work to the contrary is that of Cohen,March, and Olsen (1972)
in which streams of problems and solutions interact in a rather random
way. New model frameworks are needed incorporating this feature of
streams of input occurring both independently of and as a response to
decision input needs, and the responses of decision systems to them. The
many visible cases of such input streams in science management, as indi-
cated above, may provide a basis for beginning these modeling efforts.
RM-77-2
LINKING NATIONAL MODELS OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
An Introduction
M.A. Keyzer
January 1977
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being con-
ducted by the International Institt;te for Applied Systems Analysis,
and as such receive only limited scientifk review. Views or opin-
ions contained herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute or of the National Member Organizations supporting the
Institute.
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CHAPfER 11
FOCUSING ON LARGER AND MORE COMPLEX
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS
Applications of management science approaches to larger and more
complex institutional contexts are evident throughout both management
science literature and new literatures pertaining to planning and problem
solving within particular institutional contexts. For example, urban plan-
ning literature now includes an extensive body of management science
approaches and case applications in such areas as design of transporta-
tion networks, legislative redistricting, location of public facilities, urban
center planning, and establishment of garbage collection routes (cf. Igna-
zio and Gupta 1975, p.9 and Mesarovic and Reisman 1972). In many
respects, these applications are similar to earlier ones of inventory con-
trol and production scheduling for specific business managers or organi-
zational units in that they generally assume the framework of a single
decisionmaking entity maximizing some utility function or multi-attribute
objective function. At the sub-national regional leveL management sci-
ence analyses are more likely to recognize the conflicts among decision-
making entities (e.g. between cities and rural areas; among mUnicipalities
sharing a common facility yet benefiting unequally; and among economic
sectors within a region) and reformulate the structure of analysis to clar-
ify value differences and examine methods to ｾ ･ ｡ ｬ with them in ways
other than multiple-criteria decision frameworks.
7young et.al.(1980) address the regional-level problem of how to determine a "fair" or "just"
allocation of cost for a common water resource such as a multipurpose reservoir among par-
ticipating municipalities which vary in benefit from the resource, ability to pay, etc. They
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National and International Models
System models and simulations at the national level are fairly com-
mon today, though usually restricted to specific aspects. National models
of the economy are probably most common and are used to examine the
consequences of trends or alternative governmental economic policies on
the simulated national economy. National models of energy demand and
supply have also become widespread in response to concerns over foreign
dependence on oil. National models of food and agriculture sectors, forest
industry sectors. and others are also emerging. In these national models.
interactions among sectors and between nations is usually addressed in
forms of export/imports. movements of resources, and transfers of capi-
tal or finished goods, though without incorporating notions of overt com-
petition or cooperative behavior among disaggregated decisionmaking
units. other than that implied by normal market mechanisms (in Western
based models) and by the meeting of planned levels of production (in
Eastern based planned economy models). Here again, the purpose of the
models is to test potential government policies against a simulated
national system. or to examine the possible effects of major shocks or
discontinuities as in another abrupt rise in oil prices. a major drought. or
a critical loss or gain (through innovation or discovery) of capacity in pro-
duction.
In a few models of national systems. interactions between the
economic sector and the political sector are emphasized (cr. Frey 1978
and Ward and Cusack 1981). In these politico-economic models. a driving
force of model behavior is the desire of the government to remain in
power by maintaining a high popularity which in turn is a function of
economic variables such as inflation, unemployment. and growth in
disposable income. Economic conditions drive government policies which
effect economic conditions in a feedback loop constrained basically by
the inability of government to produce economic advances to match ris-
ing public expectations thereby producing reversals in government popu-
larity. These models are not simply fanciful or purely speculative; they
are structured on "empirically based behavior equations" relating popu-
larity as judged by public opinion polls and voting records with economic
variables such as growth in real disposable income and changes in the
rates of inflation and unemployment; and on changes in government poli-
cies such as changes in spending levels and in tax rates. as functions of
current popularity measured by polls and election returns (policies also
depend on exogenously introduced government ideology such as expan-
sionary or restrictive). Modelers of the GLOBUS model (Ward and Cusack
1981) include a domestic political-economic interactive system such as
the one described above and claim good success in historically predicting
support for the government as a function of gaps in public expectations
and actual performance along macroeconomic indicators.
compare seven different approaches in the project evaluation and game t2 .eory literature. in
terms of both advantages and disadvantages of each approach. For example. one method
they discuss is the separable costs - remaining benefits (SeRB) method actually used in the
U.S. and other countries for multipurpose reservoir projects. This method allocates certain
costs directly to each participating member lJIlit. and then divides the remainder on the
basis of some single numerical criterion such as use, population served, or level of benefit.
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Modeling at the international. or global. levels has also developed
rapidly in recent years. Table 14, taken from Guetzkow and Valadez (1981.
Table 9.1) lists a subset of these models, selected to indicate that at the
international level, a focus on the interaction among separate decision-
making entities (nations) again surfaces in many, but not all, model
frameworks. At the international level. modeled conflict often arises out
of competition for scarce resources and may escalate in action and reac-
tion spirals. Here again, the models involve feedback loops and empiri-
cally based relations among variables. For example, the GLOBUS model
recognizes that international relations between any two countries are
composed of a mixture of both competitive behaviors at different levels
(diplomatic conflicts involving disagreements on issues; serious disputes
involving threat of force; and use of force) and cooperative behaviors also
at different levels (normal cooperative actions in exchanges and joint
efforts; coalition behaviors; alliance behaviors; and foreign assistance).
Empirical data is abundant on all these levels and may be linked to both
domestic economic and political conditions and to situations of interna-
tional competition for scarce resources.
Additionally, global or international models based on linked systems
of national models (recognizing as in the regional level example earlier
the disaggregation of decisionmaking units) may help clarify the nature
of pervasive global problems such as famine in certain parts of the world
as a consequence of system interactions regarding w§rld markets and not
easily solvable through classical government actions.
Currently. management science approaches to the multi-actor deci-
sion situations inherent in large and complex institutional contexts is
basically limited to game-theoretic formulations and to multi-attribute
decision theory reoriented to fit a multi-actor framework (representing
multiple interests or values). Additionally. students of negotiation prac-
tices and principles are making significant contributions to multi-actor
de cisionmaking , though with little attention to the role or use of analysis.
These and other developments are described below.
BAn illustration of the systemic character of some world problems is given in a recent test
run on the IIASA linked system of national food and agricultural models. It was previously es-
timated that the undernourishment of the world's 460 million people in this condition could
be greatly reduced with the addition of only 30 million tons of wheat per year delivered to
those lJU!fering malnutrition In the test run, this amount was simply added to world markets
at no costs or production capacity utilization. Within a relatively brief period of simulated
time, the effect of the additional wheat on famine essentially disappeared, as price adjust-
ments in response to the added supply depressed wheat production and prices, shifted. use of
wheat from human consumption to animal feedstock for increased consumption of meat by
those who could afford it, and drove those originally in famine conditions back to them.
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Table 14
•International Interaction Models
Model Name Disciplines Central General Number of
Year.Author Used Concepts Format of Nations
Inter-Nation political war games, person- 5 to 9
Simulation science, international computer nations
[INS] 1956 and social politics game
Guetzkow, Noel psychology
International political national and person- 6 nations
Processes science international computer
Simulation politics, game
[IPS] 1967 economics,
Smoker military science
Project Link economics national and all computer 2 to 10
[LINK] 1968 international econometric nations per
Klein and economics, model region,
Hickman economic growth 25 regions
and stability
Simulated political goal and all computer 5 to 25
International science, budget based model nations
Processor economics decisionmaking ;
[SIPER] 1969 national and
Bremer international
political
(arms races)
and economic
(trace and aid)
processes
Nations-In- diplomatic military econometric 6 nations
Conflict history; conflict and model
[NIe] 1972 political violence
Choucrit science, behaviors,
and North economics alliances
and other
interactions
• •
Based on Table 9.1, pp.334-336 in Guetzkow and Valdez (1981) and limited to models of
multi-actor (nations) interactions.
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Table 14 (cont.)
Model Name Disciplines Central General Number of
Year, Author Used Concepts Format of Nations
Simulation diplomatic political, all compliter 7 actors
Model of history, economic, model
Political. political strategic
Economic, and science, interactions
Strategic calculus among
Interactions superpowers
[SIMPEST] 1974
Luterbaches,
Allen & Imhaff
World Politics diplomatic goals, all computer 10 nations
Simulations history, strategies, cybernetic
[WPS] 1975 political & foreign model
Bennett science, policy outputs
and Alker artificial in
intelligence cybernetic
configurations
Generating political government all computer 25 nations
Long-Term science decision- model
Options by (including making per
Using international domestic/
Simulation politics), international
[GLOBUS] 198.0 economics, political
Bremer et.al. sociology (including
military) and
economic
(including
trade and
monetary)
processes of
cooperation
and conflict
•The description of GLOBUS is not found in Guetzkow and Valdez (1981) Table 9.1 but is taken
from a separate unpublished addendum provided by Guetzkow and dated April 1981.
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Multi- Attribute Approaches to Multi- Actor Decisionmaki:ng
Whether multi-attribute decision theory can be used effectively in
either descriptive or prescriptive analyses of multi-actor decisionmaking
is still in contention. For over two decades. Arrow's (1951) famous "impos-
sibility theorem" diverted efforts away from attempts to construct aggre-
gate preference orderings or social welfare Junctions by combining indivi-
dual differences in utilities. More recently, Edwards (1977) suggests a
new role for multi-attribute utility theory in cases of multi-actor decision
situations, focusing on making eXPJicit the differences in values held by
the different decision participants. This approach does not lead to a par-
ticular solution. but prescribes a process in which information on differ-
ing underlying values are used as the basis for finding compromises or
alternative solutions. Peschel and Riedel (1977, pp.111-113) suggest an
alternative method in which two groups' or individuals' criterion vectors
are coordinated by a third party in an hierarchical system organized to
prevent contradictions among aims. Uses of third parties as arbitrators
or mediators is again discussed later under negotiation approaches. A
third model by Bauer and Wegener (1977, pp.362-363) combines objective
functions according to the principle of balancing the trade-off ratio
between each criterion with the ratio of values of decisionmakers on each
criterion.
None of these models represent an adequate basis for descriptive
analysis (since none are supported by evidence that group decisions are
actually made in these manners); nor for prescriptive analysis (for
choice, though Edward's model may help in formulating new options). In
effect, they are all perturbations of single decisionmaker frameworks
rather than wrmulations based specifically on group decision processes
or analyses. 1
Process Approaches to Multi- Actor Decisionmaking
A second related approach to multiple decisionmaker frameworks
particularly for descriptive analyses parallels the "organizational pro-
cess" approach of Allison described earlier. In it, the first step is the iden-
tification of participants in the decision process, often including (in policy
cases) government agencies, local citizen groups, interest groups, and
various factions within each of these. A second step is the identification of
the concerns, values. and objectives of each decision participant group
and an understanding of the way each group senses, interprets, and
processes information relating to the decision. Thirdly, analysts develop a
9Edwards (1977, p.249) argues, "Multiattribute utility measurement can spell out explicitly
what the values of each participant (decision maker, expert, pressure group, govemment,
and so on) are and show how and how much they differ - and, in the process, it can frequently
reduce the extent of such differences. The exploitation of this technique permits regulatory
or administrative agencies and other public decision-making organizations to shift their at-
tention from specific actions to the values these actions serve and to the decision-making
}lbechanisms that implement these values."
An excellent state-of-the-art survey on these and other multi-attribute decision models
and their applications is found in Hwang and Masud (1979). Major problems with models of
this kind are discussed in Cobb and Thrall (1981).
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framework (usually a flow diagram with feedback loops) illustrating how
the course of events and the nature of conflicts and options are influ-
enced by the dynamics of interaction among the groups, by differing
interpretations of fact and external and sometimes unanticipated events.
and by the development of new alternatives. Linnerooth (1980) uses this
approach to describe the decision process followed in the Oxnard, Califor-
nia liquid energy gas site denial case. Her methodology is then general-
ized in Kunreuther (1980). Braybrooke (1974) suggests an even more
extreme process approach in his conception of group decisionmaking
according to the "issue-machine approach." In this framework, decisions
evolve from distinguishable and successive "rounds," each round consist-
ing of phases of issue-circumscribing, proposal-initiating. interacting, and
decision-taking in which an authoritative decision is made or at least a
report completed on some of the issues addressed in the round. The
machine characterization of Braybrooke's model arises from his concep-
tualizing the processing of issues as would be done by computer-like pro-
grams which apply successive test questions to all policies proposed in
connection with an issue addressed, and then output either adopted poli-
cies which pass all the tests or dead issues. Braybrooke's issue-machines
are called. station-stable if the people or groups holding certain recog-
nized positions (as officials. or experts, or group spokesmen) operate
(apply their tests) in the same sequence in each successive round; and
program-stable if regardless of sequence the same reasons (test results)
count with the same weight for or against a proposal that is introduced.
The approach is used by Braybrooke to analyze the actual handling of
proposals related to reducing traffic congestion in London within the
period 1963-1968.
Process approaches such as these are inherently descriptive rather
than prescriptive. They serve to highlight the importance of dynamics,
changes in decision participants, effects of external events, interpreta-
tions and presentation of arguments. the sequence in which sub-issues
are addressed or tests applied, and the role of varying information pro-
cessing procedures used by different decision participants. In this
regard, they also serve to help understand and improve decision
processes both in avoiding stalemates and in identifying or developing
new options.
Game Theory Approaches to Multi- Actor Decisionmaki:n.g
The literature on game theory approaches to situations involving
multiple decisionmakers. especially with respect to decisions which are
economic in nature, is vast, based principatJr on utility theory, and rarely
ventures beyond a two-person situation. Game theory encompasses
both situations of conflict as zero-sum games, and situations of a
cooperative or mixed nature as non2zero-sum games. It is generallyprescriptive rather than descriptive l , and requires a powerful set of
llTwo outstandiIJ& texts in the field are John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press. ]944; and Thomas C.
ｾＲｨ･ｬｬｩｮｧＬ The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
According to Young (1975. p.37), game theory frameworks are basically static models in
that they focus on outcome rather than process. by being concerned with the ultimate divi-
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assumptions highly unlikely to be found in the real world. 13 Even with
these assumptions accepted, game theoretic models of interdependent
decisionmaking are not able to arrive at determinate solutions because
players may still find themselves in an "outguessing" regress (Young
1975, p.24).
Contributions from Negotiation Practice and PrincipLes
In contrast to the outcome oriented framework of game theory, and
related to the process approach described earlier, recent research in
negotiations attempt to find principles which help reformulate apparent
conflict situations into cooperative or mixed cooperative-competitive
ones and lay the groundwork for "side-by-side" rather than advocative
negotiation, or encourage joint problem-solving approaches to conflict
situations.
In analyzing cases of negotiation, especially with regard to the social
settings in which they are embedded, Strauss (1978) focuses on various
subprocesses of negotiation including making tradeoffs, obtaining kick-
backs, compromising toward the middle, and paying off debts, all influ-
enced by the negotiation context. This context includes (1) the number of
negotiators, their relative experience in negotiation, and whom they
represent; (2) whether the negotiations are one-shot, repeated, sequen-
tial, seriaL multiple, or linked; (3) the relative balance of power exhibited
by the respective parties; (4) the respective stakes in the negotiation suc-
cess; (5) the visibility of transactions during negotiations; (6) the number
and complexity of the issues involved; (7) the clarity of legitimacy boun-
daries of those issues; and (8) the options to avoiding or discontinuing
negotiation perceived as available (pp.237-238). Other analysts of negotia-
tions have focuses less on contextual conditions and more on processes
by which parties influence each other's expectations, assessments, and
behavior during the search for a negotiated settlement. These include
"cognitive models that purport to explain interaction in terms of the
sion of payoffs among players rather than with the sequence of actions and reactions through
which players arrive at that division. Even as prescriptive aids, game theory models have a
ｾｧｯｲ record as good predictors in empirical terms, even in carefully controlled experiments.
ｾ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｧ (197'7.p.23) summarizes these as follows: "Specifically, all game-theoretic models in-
corporate at least the following assumptions. First, both the number of players and their
identity are assumed to be fixed and known to everyone. Second, all the players are assumed
to be fully rational, and each player knows that the others are rational. Third, the payoff
function of each player is assumed to be fixed and known at the outset. This assumption sub-
sumes several subsidiary points. Each player's range of alternatives (or strategies) is fixed
and known. And under conditions of risk arising from natural (that is, inanimate) sources,
the results of each player's expected-utility calculations are fixed and known. It is this com-
plex of assumptions which makes it possible to specify the characteristic payoff matrixes of
game-theoretic models. Forth, the formal models of game theory restrict the role of com-
munication among the players in a highly stylized fashion. In particular, communication can
never affect either the form or the content of a game's payoff matrix once it is initially esta-
blished." Additionally, " ...in real-world situations, bargaining often involves lumpy or indivisi-
ble goods...in which one side or ther other gains sole possession of the good" (p.393) and
"...while most of the existing models deal with bargaining about a single, well-defined issue,
bargaining in real world situations often involve several distinct issues at the same time"
(P.394). Both situations cause severe difficulties for game theoretic frameworks.
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assumption that each party's actions depend on his perception about the
future results of those actions," "learning models in which it is assumed
that each party's actions are largely dependent on his experience of the
results of past actions by the two parties," and "reaction process models
in which a party's actions are assumed to be an almost automatic
response to his opponent's last action and to be based on the party's oWn
characteristics and propensities" (Gulliver 1979,p.49).
Gulliver's own model of negotiation sidesteps unprovable assump-
tions and focuses instead on "how and how far negotiators tolerate and
cope with unavoidable ignorance, how they assess and reassess expecta-
tions and preferences about quantifiable and nonquantifiable com-
ponents, and how in practice they make some kind of choice under risk
and uncertainty" (pp.46-47). His is a simultaneous two-process model
composed of a cyclical process of repetitive exchange of information, its
assessment, and the resulting adjustments of expectations and prefer-
ences; and a developmental process of overlapping phases toward a nego-
tiated outcome. The latter has eight phases such as formulation of an
agenda and working definitions of the issues in dispute, preliminary state-
ments of demands and offers, and narrowing of differences. In both
processes, learning and change are emphasized. Gulliver's conception of
negotiation illustrates this viewpoint:
Negotiations comprise a set of social processes leading to
interdependent, joint decision-making by the negotiators
through their dynamic interaction with one another. These
processes involve the exchange of information (and its mani-
pulation), which permits and compels learning by each party
about his opponent, about himself, and about their common
situation: that is, about their expectations, requirements,
strengths, and strategies. As a result of learning, there is
modification of expectations and requirements such that the
negotiators may shift their demands to some point at which
they can agree. Negotiators continue to exchange information
and to explore possibilities so long as they consider that they
may gain an outCome that is more advantageous than the
status quo. Negotiations are thus a dynamic process of
exploration in which change is intrinsic: changes in each
party's assessment of his requirements. in his expectations of
what is possible, preferable. and acceptable, and changes in
his understanding of the opponent's assessments and expecta-
tions. (p. xvii)
Changes in expectations, demands, positions, and strategies are also
emphasized in mediation and arbitration involving third parties. Fisher
(1978) presents a working guide for practitioners of international media-
tion in order to "loosen up a conflict situation" or move negotiations from
irreconcilable fixed positions to "new operating assumptions" about the
negotiation situation itself, including its goals, processes, and nature of
substantive options. All these negotiation models differ substantially from
the game theory formulations of fixed moves according to an advance
strategy, or the bargaining formulations of offers and counter-offers. In
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particular. the negotiation literature offers ideas relevant to understand-
ing the basically cooperative joint decisionmaking that occurs most often
in decision situations. Here, information is shared for the purpose of
achieving joint benefits and building effective relationships. Still, human
interaction in this regard. is not well understood.
Examples of Cooperative Group Decisionmaking in Science Management
Science management is usually non-authoritative and sensitive to the
concerns and judgments of interested parties. It seeks consensus across
many lines. and thrives usually on cooperative rather than competitive
behavior. It is in this last aspect that science management may provide
the greatest insights into the development of improved management sci-
ence frameworks for multi-actor decision analysis.
In the decision interactions of research managers, their key scien-
tific staff, liaison committee members. and host organization users, dif-
ferent perspectives certainly exist but the overall character of interac-
tion is generally cooperative and directed to the best interests of the R&D
organization. How these interactions differ from the more competitive or
advocative ones found in traditional case studies of group decision
processes or suggested by game-theoretic frameworks may help develop
new models of cooperative decisionmaking. Examples of cooperative
decisionmaking readily found in research management include situations
in which new programs are selected. collaborating institutions are
chosen, and research plans are formulated. In these situations. decision
participants contribute their respective expertise by providing new infor-
mation and offering assessments on proposals with ultimate payoff to all
dependent on the overall performance of the R&D organization within the
constraints and context created by their cooperative decisions. Models
based on processes with these characteristics may be more accurate
descriptors of actual situations found outside science management as
well and may help contribute to prescriptive aids for improved joint
decisionmaking in general.
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CONCLUSIONS: SCIENCE MANAGEMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
The central argument in this text is that research management and
science policy offer to management scientists application contexts that
provide clear exposure to the inherent difficulties. ambiguities. and
overly simplifying assumptions of present management science metho-
dologies and applications. and thus may serve as a base for developing
improvements in analytical frameworks. Previous chapters have focused
on realities of most application contexts and have shown how science
management offers an empirical base for hew descriptive modeling. In
this chapter. the focus is on the particular characteristics of science
management and their implications for new perspectives in analyses.
The Special Nature of Science Management
Earlier chapters describe the peculiar nature of science manage-
ment goals and decisionmaking realities. These characteristics pose
severe problems both in management and in analysis. Some of the more
difficult are summarized below:
(a) Challenges to Science Management
[1] Science Management is often characterized by decisionmaking under
a wide set of ambiguous unoperational goals and with decision conse-
quences either unmeasureable or of unknown probability.
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Faced with this perplexing situation, science managers find typical
management science methods of means-ends analysis, optimization.
and expected value computations both impossible and naive.
[2] Expectations for science are high.
Large expenditures for science activities are justified by past experi-
ence and hopes for future technological breakthroughs, cures, and
trend reversals (e.g. in reversing lagging industrial productivity or
military balance of power through sophisticated weaponry). Attain-
ment of science advances consistent with these high expectations is
uncertain at best, as is what process to follow to ensure a high proba-
bility of success.
[3] Traditional management methods employing bureaucratic authority,
hierarchical organizational structures, and career advancement and
institutional incentives are inappropriate in most science manage-
ment contexts.
Science managers seem to react to these challenges by behaving in ways
not too differently from those of managers in other settings, but with
some identifiable tendencies:
(b) Behaviors of Science Managers in the Face of These Challenges
[1] Science managers appear to focus their efforts not directly on insti-
tutional goal achievement so much as on general institutional
development .
The operational focus of concern in this regard is on (a) achieving
and maintaining a good institutional reputation for quality and
relevant work; (b) achieving a respectable rate of production of pub-
lications or patents; (c) responding quickly to changes in the science
environment and in the interests of sponsors; (d) achieving sustaina-
bility in funding, staffing, and program effort; and (e) providing an
occasional major piece of evidence of contribution toward to institu-
tional mandated goals.
[2] Science managers tend to employ defensive strategies (protecting
institutional integrity and comparative advantages) rather than
offensive ones (concentrating resources on major, novel programs of
uncertain success).
Ensuring patent coverage, using diversified project portfolios,
employing multiple methods and measures, and encouraging fre-
quent interactions throughout the relevant scientific communities
are strategies for protection from surprise and ignorance. Few sci-
ence organizations bet their existence on single-line research
approaches or on anyone big program. The uncertainties of science
prohibit it in most cases.
IThis and subsequent statements about behavior of science managers are based on personal
observations rather than on systematic collection of data.
- 125-
[3] Science managers appear sensitive to a multiple time frame. focus-
ing simultaneously on progressing through current program mile-
stones or phases. and on retaining some current resources for
opportunistic investment in unanticipated special projects.
[4] Science managers tend to create institutional mechanisms to help
prepare them for an uncertain future rather than for meeting a fore-
casted or most probable one.
Science managers rarely forecast the future state of knowledge in a
field. the specific interests of their sponsors, or the exact composi-
tion of their scientific staff beyond the next few years. Yet they must
continually adapt and respond to changes in these elements. espe-
cially to the occurrence or threat of major shocks or discontinuities
in them. To help them prepare for these occurrences. science
managers use liaison committees. advisory boards. visits. confer-
ences. professional meetings, and a host of other mechanisms to
ensure resiliency in the face of an uncertain future.
Trends and New Problems in Science Management
In addition to the challenges above and the behaviors of science
managers faced with these challenges are public concerns regarding sci-
ence and its effects on society. These concerns have produced a new set
of perspectives and criteria imposing further demands on science
management. Among them are:
[1] Growing demands for linking science policy. technology policy, and
industrial policy to other national social goals.
Science for its own sake is currently unfundable in most countries.
Yet almost nothing is known about how science contributes to social
and economic improvements except in hindsight and even then sub-
ject to widely diverse interpretation. Few models of interaction
between science and technology and their effects on society exist.
and the few notions that have surfaced (such as the theory of "spin-
offs" from science projects to commercial applications. or the
"trickle-down" of science benefits from large federal programs to the
community of independent scientists) have been largely discredited.
The belief in goal linkage is now one of the few arguments for federal
support of science that remains politically compelling (another is
international leadership in technology. especially for military
superiority) and yet little evidence or logic supports it.
[2] Public desire to improve and expand the processes of participation
and consensus in formulating science policy.
Incorporating different value perspectives. providing legitimacy '0
various interest groups. and ensuring public awareness of science
decisions of potential risk to the populace are substantial concerns
expressed in most western industrialized nations evident in court
hearings and media coverage. The substance in these cases varies
from nuclear energy to chemical waste disposal, atmospheric
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pollution. occupational hazards. depletion of the ozone layer, health
effects of dietary measures, and environmental effects of acid rain.
The issues are liability. regulation. citizen rights, perspectives in
making trade-ofts, and the proper role of government. At odds are
pressures for due process and pressures against bureaucratic delay.
values of technological progress and values of anti-technocracy,
national needs and local preferences, and requirements or
economies of scale for high technology enterprises and the involun-
tary risks they sometimes pose for the surrounding populace.
[3] Shifts away from economic analysis in evaluating science programs
or selecting science projects (if ever used in the first place)
The growing requirement to incorporate values. systems interac-
tions. and societal effects in evaluating science options. and the
failure of cost/benefit and other economic analyses to capture these
elements satisfactorily. has led to experimentation with a number of
new approaches to evaluation. These include scenario writing. gam-
ing frameworks, and process models. Unlike most prescriptive
economic approaches. these new frameworks serve to aid under-
standing of complex situations or underlying causes rather than pro-
vide direct decision recommendations.
[4] Trends toward an expanded science system perspective including
both federally supported science and privately supported science.
Particularly in the U.S .. there is a strong interest in providing incen-
tives for private industry to broaden its support of science and thus
allow a decreased dependency on federal support. The apparently
successful federal-private support model in Japan is portrayed often
as one model incorporating this broader perspective. In eastern
industrialized nations. central planning in science already includes
an integrated federal and local perspective. The general trend in the
direction of this increased systems perspective in science support is
strong, yet models or even gross understanding of integrated science
systems is severly lacking.
New Perspectives in AnrJ.lytical Frameworks
The challenges. concerns. and trends in science management and
the apparent responses of science managers to them offer new perspec-
tives for analytical frameworks more indicative of realities in science
management, and perhaps elsewhere, than is provided by traditional
management science approaches. Table 15 summarizes some of the
changes in frameworks they suggest. Together they pose a challenge and
a guidepost to theory development in management science.
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Table 15
New Perspectives in Analytical Frameworks
Suggested by Science Management
From frameworks oriented
toward goal attainment or
progress toward long-term
stated objectives
From time independent.
time value-discounted,
or equilibrium frameworks
From a multi-dimensional,
single-decisionrnaker
framework
From frameworks of
decisionmaking based
on facts
From frameworks of
analysis based on
rationality and logic
To frameworks focused on
developing viable, productive,
and resilient systems consistent
with stated objectives
To dynamic and transitional
(non steady-state) frameworks
To a multi-dimensional
multi-party cooperative decision
framework
To frameworks of
decisionmaking
incorporating values
To frameworks acknowledging
the craft aspects of analysis
Refocus on Objectives
"The age of decision is over; the era of implementation is passing; the
time to modify objectives has come." Wildavsky (1979,p.32) states the
above in describing a widespread retreat from objectives prevalent in U.S.
public agencies in health, crime, and education, and in response to the
failures of those agencies to achieve the objectives set for them. The
failures were predetermined according to Wildavsky as the objectives,
while politically attractive and forged in a time of social service optimism.
were beyond the capacity of government to achieve. The current institu-
tional response Wildavsky observes is the displacement of goals from
external effects on people (rehabilitation of criminals, health improve-
ments in local populations, increases in cognitive achievement by stu-
dents) to internal organizational processes (equaliZing access to social
services or funds spent per person, or responses given).
Since organizations wish to be regarded as successful, they try
to replace objectives whose achievement depends on variables
either unknown or outside of their control with objectives than
can be attained by manipulating the instruments that those
groups do control. (p.3B)
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Science organizations follow these tendencies routinely. Rather than
face the impossible task of measuring achievement of unoperational
goals. science managers focus on productivity, reputation, ability to
respond to external changes, and on operating in a manner consistent
with their organization's unique nature or comparative advantage. Suc-
cess is equated with achievements in these controllable measures. This
does not make science organizations goal-free; the goals of their man-
dates are treated instead as constraints in that the substance and pro-
cess of work must remain consistent with them.
This suggests that for descriptive modeling, the objectives to be built
within a framework for analysis are those inferred from behavior rather
than those taken from the institutional mandate at face value. Identifica-
tion of operational objectives thus becomes a central component of deci-
sion analysis. Such a behaviorist approach may not be appealing to many,
yet it reflects a definite trend in management science today towards
decision aids (decision support systems) and understanding (system
models. simulations. and scenarios) rather than prescriptive approaches.
These are all oriented to helping managers do what they do rather than
prescribing what they should do.
Systems in Transition
Most economic theory treats equilibrium conditions as basic and
non-equilibrium conditions as perturbations to be reduced in a return to
the steady-state. In contrast, social organizations are constantly in tran-
sition. Science organizations in particular are charged with creating
change in their own state of knowledge and in accelerating the dynamics
of their environment through innovation and discovery. For these situa-
tions, new frameworks for the analysis of developing or transitioning sys- .
terns are needed. The literature on self-organizing systems cited earlier
provides one example of systems analysis focused on transitions from one
state to another and the role of perturbations and fluctuations in system
evolution. As of yet. these developments have not been incorporated in
management science frameworks. Most management science applica-
tions are still oriented to identifying the be st or optimal future state or
option. Learning how to improve in getting from one state to another may
be equally beneficial.
Value-Laden. Multi-Party, Cooperative Decisionmaking
Chapter 11 described various approaches toward analytical frame-
works of this type currently found in the literature. None yet provide
either accurate descriptions or forecasts of behavior. or prescriptions of
high credibility. Furthermore, multi-part frameworks rarely focus on
cooperative rather than conflict situetions, though the former may be
more common in practice.
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Craft Aspects of Analysis
Chapter 1 defined management science as the application of the
scientific method to problems of management. The succeeding chapters
illustrated the variety of ways in which the practice of the scientific
method is itself a craft. Formulating the problem, selecting simplifying
assumptions consistent with a framework for analysis, selecting the kinds
of data to examine, and many other steps of model development, testing,
and experimenting, are activities of analysis requiring knowledge, skilL
and a commitment to excellence on the part of the analyst if the analysis
is to be of high quality. Like other crafts, these arise from talent, train-
ing, and experience. The subsequent calculations that follow precisely
defined and proven mathematical relations should not obscure the craft
aspects of the preliminary steps or of the interpretation and application
of results. Especially for systems involving human behavior, scientific
analysis cannot expect to provide conclusions, only conjectures; not fore-
casts, only possible outcomes; not credible prescriptions, only aids to
understanding. In the perspective of the practice of the scientific method
as a craft, management science is educative, not only about the sub-
stance addressed but also about limits to understanding and the useful-
ness of the tools employed.
Lessons from Science Management
Three themes run throughout this text: First, that management sci-
ence has not made many inroads in science management, partly for rea-
sons related to the particular characteristics of science management.
Second, that realities of problems and decisionmaking behavior in sci-
ence management as well as in most problem contexts are poorly
reflected in contemporary management science frameworks. And third,
that by addressing the particular context of science management,
management scientists may gain insights for the development of
improved analytical frameworks. Additionally, the behaviors of science
managers in facing their own perplexing problem situations provide valu-
able lessons for management scientists. These are lessons of humility, of
looking beyond quantification for analytical assistance, and of providing
safeguards for excellence.
Humility
[1] "First, many analyses are plainly not wanted" (or sought by decision-
makers)
[2] "Second, many arialyses are failing to meet the legitimate needs of
the policymakers of the broader requirement of the society."
[3] "Third, analysis can be viewed as little more than politics with an
'objective' veneer."
[4] "It is not clear that analysis 'helps.' In the really difficult policy prob-
lems, even the best analysts can arrive at contrary positions and, by
implication, policy recommendations."
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[5] "Most decisions are made by common sense, 'ordinary knowledge'
with little formal analysis."
[6] "Analysis cannot eliminate judgments about uncertainties and
values."
[7] "Poor analysis may be worse than none."
[8] "Analysis can be used and misused in the adversarial process."
However:
[9] "Analysis can help with incremental choices."
[10] "Analysis can generate creative alternatives."
[11] "Analysis can raise the level of discourse.,,2
Science managers. and some business managers according to a recent
McKinsey survey of well managed U.S. business companies (Peters 1980).
avoid analyzing issues to death and avoid complicated procedures for
developing new ideas. Analysis may not yet be in general disrepute, but
neither is it without skeptics. Historically, the expectations of manage-
ment science practitioners for acceptance of their results and even for
their ability to provide significant assistance has been overly high. SCl--
ence managers are generally highly sensitive to the uncertainties sur-
rounding'their work and to their own limitations to guide others to effec-
tive action. Their perspective is one for management scientists to emu-
late.
Looking Beyond Quantification
In applying the scientific method, management scientists seem to
have grasped onto quantification and the exotic mathematical manipula-
tions possible with quantified data as the hallmark of their approach. The
criticisms of Chapter 3 indicate that this heavy reliance on quantification
has led management science away from salient aspects of problems and
decision processes at a high cost of loss of relevancy. credibility, and use-
fulness. Because of the particular nature of science management. science
managers have developed methods and processes of analysis and
decisionmaking which rely less on quantified data and more on the pool-
ing of knowledge and judgment from a wide variety of sources. Modeling
these processes may suggest alternative strategies for management sci-
ence development.
2Statements such as these are found throughout the policy science and management science
literature. In this particule.:r set, [1] through [4] are from deLeon (1981.pp.3-4). and [5]
through [11] are from Raiffa (1981. Transparency 5).
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Providing Safeguards for Excellence
Majone (1980) presents two different arguments for the need to
develop standards or safeguards for analysis:
[1] "If it is no longer possible to believe in the objective validity of the
conclusions of an analytic study. and if even the criteria of success of
the decision it supports are ambiguous, then evaluation by results
becomes meaningless, and must be replaced by such process-
oriented criteria as internal consistency and professional (or even
political) consensus" (p.39)
[2] "...many policy studies in fields like energy, risk assessment, or edu-
cation are 'designed to influence congressional debates and to affect
the climate of public opinion, not guide decisions within individual
corporations.' The effectiveness of such analysis can only be meas-
ured in terms of their impact on the ongoing policy debate: their
success in clarifying issues, in introducing new concepts and
viewpoints, even in modifying people's perceptions of the problem.
Here analysis is no longer separable from social interaction as a
problem-solving device, but becomes an integral part of the process
by which public issues are raised, debated, and resolved." (p.42)
Science managers rely primarily on peer review of their published works
and third-party analysis of their patentable ideas as safeguards for excel-
lence. In the latter case, the two main parties are the scientists creating
the ideas and the company divisions interested in patent exploitation;
third-party analysts are patent attorneys and others judging the useful-
ness, requirements, and novelty of the ideas. For most management sci-
ence studies, however, outside or third-party reviews are rare. Green-
berger (1980) indicates why:
Modelers mostly build and run their own models: that is where
the credits lie. Very few modelers run and analyze the other
fellow's model in any systematic way... Modelers are synthesiz-
ers and refiners more than analyzers, particularly analyzers of
other modeler's models. When possible at all, such secondary
analysis is too difficult and unrewarding an activity to gen-
erate much interest. As a result, the inner workings of a policy
model are seldom understood by anyone but the builders of
the model (and not always by them). This is a weak foundation
for gaining the reliance and trust of policymakers. (p.93)
The safeguard Greenberger proposes is the development of institutions or
groups of analysts for model analysis. Their work would be directed
toward "making sensitivity studies, identifying critical points, probing
questionable assumptions, tracing policy conclusions, comprehending the
effects of simulated policy changes, and simplifying complex models
without distorting their key behavioral characteristics." Two such institu-
tions already exist in the U.S.: The Model Assessment Group at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute 30f Technology and the Energy Modeling Forum at
Stanford University. Their work and the growing research on model
3See Sweeney and Weyant (1979) for a more complete description of the Energy Modeling
Forum than is provided in Greenberger (1980).
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validation at IIASA and elsewhere is indicative of the efforts of self-
criticism. and the willingness of some management scientists to expose
their analyses and models to external evaluation by peers, that may pro-
vide some safeguards for preserving excellence in the development of
management science theory and practice.
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